Kontent News

My take on the commodity supercycle zeitgeist...and the rise of the precious metals, uranium and alternate energy. Get ready for peak everything, the repricing of the planet and "black swans" all over the place..

Thursday, November 29, 2007

M&S pyjamas' silver lining helps stop MRSA

Pyjamas that have been designed to protect hospital patients from the MRSA superbug have gone on sale in Marks & Spencer.

The £45 garment has silver thread woven into it, which tests show can reduce the spread of infections. The ongoing clinical trial's interim results are positive

M&S is selling the "Sleepsafe" pyjamas, below, at 100 stores as part of a trial.

Silver-laced nightwear has been tested in a handful of hospitals, but M&S has become the first retailer in Britain to stock the pyjamas.

They are only available for men at present and come in three colours - teal, navy and burgundy. A spokesman for M&S said: "They are produced using a fabric which has two per cent silver woven into it. Silver is know for its infection fighting properties and has previously been used by the military.

"The fabric that the pyjamas are made of has been clinically proven to reduce the risk of MRSA by killing bacteria that come into contact with the fabric. Clinical trials are currently ongoing and are three quarters of the way through. The interim results were positive."
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Katherine Murphy, from the Patients' Association, said: "We welcome the fact these are going on sale, but it shows how desperate the public is."

Dr Mark Enright, a microbiologist at Imperial College London, said that the pyjamas would reduce the risk of a patient getting a skin infection that could infect a wound.

However, Tony Kitchen, of MRSA Support, said: "It sounds like a gimmick - it cannot be a super suit and probably doesn't make a jot of difference.

"The problem lies within the hospitals. They are dirty and it should not be up to the public to safeguard themselves, it's the ethos of the hospital that needs to change.

"We've had troops who manage in the Gulf but end up contracting diseases back in British hospitals. If it's possible to keep that clean in the desert why can't we do it in a hospital?"

Pam Milward, 73, who went into hospital in Redditch, Worcs, three years ago with a rash and ended up unconscious and paralysed for a month after contracting the superbug, said: "If they work then it's a good idea but at £45 they are very expensive for pyjamas."

spirals of death

Close observers of the US housing finance disaster in recent months will have noted a curious phenomenon. Companies such as Countrywide that were in late August regarded as rock solid have recently passed clearly into the danger zone while those like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that were regarded as potential market saviors have come under a cloud. In Britain Northern Rock, whose September bailout was said to be modest, involving little risk to the taxpayer has now turned into an immense 25 billion pound ($51 billion) potential black hole – real money even in the US economy let alone in the much smaller British one. This illustrates a deeply troubling quality of the largest downturns: the tendency for the free market to turn into a death spiral, in which even sound well-run institutions are engulfed.

Death spirals are fairly rare in financial history. The Wall Street Crash of 1929 was perhaps the most virulent example. After the first downturn, the market recovered for several months. Then the collapse of the Bank of the United States in December 1930, together with the further economic damage from the Smoot-Hawley Tariff caused a further collapse in confidence and activity that was concentrated in the banking sector, as relatively solid institutions followed the Bank of the United States into bankruptcy. The Federal Reserve failed to correct for the money supply contraction caused by the bank bankruptcies, leading the US economy further into the pit. The additional shove given by President Herbert Hoover’s 1932 tax increase was almost unnecessary; only the confidence brought by a new president (albeit with equally counterproductive economic policies) brought recovery from 1933. By the time the spiral was over, more than one fourth of the banks in the United States had gone bankrupt and the stock market had bottomed out at one tenth of its peak.

A second death spiral, with somewhat less dire economic consequences, occurred in Britain in 1973-74. Edward Heath’s government had removed the quantitative controls on bank lending in 1971, which resulted in an orgy of high risk lending against real estate, very similar to the recent episode in the US except that most of the loans were made against commercial real estate rather than housing. When the first major real estate lender, London and County Bank, collapsed in November 1973 another more conservative house, First National Finance (FNFC), was used as the epicenter of the “lifeboat” rescue organized by the Bank of England. However, the decline in confidence and real estate values quickly sucked FNFC into the maelstrom.

The lifeboat rescue fund grew larger and larger for more than a year as the stock market declined to record low levels, 70% below its 1972 high. Homebuilders such as Northern Developments, in no way involved in the original crash but dependent on bank lending, were dragged down. So were the two most important entrepreneurial finance houses, both internationally diversified and neither significantly involved in commercial real estate lending – Jessel Securities, founded by Oliver Jessel and Slater Walker, founded by Jim Slater.

Neither Jessel nor Slater had been aggressively run – indeed Jim Slater had begun de-leveraging a year before the crash, as he saw trouble coming – and no wrongdoing was proved against the head of either organization, yet by the end of 1975 both very substantial companies had gone bankrupt and neither founder played a significant further role in the British financial sector. This was a great pity: in losing Jessel and Slater Britain had lost not only their very able founders but the most aggressive entrepreneurial teams in the City of London, who might have been best able to compete against the foreign invasion when Britain deregulated the financial services sector in 1986.

The British experience of 1973-74 seems more like the current position in the United States. National policy is currently reasonably neutral, so far avoiding the twin dangers of protectionism and tax increases which caused the medium sized downturn of 1929-30 to turn into the Great Depression. The problem is concentrated in the property sector. However there are already worrying signs that the magic alchemy of modern finance, though such mechanisms as securitization vehicles whose funding falls apart and complex derivative securities that prove to be unsalable in a crisis, is causing the problem to metastasize. In the consumer sector, GMAC has reported problems with its automobile loan portfolio, while it appears that credit card debt quality is rapidly deteriorating. In the corporate loan sector, loans to aggressive leveraged buyouts have got in trouble, and loans to hedge funds and private equity funds have been sharply cut back. (The latter effect can be seen in the movement of the yen/dollar exchange rate from 120 to 108, as the hedge funds’ ”carry trade” positions have been de-leveraged.)

The “death spiral” characteristics of the current market are pretty clear. If Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s original estimate of subprime loan losses of $50-100 billion had been anywhere close to accurate, there would have been no problem. The market deals with difficulties of that size all the time, without significant effect on surrounding sectors. A few fringe operators go bankrupt, a few large houses show unexpected losses, and the overall market continues without a tremor. The collapse of the Amaranth hedge fund in September 2006 or that of Refco a year earlier were substantial events, causing losses to a number of those institutions’ business partners, but there was no question of any general market disturbance.

When the subprime problem first emerged in February, it appeared that it would also be limited. A number of subprime lenders, relatively insignificant institutions, were forced to shut down. However the general market appeared unaffected; its view appeared to be that the problem was localized and should have no effect on the real economy, nor even any great effect on the broader housing finance market.

August’s widening in Libor spreads, at which banks lend money to each other, should have told us that this problem would be different, and altogether more important. If leading banks were unable to assess each other’s credit quality for short term transactions then something much more serious was wrong than the collapse of a modest fringe sector of the housing finance market. The Fed’s chosen solution, dropping interest rates and pumping more money into the system, did not address the real problem and was thus useless, as it has since proved. It has only postponed the denouement for a few months and stored up further trouble with inflation.

Two factors are at play here. The first is sheer size. If as now appears likely the eventual losses in the home mortgage market do not total only $100 billion, but a figure much closer to $1 trillion, then the subprime debacle becomes something much more than a localized meltdown. $1 trillion of losses is 7% of US Gross Domestic Product. The market cannot absorb losses of that size without some major institutional bankruptcies or a lengthy recession. The closest equivalent problem is the savings and loan collapse of 1989-92; that caused a major housing downturn but only a minor recession. However its cost (mostly borne by the US taxpayer) of $176 billion was about 3% of 1990 US GDP, only half the size of the likely current losses on mortgage loans.

The second is lack of transparency, and the blow to confidence that comes from the dawning suspicion that a large portion of the derivatives and securitization mechanisms designed in the last quarter century are faulty. The unluckily timed implementation for years beginning after November 15 of FAS Rule 157, requiring banks to divide their assets into three levels according to their degree of marketability, has thrown an unwelcome spotlight on the problem. If Level 3 assets can be valued only by reference to an internal valuation model, and have been allowed to accrue value in banks’ financial statements for a decade or more (enabling hefty bonuses to their progenitors) then how do we know they are really worth anything close to what the model says, and how do we go about realizing them, in a market where confidence has vanished?

To ask those questions is to answer them. Since every incentive led bank mathematicians to devise models that maximized the reported value of the bank’s holdings, and since little or no market existed by which those values could be checked, it is likely that today those assets’ book values are highly overstated. Moreover, even in banks where the mathematicians and their bosses were scrupulously, even impossibly disinterested and intelligent, there still remains the problem that those assets are worth far less in a downturn, because their illiquidity makes them intrinsically unattractive in a market where liquidity has become once more important. Anyone who has attempted to sell venture capital positions in a bear market can attest to how rapidly and completely the value of such assets can disappear. It is thus perfectly possible that the true realizable value of “Level 3” holdings in a bear market is no more than 10% of their book value.

This immediately demonstrates the problem. Goldman Sachs, generally regarded as insulated from the subprime mortgage problem, has $72 billion of Level 3 assets; its capital is only $36 billion. If anything like 90% of the Level 3 assets’ value has to be written off, Goldman Sachs is insolvent. They do not have the option of acting like Nomura Securities did recently, selling everything possible and writing the remainder down to zero, because they would be without capital. Instead they are likely to be dragged kicking and screaming, quarter by quarter, to a gradual writedown and sale of their Level 3 assets, with their true position remaining undisclosed and obfuscated by meaninglessly optimistic statements by top management. Only the bonuses will survive, paid in cash and draining liquidity from the struggling company.

That’s what a death spiral looks like. The US survived the Great Depression, eventually, and Britain survived the 1973-74 debacle. However the market recovered only after it had plumbed depths previously thought impossible, at which even the soundest investments were trading far below their true value. After normality returned, the financial services landscape was very different, with many large and apparently solid houses having disappeared, a generation of participants reduced to driving taxis or selling apples and a generation of investors scarred by their losses and unwilling to return to the market. Emergency infusions of money, from the Fed or the taxpayers, generally do no good, only postponing the denouement and delaying the arrival of truly bargain price levels.

Such spirals of death represent the final definitive triumph of the bears.

Regulatory Debauchery

Dazzling World of Derivatives (2006, FT-Prentice Hall).

Earlier versions of some parts of this article have appeared in Business Standard (India), www.businessspectator.com and www.minyanville.com

Lenin is said to have declared that the best way to destroy the capitalist system was to debauch the currency. Debauching the regulatory apparatus is a step along the same road.

Current problems in credit markets are attributable, in part, to failures on the part of central banks and regulators. The response to the credit crisis also contains fundamental deficiencies.

The “Greenspan” Put

Central bankers fueled the liquidity bubble through excessive monetary growth and low interest rates. The “Greenspan Put” repeatedly bailed out banks and investors from poor decisions or irrational exuberance underwriting excessive risk taking. Asset price bubbles rolled merrily along; waves of risk mis-pricing moving through different markets. The current credit crisis has its origins in the Federal Reserve’s interest rate cuts of the early 2000s that helped engineer the housing bubble. This enabled the markets and economy to recover from the Internet bubble.

Bank regulators have presided over substantive changes in financial institution balance sheets and risks. The balance sheet of large banks and investment banks now hold high levels of risky and illiquid assets, such as private-equity investments, bridge loans, hedge funds investments, distressed debt and exotic derivatives. Derivative transactions with and loans to hedge funds through their prime broking operations are substantial. Assets and exposures in “arbitrage” conduit vehicles, structured investment vehicles (“SIVs”) and hedge funds outside regulated bank balance sheets have increased. A recent OECD analysis[i] shows that while major banks have increased capital and reduced reliance on short-term funding the risks have increased faster.

Regulators have been uncritically accepting of financial innovation. The benefit of dispersion of risk through the final system has become the accepted orthodoxy. The risks of a diffuse, opaque, globally inter-linked, highly leveraged financial system have largely been ignored. Belatedly, in its 2007 annual report, the Bank of International Settlements (“BIS”) admitted that “our understanding of economic processes may be even less today than it was in the past”.

As recent events show the risk transfer is largely cosmetic. In excess of $300 billion of risk in the form of Asset backed Commercial paper (“ABS CP”) - short term IOUs secured against high grade (AAA/AA rated) securities including CDOs (“Collateralised Debt Obligations”) – has returned to bank balance sheets as ABS CP investors have gone on a buyer’s strike.

Financial institutions have already incurred losses of over US$ 50 billion. A substantial volume of assets is likely to return onto bank balance sheets as off-balance sheet structures and hedge funds are forced to sell. For examples, HSBC has announced that it will bring around US$ 45 billion of assets from two SIVs de facto back on balance sheet. The total amount that will be re-intermediated by banks may be in the range of US$ 1 to 2 trillion. Weaker banks have been forced to forage down the back of the sofa for any loose change to add to their dwindling liquidity to meet these commitments. This has led to sharp rises in inter-bank lending and borrowing rates as well as general shortage of funds, especially for riskier borrowers.

Mean reversion

Central banks have reverted to type in dealing with the crisis. There is no difference between a run on a bank and shutdown of access to funding from the capital markets. US mortgage lenders have faced old-fashioned runs. Northern Rock found itself requiring central bank support (in excess of £20 billion (US$ 40 billion)) as it was unable to raise required funding in money markets. The Chancellor of the UK Exchequer was forced to effectively guarantee the UK system of bank deposits to restore confidence Central banks, including the Fed and European Central Bank (“ECB”), have pumped money into the system in an effort to ease the liquidity crunch.

In further regulatory debauchery, the Fed recently allowed banks to pledge ABS CP as well as highly rated asset-backed securities, corporate bonds and mortgage-backed instruments as collateral for funding at the discount window. Funding has been extended from overnight to 30 days. Other central banks have followed suit.

Traditionally, only government securities are eligible for discounting. A fundamental principal of the discount window is that it is designed to provide short-term liquidity against instruments of unimpeachable credit quality. The regulatory spin is that this is “temporary” “in the light of market conditions” and “recognises innovation in the market”.

There are profound practical and policy issues in this development. What price will the central banks attribute to these riskier securities? What is the level of the advance that the central bank will offer and how will this be adjusted as market values of the underlying collateral changes? There are unconfirmed suggestions that the central banks are placing a value of 85% on AAA CDO securities. Given that there is significant uncertainty about the value of the security and even how they should be valued, the entry into this debate by central banks is curious.

There is also the question what happens if the bank cannot redeem the borrowing at the end of the 30 days and the value of the securities is below the level of the amount advance. This is precisely the problem confronting lenders who have lent against these securities. Central banks appear to have entered the field of prime broking, perhaps tempted by the profitability. In widening the eligible assets, central banks are effectively underwriting the credit risk and the liquidity of the financial system with public money.

The moves have also done little to ease liquidity or credit market concerns. Following the cut in the discount rate, four major US banks used the discount window: “to encourage its use by other financial institutions”. They did not need cash. It was a sign of strength. In the words of financial historian, Charles Geisst, it was : “like someone from the Upper East Side being seen in .. Wal-Mart”.

In other cases of “déjà vu all over again”, there have been suggestions that Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae step in to buy mortgages to support liquidity as they have done in past crisis. The two institutions have assets and guarantees of almost US$4.0 trillion supported by stockholders’ equity of around US$60 billion. Both entities have also reported recent losses and have been forced to raise capital. The scope for liquidity creation by this route is likely to be difficult.

Socialism for Wall Street

In good times, financial markets embrace Capitalism. In bad times, financial markets re-discover Socialism. Currently, the US Federal Reserve is engaged in a dangerous strategy to look after its Wall Street friends.

The Fed has cut the fed funds and discount rates. The markets cheered the Fed decision to cut rates in September and then again in October. “This is manna. I am blown away. These guys get it I could hug these guys. This is what we wanted.” Jim Cramer, CNBC's markets pundit, was at the forefront of the cheerleading. Since the Fed's interest rate cuts, equity markets have reached records levels and the junk debt has recovered modestly.

Relief has been short lived. In recent weeks, the differential between inter-bank rates and the central bank targeted rates has widened to levels not seen since August. This points to further potential cuts in both rates by the end of the year. Lower cuts are inconsistent with above target inflation levels resulting from high oil prices, higher food prices, increasing cost pressures in emerging economies such as China and the potential inflationary effect of a weaker US dollar.

The US central bank’s strategy is clear. The current credit problems require a substantial reduction in the level of borrowings and leverage in the global financial system. Asset prices ramped up by excessive debt need to adjust. The adjustment can take place via a “crash”. This would be de-stabilizing and would wreak further havoc on already weakened banks. Alternatively, the de-leveraging and price adjustment can be achieved by creating inflation through loose monetary policy. If asset prices remain at current levels, higher inflation allows values to fall in real terms. Higher inflation also reduces the value of the borrowings that must be paid back allowing the required reduction in leverage.

Between January 1960 and December 1974, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was substantially unchanged. This is despite significant periodic rallies during the “go-go years”. If inflation averaged 5% pa, then the value of the market (ignoring dividends) lost around half (50%) of its value in real (inflation adjusted) terms.

The Fed strategy also assists affected banks. The large writedowns in risky assets and the expected re-intermediation of assets means that some banks need large infusions of capital. Given recent performance and subdued profit outlook, it would be difficult for them to raise this capital at acceptable prices.

Lower short-term interest rates allow banks to borrow cheaply. The money can be used to purchase government bonds that provide higher returns than the cost of borrowing. This generates profits for the bank without the banks having to hold capital against their assets (banks generally are not required to hold capital against government securities). The profits help re-capitalize the bank. An added benefit is that the US government can fund its deficit by selling its debt to the banks. This would be handy if foreign demand for US Treasuries decreases in response to the weaker dollar.

In the 1980s, US manufacturers looked to Japan as the source of ideas to improve efficiency. Remember “Just-in-Time” manufacturing, “zero defect” etc. Now, it seems US regulators are borrowing ideas from their Japanese colleagues. The Bank of Japan used the same strategy to re-capitalize the loss making Japanese banks after the collapse of the “bubble economy” in 1989.

Higher inflation expectations are already evident in higher gold prices, the steeper US yield curve (long term rates are higher than short-term rates) and the weaker US dollar. Foreign investors, especially large sovereign investment funds, are switching from financial assets (bonds) to “real” assets (companies with real businesses) reflecting higher inflationary expectations.

The strategy is dangerous. Inflation can lead to a significant transfer of wealth from investors to borrowers. Inflation once embedded in the economy distorts economic activity such as investment and savings. The experience of the late 1970s and early 1980s highlights the difficulties in recapturing the inflation beast once uncaged. Paul Volcker, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, bravely increased interest rates to stratospheric levels to squeeze inflation out of the financial system.

The strategy may also not work. The cuts in rates do not appear to have had the desired effect in improving market liquidity conditions. Default risk concerns continue to inhibit lending and other routine financial transactions. Lower rates may set off further bubbles – for example, in equities and emerging markets. Asset prices may fall sharply anyway. In fairness to Dr. Bernanke, he has limited policy alternatives available.

Central bankers have stated that “errant” banks and investors will not be “bailed out”. Actual actions suggest otherwise. Banks have played their “nuclear” option well. The specter of “systemic risk” – whether real or not - is one a central banker cannot ignore. The banks continue to privatize gains and socialize losses.

These moves have attracted remarkably little scrutiny or comment. Central banks are effectively underwriting the credit risk and the liquidity of the financial system with public money but without any transparent political debate. Socialism for Wall Street prevails, once again.

Central banks and regulators bear a serious responsibility for safeguarding the functioning and integrity of financial systems. At the moment they are being exposed like the Wizard of Oz – old desperate men (they are mainly men) behind the curtain running from one lever to another in a desperate attempt to maintain illusions.



© 2007 Satyajit Das All Rights reserved.



[1] See Adrian Blundell-Wignall (2007) An Overview of Hedge Funds and Structured Products: Issues in Leverage and Risk; OECD

Wednesday, November 28, 2007

Google Plans to Develop Cheaper Solar, Wind Power

By Ari Levy

Nov. 27 (Bloomberg) -- Google Inc., whose corporate motto is ``don't be evil,'' created a research group to develop cheaper renewable energy sources, focusing on solar, wind and other alternative forms of power.

Google, the owner of the most-used Internet search engine, said today that it's hiring engineers and energy experts to lead a process that may cost hundreds of millions of dollars.

The project, called Renewable Energy Cheaper Than Coal, is meant first to help Google cut its energy costs and then to offer customers cheaper power. It follows initiatives this year to maximize the efficiency of its data centers, which account for most of the energy Google consumes.

``We're a large consumer of energy due to our data centers, so we're a natural customer,'' Larry Page, Google's co-founder, said in an interview. ``We see opportunities to make significant investments that generate positive returns.''

Investors might worry about the company's ``long-term focus'' and questioned whether the project was a good fit for the company, said Jordan Rohan, an analyst at RBC Capital Markets in New York. Mountain View, California-based Google makes 99 percent of its revenue selling advertising.

`What the Heck?'

``What the heck are they doing? It boggles the mind,'' said Rohan, who advises buying Google shares. ``The company is blessed with the best business model on the Internet. This makes me worry about Google's priorities.''

Google rose $7.57 to $673.57 at 4 p.m. New York time in Nasdaq Stock Market trading. The shares have gained 46 percent this year.

Through internal development and investments in other companies, Google expects to generate revenue in the alternative- energy market. Its philanthropic arm, Google.org, will make grants to companies, laboratories and universities working on related projects, the company said in a statement.

The goal is to create a gigawatt of renewable energy, enough to power a city the size of San Francisco for less than it would cost using coal, in ``years, not in decades,'' Page said. Coal accounts for more than 50 percent of all U.S. power and is one of the biggest sources of carbon emissions.

A typical data center consumes 300 megawatts to 400 megawatts of energy, according to Sandeep Aggarwal, an analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. in San Francisco. Google probably has 10 to 15 data centers, he said. One gigawatt equals 1,000 megawatts.

Large Consumer

``If Google is consuming between 3,000 to 5,000 megawatts of energy, they might be one of the largest consumers of energy,'' said Agarwal, who recommends buying the shares, which he doesn't own. ``If they can figure out how to save money in their energy consumption, this sounds like a positive to me.''

Google is already working with Pasadena, California-based ESolar Inc., a solar-power company, and Alameda, California-based Makani Power Inc., a developer of wind energy.

``Climate change is a very important reason for this announcement but it's not the only reason,'' Google co-founder Sergey Brin said today on a conference call. ``There's a lot of demand'' for cheaper energy, he said.

The company plans to hire 20 to 30 people over the next year for the project, Bill Weihl, the head of Google's environmental programs, said on the call. In June, Google and five partners including Microsoft Corp. started the Climate Savers Computing Initiative, a plan to save electricity in personal computers.

To contact the reporter on this story: Ari Levy in San Francisco at levy5@bloomberg.net .

Sunday, November 25, 2007

Panic of 2008

RHINEBECK, N.Y., Nov. 19 (UPI) -- A financial crisis will likely send the U.S. dollar into a free fall of as much as 90 percent and gold soaring to $2,000 an ounce, a trends researcher said.

"We are going to see economic times the likes of which no living person has seen," Trends Research Institute Director Gerald Celente said, forecasting a "Panic of 2008."

"The bigger they are, the harder they'll fall," he said in an interview with New York's Hudson Valley Business Journal.

Celente -- who forecast the subprime mortgage financial crisis and the dollar's decline a year ago and gold's current rise in May -- told the newspaper the subprime mortgage meltdown was just the first "small, high-risk segment of the market" to collapse.

Derivative dealers, hedge funds, buyout firms and other market players will also unravel, he said.

Massive corporate losses, such as those recently posted by Citigroup Inc. and General Motors Corp., will also be fairly common "for some time to come," he said.

He said he would not "be surprised if giants tumble to their deaths," Celente said.

The Panic of 2008 will lead to a lower U.S. standard of living, he said.

A result will be a drop in holiday spending a year from now, followed by a permanent end of the "retail holiday frenzy" that has driven the U.S. economy since the 1940s, he said.

Saturday, November 24, 2007

Bankers Gone Wild

By PAUL KRUGMAN

“What were they smoking?” asks the cover of the current issue of Fortune magazine. Underneath the headline are photos of recently deposed Wall Street titans, captioned with the staggering sums they managed to lose.

The answer, of course, is that they were high on the usual drug greed. And they were encouraged to make socially destructive decisions by a system of executive compensation that should have been reformed after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, but wasn't.

In a direct sense, the carnage on Wall Street is all about the great housing slump.

This slump was both predictable and predicted. “These days,” I wrote in August 2005, “Americans make a living selling each other houses, paid for with money borrowed from the Chinese. Somehow, that doesn't seem like a sustainable lifestyle.” It wasn't.

But even as the danger signs multiplied, Wall Street piled into bonds backed by dubious home mortgages. Most of the bad investments now shaking the financial world seem to have been made in the final frenzy of the housing bubble, or even after the bubble began to deflate.

In fact, according to Fortune, Merrill Lynch made its biggest purchases of bad debt in the first half of this year after the subprime crisis had already become public knowledge.

Now the bill is coming due, and almost everyone that is, almost everyone except the people responsible is having to pay.

The losses suffered by shareholders in Merrill, Citigroup, Bear Stearns and so on are the least of it. Far more important in human terms are the hundreds of thousands if not millions of American families lured into mortgage deals they didn't understand, who now face sharp increases in their payments and, in many cases, the loss of their houses as their interest rates reset.

And then there's the collateral damage to the economy.

You still hear occasional claims that the subprime fiasco is no big deal. Even though the numbers keep getting bigger some observers are now talking about $400 billion in losses these losses are small compared with the total value of financial assets.

But bad housing investments are crippling financial institutions that play a crucial role in providing credit, by wiping out much of their capital. In a recent report, Goldman Sachs suggested that housing-related losses could force banks and other players to cut lending by as much as $2 trillion enough to trigger a nasty recession, if it happens quickly.

Beyond that, there's a pervasive loss of trust, which is like sand thrown in the gears of the financial system. The crisis of confidence is plainly visible in the market data: there's an almost unprecedented spread between the very low interest rates investors are willing to accept on U.S. government debt which is still considered safe and the much higher interest rates at which banks are willing to lend to each other.

How did things go so wrong?

Part of the answer is that people who should have been alert to the dangers, and taken precautionary measures, instead blithely assured Americans that everything was fine, and even encouraged them to take out risky mortgages. Yes, Alan Greenspan, that means you.

But another part of the answer lies in what hasn't happened to the men on that Fortune cover namely, they haven't been forced to give back any of the huge paychecks they received before the folly of their decisions became apparent.

Around 25 years ago, American business and the American political system bought into the idea that greed is good. Executives are lavishly rewarded if the companies they run seem successful: last year the chief executives of Merrill and Citigroup were paid $48 million and $25.6 million, respectively.

But if the success turns out to have been an illusion well, they still get to keep the money. Heads they win, tails we lose.

Not only is this grossly unfair, it encourages bad risk-taking, and sometimes fraud. If an executive can create the appearance of success, even for a couple of years, he will walk away immensely wealthy. Meanwhile, the subsequent revelation that appearances were deceiving is someone else's problem.

If all this sounds familiar, it should. The huge rewards executives receive if they can fake success are what led to the great corporate scandals of a few years back. There's no indication that any laws were broken this time but the public's trust was nonetheless betrayed, once again.

The point is that the subprime crisis and the credit crunch are, in an important sense, the result of our failure to effectively reform corporate governance after the last set of scandals.

John Edwards recently came out with a corporate reform plan, but it didn't receive a lot of attention. Corporate governance still isn't regarded as a major political issue. But it should be.

Thursday, November 22, 2007

Dark Horse of the Year: Ron Paul

http://men.style.com/gq/blogs/gqeditors/2007/11/gqs-dark-horse.html

GQ Men of the Year 2007


We've chosen presidential candidate Ron Paul as our Dark Horse of the Year—in GQ's December Men of the Year issue, on stands nationwide on November 27th. Here's why.

Washington sure seems like a town full of bullies sometimes. Along comes a 72-year-old physician from south Texas who weighs maybe 140 pounds with rocks in his pockets, whom most people, at the beginning of the year, couldn't have picked out of a two-person lineup, who took in barely enough first-quarter money to buy a fancy Italian car, who comes armed with ideas both misbegotten (Abolish the Fed!) and very much not (End this war! Stop indefinitely detaining human beings!), and what do the folks who run the Republican Party do?

They try to silence him. The head of the Michigan Republicans calls for his removal from the debates. Rudy Giuliani attacks him for—what else?—insufficient patriotism. To witness this is to understand the fear Ron Paul has instilled in the GOP.

He has tapped into his party's silent minority, one that won't abide torture, reckless spending, or endless war. And his supporters (and admittedly, there are some real conspiracy-minded moonbats among them) have rewarded Paul for his courageousness, to the tune of more than $5 million in campaign contributions in the third quarter—about the same as John McCain has raised.

It isn't a revolution, but Ron Paul's candidacy serves as a reminder that electoral politics needn't be a joyless march to a clothespin vote. It can be daring and kind of kooky, too. —Greg Veis

Citibank SIVs Hit Norway Townships

by Mike Shedlock


Several Norway townships are caught up in the international credit crisis.

Several small townships in northern Norway went along with a securities firm's advice and invested as much as NOK 4 billion in complicated American commercial paper sold by Citibank. They now risk losing it all.

The township politicians are both embarrassed and angry at the financial advisers who they now claim led them astray. "They think we're a bunch of small-town fools," one local mayor told newspaper Dagens Næringsliv.

Officials in four northern Norwegian townships (Narvik, Rana, Hemnes and Hattfjelldal) went along with an alleged recommendation by Terra Securities to invest a total of NOK 451 million in what they're now calling "high-risk structured products" offered by Citibank and sold for Citibank by Terra.

To boost returns, the Norwegian townships also borrowed NOK 3.5 billion to invest in Citibank's products, which later lost as much as 50 percent of their value because of the US credit crunch.

By now it should be clear that Asset Backed Commercial Paper ABCP problems are likely to turn up anywhere and everywhere.

Here is a small sampling:
Two Bear Stearns (BSC) Hedge Funds went to Zero
Two Hedge Funds in Australia liquidated
Money has been frozen in Canada including the Yukon
US and Canadian pension plans are affected
Two banks in Germany were bailed out by the ECB
Norway Townships borrowed money to invest in this mess
Citigroup (C) and Merrill Lynch (MER) both lost their CEOs over this mess
Hundreds of $billions in potential losses are still circulating

The latest news in the US is that SIV debts are hiding in scores of public school funds and close to a $billion in defaults losses had not even been disclosed as late as a week ago even though this mess has been brewing for six months. See SIV Debts A Disaster For Public School Funds for more on this story.

Very Expensive Lessons
Don't chase yield
Don't buy something you do not understand
There is no free lunch
Rating agencies opinions are essentially worthless because they are never timely enough and because their business model creates enormous credibility as well as conflict of interest issues
Don't trust Citigroup, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch or anyone else hawking debt

That last point is critical. Lack of trust will impact Citigroup, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch's credibility, as well as their ability to raise capital for years to come. Trust once lost, is not easily restored.

Gold & Deflation/Inflation by Marc Faber

I am asked constantly how gold would perform in a deflationary collapse. With the propensity of the Fed and the ECB to flood the system with liquidity and to take "extraordinary measures" whenever problems arise, deflation is a remote possibility for the foreseeable future. So, before worrying about deflation, I would worry inflation accelerating strongly in the years to come - especially if the US economy stagnates. But let us assume that at some point in the future deflation follows. What then? In my opinion, deflation could only be triggered by one event: a total collapse of the existing global credit bubble. And the only event that I can think of that would trigger such a debt collapse would be a third world war. The failure of a large bank - say, Citigroup - wouldn't do the trick, because the Fed would immediately bail it out (unless Ron Paul is US President).

Now in a debt collapse, where would you rather have your money? In bank deposits, in CDs, in dubious commercial paper, in bonds, in money market funds - all of which would experience soaring default rates - or in physical gold, ideally in a safe deposit box? I think that, particularly in a debt collapse, physical gold would shine, as people the world over would become extremely concerned about, not the return on their money (interest), but the return of their money. This would be particularly true of Asian central banks, which now have less than 2% of their reserves in gold but hold massive quantities of all kind of debt securities.

Consequently, while I find the gold price to be currently somewhat overbought, I still think that gold will be one of the best investments over the next couple of years. In particular, I would expect demand for gold from individuals around the world to increase meaningfully - especially in Asia - at a time when production is unlikely to increase. I wish to add that I am not a "gold bug". I would much prefer to live in a world in which central banks' top priority was to safeguard paper money's purchasing power and its function as a "store of value". I would also much rather live in a world in which the US dollar was a strong currency, and where America was as free as it was in the 1960s, and the economic and financial imbalances weren't as extreme as they are today. As Steven Roach recently remarked, "no nation has ever devalued its way into prosperity". But the fact is, the time has come when we can no longer trust central banks. Therefore, each individual must be his own central bank and maintain adequate reserves for himself in the form of physical gold. The supply of paper money is potentially endless, whereas the supply of gold is very limited. (In fact, gold production from mines is declining.)

Marc Faber

excerpted from
The Gloom, Boom & Doom Report - Nov 2007

Central bankers grapple with dollar conundrum

Central bankers grapple with dollar conundrum

By Peter Garnham in London

Published: November 21 2007 02:00 | Last updated: November 21 2007 02:00

The sliding dollar has presented custodians of the world's massive foreign exchange reserves with a conundrum.

Countries such as China and those in the Gulf, which peg their currencies to the dollar, risk inflationary pressure that has the potential to trigger serious economic and social problems.

But any move to cut their links to the dollar could spark a run on the currency that would undermine the value of their reserves.

Global currency reserves have soared from $2,000bn in the second quarter of 2002 to $5,700bn (€3,885bn, £2,780bn) in the corresponding period this year, according to the International Monetary Fund.

Furthermore, two-thirds of the world's reserves are in the hands of six countries: China, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Russia and Singapore.

But China tops the league, with the latest official figures showing the value of its reserves at $1,443.6bn in July.

Many of China's trading partners argue that this stockpile - which grew at $40bn-$50bn a month in the first half of the year - has been caused by what they believe to be an undervalued renminbi.

Most analysts say that

the country's reserves have accumulated rapidly since July and that this explains the growing concern about the dollar expressed by Chinese officials.

Yesterday the dollar plunged to a record low of $1.4813 against the euro.

Beijing does not reveal the currency composition of its reserves. However, informed observers say the weightings of its various currencies roughly follow the latest figures from the IMF.

Central banks which have revealed the make-up of their reserves hold on average 64.7 per cent in dollars, 25.5 per cent in euros and the remainder in currencies such as sterling, yen and the Australian dollar.

China's concerns have been highlighted by Wen Jiabao, the premier, who said the country had never experienced such pressure over its reserves and that he was worried about how to preserve their value.

Hans Redeker, at BNP Paribas, says these comments are a clear indication that China wants to slow down the pace of increase of its reserves.

Primarily driven by food prices, China's rising rate of inflation currently stands at 6.5 per cent. Mr Redeker suggests that a rising renminbi is now favourable for the country as it will reduce import price pressure for food products.

"The undervalued renminbi supplied the globe with excess liquidity while the investment boom created demand for raw materials," he says. "This overvaluation [of raw materials] is now going to correct as China leads its currency closer to its fair value and tighter domestic conditions slow investment spending."

While an appreciation of the renminbi would slow China's accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, it would not address the problems caused by the weak dollar undermining their value.

Simon Derrick, at Bank of New York Mellon, says it is ironic that a large part of the reason for the dollar's fall can be attributed to central bank reserve managers.

IMF data reveal that, in the second quarter of 2002, the dollar represented 71 per cent of central bank holdings, while only 19.7 per cent was held in euros.

"All the available evidence indicates that the phenomenal growth in foreign exchange reserves over the past five years has been accompanied by a notable push to diversify away from the dollar and into the euro," he says. "This explains the rise of the euro."

Other analysts were less sure of the role played by central bank reserve diversification in the dollar's fall.

They say cyclical factors are the main driver behind the dollar's 40 per cent drop against the euro since 2002, arguing that the shift in reserve currency allocations needed to drive the dollar so far would be much greater than the shifts reported by the IMF.

Marc Chandler, at Brown Brothers Harriman, says central banks may well be diversifying new reserve accumulation away from the dollar, but China's recent comments do not mean they are diversifying existing holdings. "What incentive do they have to tip their hand, even if that is what they intend to do?" he asks.

In any case, Mr Chandler believes it is unlikely that the Peoples' Bank of China has turned from the traditional role of a central bank to become a currency speculator.

Global crash imminent, warns expert

Global crash imminent, warns expert
by Joel Bowman on Sunday, 18 November 2007


A sharp downward correction is due in the global markets as real estate, stocks and energy soar to record highs, warned a leading expert on the opening day at this year's Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Week.

Even as emerging markets like China, India and Brazil careen ahead at voracious growth rates, the speculative "bubbles" arising in the markets could cause a major global recession, cautioned Robert Shiller, the Stanley B. Resor Professor of Economics at Yale University, at yesterday's event.

"Perhaps we have gotten a little too confident in the global economic growth," said Shiller. "The problem is high oil, stock and real estate prices. I believe that a substantial part is speculative bubble thinking. We have gotten too confident of the prices in these markets," he said.
Story continues below ↓
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Oil prices, driven partly by demand from the rampant economic expansion of emerging markets, are flirting with all time record prices, even when adjusted for the devaluing of the U.S. dollar, in which oil is almost universally priced.

Housing too has been boosted to obscene highs on the back of the liquidity glut caused by low interest rates around the turn of the century and by speculative buying. Shiller pointed to the increase in long term home prices in the Netherlands, Norway and the U.S. to illustrate the precarious position the markets have been elevated to.

Now that the global credit crunch has all but dried up the lending and borrowing frenzy that fueled these price run-ups, the markets could face troubled times ahead.

"The unwinding of these markets is the most serious risk facing these markets today," Shiller said.

The confidence of consumers and investors has steadily eroded as they buckle under the pressure of these record high prices, according to measures taken by the Yale School of Management Stock Market Crash Confidence Index and its Market Valuation Confidence Index.

Shiller also pointed to the futures market, such as that of the CME in Chicago, which now predicts a major, ongoing decline over the coming four years.

DIFC Week runs until November 23 and features presentations from a host of economic leaders including Dr. Nasser Saidi, Larry Summers, Jeffery Sachs and Freakonomics author, Steven Levitt. View exclusive coverage at ArabianBusiness.com's Special Report .

Wednesday, November 21, 2007

The Coming Crash

Message from John L. Petersen on the Coming Crash

November 19, 2007


It appears that the world in general and the United States in particular are on the edge of a major disruption in the global financial system. Here's the summary as we see it.

At a recent Board meeting of The Arlington Institute, Dr. David Martin, CEO of M*CAM and one of the members of the Board was asked for his assessment of the global financial situation in the coming months.

Here are my notes from his response:

I stand by my commentary in July of '06.

The next shoe to fall is consumer credit
Currently as reports came in on the 3rd quarter, foreclosures were up 470% this quarter alone. They will be up over 500% this coming quarter (4th). A foreclosure in our terms is when the bank has officially declared an account insolvent and tries to regain the asset (if it exists). The person who is foreclosed upon can no longer secure any traditional consumer credit. This in turn goes straight to the banks as no one will be able to get the store issued charge cards.

A minority of people pay off their consumer debt every month. When one considers the combination of consumer credit card debt and the compounded debt of “home equity” financing, we estimate that less than 20% of people actually carry no consumer credit from one month to the next. Many of the ones who don't pay off their carried consumer debt have at least one credit card at its limit and therefore lack credit capacity. Most have their paycheck directly covering bills and servicing the minimum balance due.

Therefore people who are foreclosed upon will not be able to obtain credit and since their paychecks will be maxed out, there will not be extra cash left over from the paycheck to service a new debt.

Next, everybody buys things at Christmas. As much as 40% of retail sales are done in the 4th quarter of the year – i.e. the retail miracle. The purchase decline in retail goods this fourth quarter will occur because many credit-only consumers will lack the credit capacity mentioned above. Frequently, people overcharge their limit and the banks (albeit a profit center for subprime credit users) levy a penalty by increasing interest rates and charging additional fees. In the 4th quarter of 2007, the amount of people overcharging their limits will be too many for the banks to handle. We do not have a system in place to deal with overcharge on that scale. A substantial number of this December's purchases will go into an overdraft on credit limits.

CDO – Collateral Debt Obligation – Consumer Credit

Consumer credit pooled debt investment instruments (a form of CDO) are originated and rated based on underlying historical credit behavior and a complex series of predictive models for repayment dynamics. CDOs have “strips” which are a combination of similar profile tranches within a larger investment product. Based on the market's appetite for risk, investment performance guarantees (or credit enhancements) are packaged with the credits. These credit guarantees are issued by insurance companies, reinsurance companies, and other specialty finance companies – many operating with extra-territorial jurisdiction rendering fiscal oversight more complicated.

These strips come in several categories:

* Investment grade
* Almost investment grade
* Junk and
* Why did we give them a credit card?


All of these grades are priced on historical default rates. The credit insurance companies (AIG, MBIA, Ambac, Financial Security Assurance, Channel Re, XL, Zurich Re and other reinsurers) have, from time to time, issued credit guarantees to the securities. Banks sell debt in the form of a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO).

Minor shifts in default actuarial activity (+/- 25 basis points) from normative behavior is absorbed within pricing of these financial guaranty contracts. However fundamental shifts (hundreds or thousands of basis points in one quarter) are not built into the model and result in credit enhancement insolvency on a major scale. When the insurer cannot pay based on its own liquidity impairment, the bank is left with catastrophic (an insurance term for excessive loss outside of expected) exposure.

If in a single quarter we have an increased foreclosure rate of 400% (or 4000 basis points) the insurance contracts simply cannot handle that kind of drastic shift as evidenced by the write offs in the third quarter. When we will follow the drastic third quarter with a loss of 500% in the fourth quarter, the trajectory becomes clear.

Neither the banking nor the insurance industry has a historical experience in dealing with this type of challenge and neither has the liquidity linked to these contracts to support system wide collapse.

Where was the announcement of this? There was no announcement.

However Hank Greenberg is resurfacing in AIG leadership even during an SEC investigation because without him, no one else can remember where the counterparty risks are. In order to save the insurance industry, shareholders have looked past alleged SEC violations as there is no one with Mr. Greenberg's awareness of the market and counterparty agreements who can hope to navigate the coming challenges. In the 4th quarter, the US will have another record foreclosure announcement. Once you're over 25% (25 basis point) foreclosure, all models are broken.

Under a consumer credit melt-down, Capital One and/or Wachovia are likely going to put a massive foreclosure liability to an insurance company and the insurance company will not have liquidity to cover the exposure.

This is the problem we got into when we issued credit card debt on top of secondary mortgages – (inflated the value of the home) and gave out credit based on faux equity that no one really had.

The reason why this problem is the second shoe to fall (subprime mortgage collapse was the first shoe) is because consumer credit has a different foreclosure frequency than traditional mortgage credit.

December is when the maturity of the giant buyout of the economy moves.

By December, you'll have a second round of charge offs based on consumer credit. The real big problem – when you foreclose on consumer credit, people stop buying things. When people stop buying things, we don't have a tertiary way to pump liquidity into the market. People won't have extra cash from their paychecks and won't have capacity on their cards.

Try this case study:

Go to the mall and stand in front of counter at Victoria Secret. Watch what happens when someone wants to pay with cash. The clerk won't know how to ring up cash. They will need a manager to come over to give change and unlock drawers. When you don't have capacity on those cards, you don't buy things. VISA credit cards actually denigrate using cash in their run-up-to-Christmas add campaign.

Next, go to any savings bank data set. If you were going to spend $1000 in cash this Christmas, can you do it? For the most part, the answer would be “no” because we have had a net negative spending for the last 5 years.

Therefore there will be depressed consumer spending this Christmas but what is spent, people will overcharge. This will take what used to be good investments in CDOs and will change the dynamic. If you used to be a person who paid their bills on time, you will now only pay half. If the credit companies are counting on the top two tranches to pay their card off in full and they don't, they won't have liquidity to cover the rest. The banks cannot afford the top tranch paying half.

The estimates are out. There will be at least $400B in the first round of charge offs in the CDO market.

We're not going to be done with the subprime mortgage when the CDOs fall. Therefore we will have an insolvency problem with the banks that are mentioned above.

This is the kiss of death of a privately held Federal Reserve. For the Federal Reserve to function, its stakeholder banks (like JP Morgan Chase) must remain viable and liquid. When one of them, or any major bank in the U.S. (like Bank of America, Citibank, Wells Fargo, Bank of New York, Washington Mutual, etc.) is impaired or ceases to exist, the architecture of the Fed's capacity to respond to systemic challenges is unsustainable.

If the banks have no money, they can't pump liquidity into the market. Taking half of a trillion dollars out of market in a single distressed write down becomes problematic. The US banking system does not have the liquidity to take the hit.

The actual solvency of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is relatively indecipherable due to the fact that their treasury management processes (and the risks of their own investment strategies) are not uniformly disclosed with sufficient transparency. The FDIC was set up for isolated problems with a few bad banks but is NOT prepared to “insure” the system in an industry-wide crisis. The actual liquidity reserve of the “insurance” that Americans view as their safety net is 1/100th the actual exposure of outstanding deposits. The actual coverage ratio for the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) fell below 1.25% in 2002, the same year that less stable credit practices were adopted by America's leading banks.

The funny part is that the Federal Government will be on holiday when all of this happens. There will be no one to put freeze actions and moratoria on actions. The only way you stop the cataclysm is to put together civil actions on deposit withdrawals.

As I discussed previously, the Chinese currency wild-card may become relevant far sooner than expected. An effort by China to convert its $1.4 trillion U.S. Treasury holdings into euros is not viable for many reasons – not the least of which is the European Central Bank's inability to absorb such an event. As China continues its rush away from supporting U.S. Treasuries and as Middle Eastern investors are buying them up in more diversified holdings, a new “currency exchange” is unfolding. Realizing that they cannot liquidate their holdings, it appears that the Chinese are currently using their U.S. Treasury holdings as collateral for euro denominated purchases and long term infrastructure transactions. In other words, they may be “liquidating” their holdings as collateral and, in so doing, effectively migrating to non-dollar value without ever having to officially dump their current Treasury holdings.

Therefore, collateralize the credit in dollars – especially if you're long in dollars. The lender/financier won't call the note because you have it structured in such a way to both allow it to perform and hold illiquid collateral that no one wants. This essentially inflates euros. Although you can't sell dollars, the whole purpose of collateral is that it is a second source of payment – collateral is there to down rate the risk of the loan. Secondary becomes irrelevant.

When February comes, the Chinese are going to do something as they will have to decide what the exposure is going to be with the treasury. As I see it they have to just dump the treasury. They only keep it because they can use it – they have 43% direct/indirect of US treasuries so they'll dump them on the market.

The US Congressional pressures to decouple the RMB will work, but not in the way we want. Our plan includes helping them hold on to the treasuries, it does not involve them not holding the dollar anymore. The US wanted the tether to be part of the float. This will cause disenfranchisement of the US electorate (during primary season). February is also when public (media) will realize we won't pull out of this.

Side note: Mayor Bloomberg could enter the race at this point, being the savior candidate (at least economically), but has $1B dollars in non-liquid money so he may not be able to enter.

March is when we realize that the dollar doesn't come back.

OPEC price with the whole fluctuation of oil futures presages the event. They are going to run the price of oil as high as they can get it on the dollar, while buying US treasuries from China with the money. When the dollar does collapse, they'll flip denominations. The wild card is long about March when the OPEC cuts spot oil off the dollar to the euro. One can look at the current oil price at close to $100/barrel and fail to see that, as this premium price is currently turning around and investing in a weakening dollar, the effective price (less the dollar investment hedge) is probably closer to $50/barrel than the spot price reflects.

Currency problems will change the game – they are financially structuring themselves to take the hit.

When we can't afford to buy oil commodities on a spot market – it compounds the problem however the consumer that Saudi Arabia ships to is liquid (China). In the US it is a big problem. There is still a market for oil; it just changes. When you come out of Straits of Hormuz, turn left.




RE: Key Paragraph Jacking Oil To Keep Up Dollar Demand... GrislyBear
NEW 11/20/2007 7:07:38 PM
OPEC price with the whole fluctuation of oil futures presages the event. They are going to run the price of oil as high as they can get it on the dollar, while buying US treasuries from China with the money. When the dollar does collapse, they'll flip denominations. The wild card is long about March when the OPEC cuts spot oil off the dollar to the euro. One can look at the current oil price at close to $100/barrel and fail to see that, as this premium price is currently turning around and investing in a weakening dollar, the effective price (less the dollar investment hedge) is probably closer to $50/barrel than the spot price reflects.

Several other analysts have made this point.

But since the USA consumes 25% of world oil, and less than 5% of world's population, the game can't go on much longer.
Specifically, at some point whether that be $150 or $200 oil, demand will crash and ironically, so will the USD price.
Weird.

RE: Thanks, notsure smokey
NEW 11/20/2007 8:20:09 PM
"This is the kiss of death of a privately held Federal Reserve. For the Federal Reserve to function, its stakeholder banks (like JP Morgan Chase) must remain viable and liquid. When one of them, or any major bank in the U.S. (like Bank of America, Citibank, Wells Fargo, Bank of New York, Washington Mutual, etc.) is impaired or ceases to exist, the architecture of the Fed's capacity to respond to systemic challenges is unsustainable.
If the banks have no money, they can't pump liquidity into the market. Taking half of a trillion dollars out of market in a single distressed write down becomes problematic. The US banking system does not have the liquidity to take the hit. "

***

The Federal Reserve Banking system is based on collateralized debt. Before banks or other financial institutions can borrow from the system, they must offer something of equal value as collateral plus any added interest for the duration of the loan.

Ben Bernanke, in his "printing press" speech of 2002, either knowingly or unknowingly misspoke when he described the Fed's unlimited ability to provide liquidity to the markets.

The Fed injects liquidity into the financial system by buying certain assets like US treasuries. This process does not add any value to the system. It is the financial system which must use the injection of liquidity to add value through providing credit to entities which can then invest or speculate in appreciating assets.

As long as the financial/economic system is growing, banks and other financial entities will be able to use the credit issued by the Fed to grow their asset base by issuing their own credit to the expanding economy. They can then not only repay their loans from the Fed, but also buy US treasuries and other financial assets which can be used as collateral for future loans.

This mechanism works as long as appreciating assets in the system continue to expand the capacity for more debt. Financial bubbles of the recent past have been able to expand debt beyond its normal limits by hyperinflating the values of assets involved in the bubbles.

As long as these hyperinflating assets remained in the virtual reality of the financial markets like stocks, bonds and the derivatives thereof, they seemingly had infinite potential to appreciate.

But when the expansion of credit spread into the real economy through rising real estate prices, the asset appreciation began to be limited by the incomes of the real estate investors and speculators. This limitation of income then brought the expansion of credit to a dead-end through debt saturation.

The REAL economy brought the virtual expansion of financial assets to a screeching halt.

Without new assets with which to offer as collateral, the banks and large financial entities can no longer purchase the collateral necessary to expand their asset base through selling more credit. Therefore as the asset bubbles pop and defaults increase, the banks and their depositors are left holding the bag.

The Fed can lower interest rates down to zero, but without an expansion of the basis for collateral, the demand for credit will remain flat while the increasing defaults continue to destroy any possibility of credit expansion.

All talk of Weimar hyperinflation at this point is simply talk. The Federal Reserve banking system based on collateralized debt would have to be replaced with a nationalized banking system in order for a Weimar or Zimbabwe type hyperinflation of the monetary base to occur.

Of course, anything is possible.

Maybe Congress will forgo their upcoming paid holidays to abolish the Fed.

Ya think?

Monday, November 19, 2007

LEAP/E2020

LEAP/E2020 now estimates that at least one large US financial institution (bank, insurance, investment fund) will file for bankruptcy before February 2008, sparking off bankruptcies among a series of other financial institutions and banks in Europe (in the UK especially), in Asia and in various emerging countries. According to an expression by Blackstone president Tony James's (1), a financial « black hole » was formed after the US subprime crisis.

The triggering factors for a major financial institution to go bankrupt are now so powerful and warning clues so numerous that, according to our researchers, the probability that it happens within three month now reaches 100%. Probabilities are as high that the US authorities will try to introduce a reimbursement protection-net in order to avoid panic from spreading throughout the entire US financial system (2); but the size of the bankruptcy will immediately hit the most exposed financial institutions operating in the US and in the rest of the world. Countries whose financial operators are the most linked to US financial operators will be on the frontline: United Kingdom, Japan, China in particular (3).

There are four main triggering factors, according to our team:

1. Drastic drop in revenues for banks operating in the US
2. Slumping value of assets owned by these banks resulting from new US banking regulation (FASB regulation 157)
3. Increasing weakness of bond insurers
4. Economic recession in the US

These factors must of course be placed in the general context described by LEAP/E2020 since the beginning of 2006, i.e. a global systemic crisis, which only today is beginning to be grasped by the world's political, financial and economic leaders (4). The fact that over the past two years, the largest financial operators and central banks, the US Fed and the Bank of England in particular, were systematically late on the course of events, entails to believe that they will only become fully aware of the existence of a banking crisis once some major event has happened, once it is too late to efficiently prevent the system's contamination.



University of Michigan « Consumer Sentiment » (November 2007 included) – Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis / LEAP/E2020
In the present public announcement of the GEAB N°19, LEAP/E2020 chose to present its anticipation of drastic drops in the revenues of banks operating in the US (Factor N°1).


Factor N° 1 - Drastic drop in revenues for banks operating in the US
As detailed in GEAB N°19, the coming into effect of the FASB 157 standard on November 15, 2007, will directly involve the financial statements of financial institutions operating in the US and expose them to the consequences of a loss in value of a large proportion of their assets, knowing that this part is increasing. Indeed the subprime crisis was nothing but a catalyst for a wider-ranging financial crisis today affecting all US financial assets (5). The CDOs altogether are now dragged into a general confidence crisis, and they represent a large part of bank assets since, in the past few years, large banks from lenders became investors and speculators, like hedge funds.

By the way, the latter represented for nearly a decade a growing source of revenue for large international banks. Everyone still has in the mind the huge fees that these hedge funds and investments funds paid to the banks in the framework of their various operations such as LBOs (Leverage Buy-Out), M&As (Merger and Acquisition) and other IPOs (Initial Public Offering). These not-so-remote-times (they ended last summer) now belong to the past.

Today, hedge funds are striving to avoid bankruptcy. Investment funds deepen their losses as they try to avoid being sucked into the “financial black hole” mentioned by Blackwater's CEO (cf Factor N°2, GEAB N°19).

Merger and Acquisition projects are at a standstill. For instance, in the technology sector (a privileged target of M&As), Wall Street saw the amount of transactions decrease from USD 99 billion in the third quarter of 2006 down to USD 52 billion in the third quarter of 2007 (i.e. a 50 percent drop), knowing that the credit crisis was only beginning in the third quarter of 2007. Yet the weakness of the US dollar provoked a frenzy of European LBOs in the US; indeed for the first time the Europeans bought as much as their North-American counterparts (6).



LBO freeze – Source Dealogic
Despite the fact that IPOs on Wall Street resisted quite well the Summer crisis, they are now postponed to unknown dates, when times are less gloomy. For instance, the number of IPOs for more than USD 1 billion fell from 8 per quarter (in the third quarter of 2006) to 2 (in this year's third quarter), knowing that this trends is strengthening as recently illustrated by RWE, this German energy supplier who decided to postpone its American Water division's public listing because of the credit crisis in the US (7); another example is provided by Rusal, the Russian aluminium giant who postponed to an unknown date its planned IPO, though it promised to count as this year's most important one and despite the fact that operating banks have already been designated (i.e. Morgan Stanley, JP. Morgan and Deutsche Bank) (8).

With regard to LBOs (these remarkable financial packages which make it possible to buy a company with the riches it potentially contains (9)), the market is practically closed. Moreover all transactions that were not frozen or cancelled end up in court, as illustrated by the emblematic case of SallieMae, the student loan company, and JC. Flowers (a very active investment fund with no website!) (10). In October, LBOs only represented 5 percent of all M&As, versus 31 percent in June 2007.




US banks' level of exposure to financial derivative risks – Source Contraryinvestor
All these tendencies point in the same direction: the loss of a significant source of revenues for banks operating in the US, that will soon combine with the consequences of the implementation of the FASB 157 standard on the one hand and with the CDO crisis on the other, meaning the loss in value of an important part of the same banks' assets.

Indeed in 2006, revenues drawn from their advisory and intermediary services in LBOs, M&As, etc… represented 27 percent of their total revenue, after experiencing the strongest progression recorded in the past seven years (seven years before, in 1999, i.e. on the even of the Internet bubble burst!). Moreover in 2006 already, these revenues had to compensate for losses induced by the first effects of the subprime crisis. In 2007, losses related to the mortgage market literally exploded compared to 2006, and everyone can see that all large financial transactions' advisory and intermediary services have now dried up (11).

No need to be visionary to conclude that these banks will experience between the end of this year and the beginning of next year a severe crisis capable of entailing losses that some of them will not be able to cope with. According to LEAP/E2020, all these clues are harbingers of a major banking crisis whose causes and consequences for investors and savers are retailed in the GEAB N°19.


---------
Notes:

(1)Tony James used this expression to describe the financial environment that led his capital investment company, one of Wall Street's wonders until a few weeks ago, to announce a USD-113 million loss (source Forbes, 11/12/2007). Blackstone's shares were listed on the stock market last year, simultaneously with a number of other mega-investment funds such as KKR or Fortress, for instance. By the way, last spring, our team warned that these Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in fact aimed at pooling future losses rather than past profits. This is now confirmed.

(2)It is already the case with “Paulson's super-conduit” (cf. GEAB N°18).

(3)For more details on the level of exposure to US financial risks, see GEAB N°16, 17 and 18 in particular.

(4) This means that they are only beginning to understand the « systemic » nature of this crisis. Until now, they first refused to admit that there was a crisis, and then they treated it as one more episode of the usual economic and financial cycles.

(5) Source: Bloomberg, 11/13/2007

(6) Source: The451Group, 10/01/2007

(7) Source: YahooNews/Reuters, 11/14/2007

(8) Source: Financial Information Service, 09/21/2007

(9) As long as they manage to convince a sufficiently large amount of financial operators to lend them the corresponding sum.

Friday, November 16, 2007

Six Positive Trading Behaviors

There is much more to good trading than merely eliminating bad habits. Here are six trading behaviors I find among many of the best traders I've had the pleasure to work with:

1) Fresh Ideas - I've yet to see a very successful trader utilize the common chart patterns and indicator functions on software (oscillators, trendline tools, etc.) as primary sources for trade ideas. Rather, they look at markets in fresh ways, interpreting shifts in supply and demand from the order book or from transacted volume; finding unique relationships among sectors and markets; uncovering historical trading patterns; etc. Looking at markets in creative ways helps provide them with a competitive edge.

2) Solid Execution - If they're buying, they're generally waiting for a pullback and taking advantage of weakness; if they're selling, they patiently wait for a bounce to get a good price. On average, they don't chase markets up or down, and they pick their price levels for entries and exits. They won't lift a market offer if they feel there's a reasonable opportunity to get filled on a bid.

3) Thoughtful Position Sizing - The successful traders aren't trying to hit home runs, and they don't double up after a losing period to try to make their money back. They trade smaller when they're not seeing things well, and they become more aggressive when they see odds in their favor. They take reasonable levels of risk in each position to guard against scenarios in which one large loss can wipe out days worth of profits.

4) Maximizing Profits - The good traders don't just come up with promising trade ideas; they have the conviction and fortitude to stick with those ideas. Many times, it's leaving good trades early--not accumulating bad trades--that leads to mediocre trading results. Because successful traders understand their market edge and have demonstrated it through real trading, they have the confidence to let trades ride to their objectives.

5) Controlling Risk - The really fine traders are quick to acknowledge when they're wrong, so that they can rapidly exit marginal trades and keep their powder dry for future opportunities. They have set amounts of money that they're willing to risk and lose per day, week, or month and they stick with those limits. This slows them down during periods of poor performance so that they don't accumulate losses unnecessarily and have time to review markets and figure things out afresh.

6) Self-Improvement - I'm continually impressed at how good traders sustain efforts to work on themselves--even when they're making money. They realize that they can always get better, and they readily set goals for themselves to guide their development. In a very real sense, each trading day becomes an opportunity for honing skills and developing oneself.

These six criteria, I believe, can form the basis for effective report cards. Traders can grade themselves in these six areas and, over time, establish where they're strongest and weakest. I find such self-appraisals very helpful for coaching; ultimately they provide goals for self-development and criteria for measuring progress over time. In no small measure, good trading boils down to three factors:

1) Having a demonstrated edge;

2) Having the skills needed to exploit that edge; and

3) Having the resilience to bounce back when the edge is no longer present.

It's the traders who have all three qualities that are most likely to make a long-term career out of the markets.

The big secret -- Rudd is the new Scullin --

(Don't tell the electorate, they will find out soon enough).
by James Cumes

There are intriguing similarities between the forthcoming Australian elections and those of 1929.
In 1929, the Scullin Labor Government won a landslide victory and took office just 2 days before the New York Stock-Exchange Crash of Black Thursday, 24 October ushered in the Great Depression of the 1930s.
Prime Minister Stanley Melbourne Bruce, after more than six years in office, lost not only government but his own seat in the House of Representatives.
Now we have a similar situation in that centre-right Prime Minister John Howard, after eleven years in office, looks like being swept away in a landslide by centre-left Labor led by Kevin Rudd. Though perhaps unlikely, it may be that Howard could even lose his seat in the House of Representatives.
However, what comes after is the most intriguing aspect. In 1929, no one, least of all James Scullin and his ministers, had any idea that the world was about to crash into the greatest economic depression the world had known. They had even less idea of how they should react to any such crisis. Intriguingly, two of the key issues which confronted them were irresponsible debt and industrial relations.
The same seems to be true of the prospective Rudd Government. He has proclaimed himself to be a “conservative economist.” He has spoken, during the campaign, mainly about interest rates and housing costs in conventional terms. He will amend industrial legislation to be more acceptable to workers. He says it all in the obvious expectation that the next few years – the next ten years perhaps – will be much the same as the last ten years under Howard.
There is not the slightest possibility that they will be.
We are about to go through the most tumultuous years – in economic, social, political and strategic terms – that we have ever known. The financial, banking and credit “system” will need to be reconstructed almost from scratch, globally as well as nationally. We will have to revise fundamentally our thinking about the means to maintain economic stability and growth, non-discriminatory international trade, stable exchange rates and international capital flows; indeed, the whole gamut of issues with which we were concerned in reconstructing the world economy after the Great Depression and the Second World War.
Can a Rudd Government survive attempts to achieve such a remodelling of so much? Does it have any idea how it will contribute to thinking about such re-modelling – and do so with the vital interests of Australia both short and long term in mind?
The Scullin Government was an abject failure. Despite Mungana, it was not corrupt or dishonest. It was well-intentioned; and it was in no sense extremist or revolutionary. On the contrary, its economic and financial policies were conservative. Though some of its members wanted more expansionist policies, it accepted a “Premiers’ Plan” so devastatingly conservative that it did more to create misery for the people of Australia than the Great Crash of the NYSE ever did.
Confused, defeated and despised by its left constituency as well as the right, it lasted until January 1932. The Labor Party split three ways. A Labor defector, Joe Lyons, formed the United Australia Party, became Prime Minister and staggered on until his death in 1939 – some months before the outbreak of war.
Labor did begin to show some signs of revival in the mid-thirties. Most conspicuously, Ben Chifley made some useful contributions to the Royal Commission on Money and Banking in 1936. By the time Labor regained office just weeks before Pearl Harbour in 1941, ideas that would remedy the ills of the 1930s were being drafted into policies by Labor and formed the basis of the domestic and international economic policies that the Curtin and Chifley Governments would implement with such success between 1945 and 1949.
For Curtin and Chifley, the revolution was well prepared and they succeeded. For later Labor Governments, the way was never sufficiently prepared. The Whitlam Government had no idea how to deal with the problems of the 1970s. The Hawke and Keating Governments thought they did know and, in the process, led us down a highly conservative, right-wing, Reagan/Thatcher road that now threatens to destroy global stability and Australia’s economic, political and strategic security in a highly toxic global environment.
Where does that leave us with a Rudd Government? Past governments have failed utterly to make us the “Tiger” we should have been in the world that followed the breakdown of post-war stability between 1969 and 1971. Instead, they have left us exposed to all the hazards that flow from “floating” exchange rates, massive global speculation, reckless deregulation, opportunistic privatisation and, most recently, the escapades of the financial adventurers, marauders and buccaneers who have flogged credit and other dubious derivatives, Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs), Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs), hedge funds, private-equity deals and the rest around the world. These various financial “enterprises” have, inter alia, feasted on pension funds which, in turn, in our privatising mania, have fed on millions of pensioners whose future financial security is now gravely at risk.
There is nothing in what Rudd, his shadow ministers and advisers have said and indeed nothing in the pronouncements of academics, “experts” or anyone else, that suggests that the incoming government – whether it be Labor or Coalition – has the faintest idea of the nature, scope and magnitude of the problems that confront us or of the ways in which they may be resolved.
Unless the incoming government – let’s assume it will be a Rudd Government – is extremely lucky, the crash will become manifest in the next few weeks or latest by March 2008. The United States is almost certainly in recession already – concealed only by spurious official statistics – the dollar has fallen sharply and almost certainly will fall further and faster as the weeks go by. Household, corporation and public debt is monstrous, unprecedented and all those adjectives that we thought we would never have to use. Consumer and asset inflation is high. Credit is tight and getting tighter – largely because, in the casino world that the global economy has become, too many have already lost their shirts and far too many more fear that the shirt hangs far too loosely on their own back and on the backs of those who already do or might want to owe them money.
The financial crisis is already flowing to the rest of the American economy – and spreading, like a deadly plague, globally.
Central banks never were of much value. In recent years, they have created far more problems than they have solved. The Fed purports to manage the crisis; but its reduction of interest rates and its flooding of the banking system with funds serve little purpose except to give desperate, short-term hope in a financial “system” which is so inherently invalid that its collapse is several degrees more assured than we usually associate with the term “inevitable.”
Very little of this seems to be preoccupying anyone in Australia – at least among the campaigning parties or those advising them. Concern is expressed from time to time about the “sub-prime crisis” and the credit crunch. Very little is said about, for example, the carry trade which has been supporting the Australian dollar and conveniently neutralising a large part of Australia’s external deficit. Recently, the yen has been highly volatile and the carry trade has been unwinding and rewinding in harmony. We have not yet had the “Great Unwind” but, assuredly, it is not far down the road.
That leads us to the further point that we have, for the last two or three years in particular, been through one of the greatest commodity booms in history. This boom has affected a whole range of raw materials – as well as food for which, if, because of drought, we have not been able to sell in abundance, we should, in some compensation, have been able to get better prices.
From this, we might have imagined that we might be enjoying as splendid a surplus in our external trade as, let us say, Russia from the boom in oil. But that is not so.
It has not happened, largely because Australians have continued to consume vast quantities often of luxury goods, paid for by massive credit-card and mortgage debt based largely on false notions of expanding personal wealth.
The external deficit has shown some volatility but it is a reasonable prediction that, based on performance so far, the trend in future will show the deficit increasing rather than receding. The carry trade will then unwind, perhaps completely and there may be an easing – perhaps a grave easing – of commodity demand from China if their economy and, for example, India’s strike a rougher patch.
None of these developments is improbable nor is it improbable that they could occur together.
Australia is not prepared for any such eventuality. Past Australian policies have been based on about as many false premises as anyone can possibly poke a stick at.
Against this background, a Rudd Government is not remotely prepared to deal with the probable crises that might confront us; nor of course would a Howard Government have a clue as to what it might be best to do.
Either alternative would be faced with the outcome of nearly forty years of successive governments’ failure to make Australia one of the “Tiger” economies. Rudd now declares his determination to put a laptop in the lap of every young Australian. In itself, that objective is noble; but it is pathetic that only now a Labor campaigner for office should be advocating it as a sort of cure-all. He may be putting it forward when, before one laptop can be delivered under the program, the house of financial and economic cards that Labor and Liberal governments have built over the past three to four decades will be toppling around us. Many of us will be left with no job, no house, no adequate professional or trade education, no decent health service and, at the end of it all, no pension except one that has been heavily depreciated in the financial storms that our Governments have done so much to provoke.
A Rudd Government, if we get one, might last as long as Scullin’s did. That would take us perhaps to the beginning of 2010. Labor would probably split long before that. The Treasurer or some other minister might take a few Labor dissidents to form a government with Opposition members led perhaps by Peter Costello. Somehow, we might then stumble through a long, deep and terrible depression, to end around, let us say, 2017 in World War Three. Only the Almighty knows whether we might have any allies at all by then - and whether they might have any residual power even to secure themselves let alone prop up any allies.
With those prospects, Labor – and Kevin Rudd - might be well advised to disdain any offer of power to govern and so avoid going down in history as another well-meaning but feckless Scullin-type Government. Let Howard and his retinue take the blame and just opprobrium for a catastrophe to which they have contributed with such unbridled generosity.
It won’t happen of course. On the night of 24 November 2007, Labor, led by Rudd, will probably be declared the victor and they will confront their unenviable destiny. For Australia, it won’t be any worse than having Howard’s Coalition as the victor. Indeed, it might be rather better. However, whoever is the victor, I – as one who grew up in the last Great Depression – can only offer a prayer and express a hope. That hope is that we Australians may come through this new and even more terrible challenge, with the same spirit and fortitude that we did seventy years and more ago.

James Cumes
Author of “America’s Suicidal Statecraft: The Self-destruction of a Superpower”
http://www.authorsden.com/jameswcumes

Thursday, November 15, 2007

Merrill Taps Thain After Fink Demanded Full Tally

Merrill Lynch's decision to name John Thain as its new chief executive came after the firm's first choice, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink, demanded that Merrill make a full accounting of its subprime exposure, CNBC has learned.


Thain, who has been CEO of NYSE Euronext for nearly four years, will succeed Stanley O'Neal, who stepped down in late October after Merrill reported huge writedowns from subprime-related losses.

Merrill's selection of Thain was a surprise because the firm had recently indicated to Fink that the job was his if he wanted it. CNBC has learned that Fink said he would take the job but only if Merrill did a full accounting of its subprime exposure. At that point, Merrill, which owns 49% of BlackRock , moved in a different direction and decided to go with Thain instead.

A Merrill spokesman told CNBC that "Merrill Lynch can confirm that Laurence Fink was not offered the job of CEO at Merrill Lynch."


Replacement for Thain

The NYSE will name Duncan Niederauer, the current chief operating officer, as Thain's replacement.

Merrill ousted CEO Stan O'Neal after posting an $8.4 billion write-down for the third quarter. The write-down resulted in a $2.3 billion loss, the largest quarterly loss in the company's 93-year history.


Thain has a blue-chip Wall Street resume, with credentials sharpened by running NYSE and his time as a former co-president at Goldman Sachs.

Thain took over the NYSE in January 2004 after longtime CEO Richard Grasso was forced to resign over his $188 million pay package. Thain sought to present a new image for the exchange and pushed through some major structural changes, including the move to electronic trading.

Thain had also been rumored to be a possible CEO candidate for Citigroup , whose chief executive Chuck Prince also stepped down following big subprime-related losses. No replacement for Prince has been named.

Created Global Exchange

Thain, who is credited with remaking the NYSE into the world's first truly global exchange, is no stranger to the investment world. He started out on the bond desk at Goldman Sachs and left the firm as its chief operating officer.


Many say he's also exactly what Merrill Lynch needs after last month's ouster of Stan O'Neal. The former CEO was not well liked by Merrill's army of some 16,000 brokers, and lost their confidence after the company recorded its biggest loss since being founded 93 years ago.

Merrill Lynch ratcheted up a $2.24 billion loss during the third quarter because of investments in subprime mortgages and other risky types of debt. It joined dozens of other major financial institutions who are getting squeezed as investors steer away from riskier securities, causing credit markets to tighten significantly.

There is also speculation by a number of analysts that Merrill may take a $3 billion fourth-quarter writedown. That would be besides the $7.9 billion charge taken last quarter. Merrill originally said it would write down only $4.5 billion because of the credit crisis.

Faces Daunting Task

Thain faces a daunting task of cleaning up those investments, and reviving morale at a firm badly bruised during the past few months. There has been speculation that a new CEO would be forced to turn around Merrill's fixed income division, a department that he once ran for Goldman in the 1990s.


Meanwhile, Fink may be a possible replacement for Prince, who left the helm of Citigroup less than a week after O'Neal stepped down from Merrill. Thain was also said to be considered to run the nation's biggest bank.

Prince was forced out of his job after Citi's profit fell 57 percent in the third quarter after it booked $6 billion in asset markdowns and other credit-related losses. The night Prince resigned, the company estimated it would need to write down another $8 billion to $11 billion in the fourth quarter.

Thain leaves behind a transformed exchange now locked in competition with rival Nasdaq Stock Market. His first task after taking over in 2004 was the acquisition of electronic trading platform Archipelago Holdings. It was the first step in bringing NYSE into the 21st century, which ultimately led to the creation of a mostly electronic market last year.

He also shepherded the NYSE's April acquisition of European rival Euronext, which operated bourse's in Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels and Lisbon.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

© 2007 CNBC.com
URL: http

Wednesday, November 14, 2007

A Minsky Moment

Monday, November 12, 2007

The U.S. Credit Crunch Of 2007

A Minsky Moment By Charles Whalen

Introduction On September 7, 2007, just after the U.S. Department of Labor released its monthly jobs report, a journalist at National Public Radio asked three economic analysts for a reaction. Their one-sentence responses were: "It's worse than anybody had anticipated"; "It's pretty disastrous"; and "I'm shocked" (Langfitt 2007). Before the report became available, the wide-spread view among economic forecasters was that it would show the U.S. economy gained about 100,000 jobs in August. Instead, there was no job growth for the first time in four years. In fact, there was a net loss of 4,000 jobs (U.S. Department of Labor 2007).

The forecasters were not done getting it wrong, however. After publication of the jobs data, a number of them predicted the news would bolster the U.S. stock market. Why? Because, they argued, the employment report practically guaranteed that the Federal Reserve (Fed) would cut interest rates on September 18. Instead, investor panic over the employment report caused the market, which had been volatile during most of the summer, to quickly lose about 2 percent on all major indices. The Fed did eventually cut rates as expected, but it took a number of reassuring comments by U.S. central bank governors on September 10 to calm Wall Street's fears. What is now clear is that most economists underestimated the widening economic impact of the credit crunch that has shaken U.S. financial markets since at least mid-July. A credit crunch is an economic condition in which loans and investment capital are difficult to obtain. In such a period, banks and other lenders become wary of issuing loans, so the price of borrowing rises, often to the point where deals simply do not get done. Financial economist Hyman P. Minsky (1919?1996) was the foremost expert on such crunches, and his ideas remain relevant to understanding the current situation.

This brief demonstrates that the U.S. credit crunch of 2007 can aptly be described as a "Minsky moment." It begins by taking a look at aspects of this crunch, then examines the notion of a Minsky moment, along with the main ideas informing Minsky's perspective on economic instability. At the heart of that viewpoint is what Minsky called the "financial instability hypothesis," which derives from an interpretation of John Maynard Keynes's work and underscores the value of an evolutionary and institutionally grounded alternative to conventional economics. The brief then returns to the 2007 credit crunch and identifies some of the key elements relevant to fleshing out a Minsky-oriented account of that event. The Credit Crunch of 2007

As early as March 2007, a smattering of analysts and journalists were warning that financial markets in the United States were on the verge of a credit crunch. By early August, business journalist Jim Jubak concluded that a crunch had finally arrived in the business sector, but not yet for consumers ( Jubak 2007). Then, in early September, a survey sponsored by a mortgage trade group provided evidence that households were feeling the crunch too: a third of home loans originated by mortgage brokers failed to close in August because brokers could not find investors to buy the loans (Zibel 2007).

In an effort to explain the current credit crunch with an illustration, Jubak described the situation in the market for loans that finance corporate buyouts. In the past, banks have been willing to lend to the buyout firms because the banks have been able to resell the loans to investors. The problem in July 2007, however, was that the market for new and existing buyout loans had shrunk rapidly. Indeed, "Investors with portfolios of existing loans discovered [in late July] that they couldn't sell their loans at any price. They were stuck owning loans that were losing big hunks of value by the hour. And they couldn't find an exit" ( Jubak 2007). Because other investors do not want to get caught in the same situation, buyout deals sit idle. According to the September 3 issue of BusinessWeek, "Banks now have a $300 billion backlog of deals" (Goldstein 2007, p. 34).

The buyout market is just one dimension of the credit crunch. Another dimension involves "commercial paper"-- promises to pay that a wide variety of companies issue to acquire short-term funding. By the end of August, the $1.2 trillion asset-backed commercial paper market, which often uses mortgages as collateral, was "freezing up," just like the market for buyout loans (ibid.).

Yet another dimension to the crunch involves the role of hedge funds, which are largely unregulated, operate with considerable secrecy, and are designed primarily for wealthy individuals. Such funds are among the institutions that have relied most heavily on issuing commercial paper in the past few years. As recently as the end of 2006, Wall Street banks lent liberally to such funds, and much of that borrowed money was used to invest in huge packages of mortgages. However, when it became increasingly clear that large numbers of homeowners could not repay their mortgage obligations, the cash flowing to hedge funds dried up, and fund managers found themselves sitting on enormous losses. In June 2007, for example, two hedge funds run by Bear Stearns were wiped out, for a total loss of $20 billion (Foley 2007). The Economics of Minsky

Throughout the summer of 2007, more and more financial-market observers warned of the arrival of a Minsky moment. In fact, "We are in the midst of [such a moment]," said Paul McCulley, a bond fund director at Pacific Investment Management Company, in mid-August. McCulley, whose remarks were quoted on the cover of the Wall Street Journal, should know about a Minsky moment: he coined the term during the 1998 Russian debt crisis (Lahart 2007).

McCulley may have originated the term, but George Magnus, senior economic advisor at UBS, a global investment bank and asset management firm, offers perhaps the most succinct explanation of it. According to Magnus, the stage is first set by "a prolonged period of rapid acceleration of debt" in which more traditional and benign borrowing is steadily replaced by borrowing that depends on new debt to repay existing loans. Then the "moment" occurs, "when lenders become increasingly cautious or restrictive, and when it isn't only overleveraged structures that encounter financing difficulties. At this juncture, the risks of systemic economic contraction and asset depreciation become all too vivid" (Magnus 2007, p. 7).

If left unchecked, the Minsky moment can become a "Minsky meltdown," a spreading decline in asset values capable of producing a recession (McCulley, quoted in Lahart 2007). Even without a meltdown, the jobs market can soften. The "natural response" of employers is to be more cautious about adding workers when financial conditions tighten (Langfitt 2007). The attention now being paid to Minsky raises the questions, Who was this economist, and what did he have to say about market economies and financial instability?

Hyman Minsky was born in Chicago in 1919 and studied at the University of Chicago and Harvard University. He earned tenure as an economics professor at the University of California, Berkeley, but later moved to Washington University in St. Louis. From 1991 until his death in 1996, he worked as a senior scholar at The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. Minsky considered himself a Keynesian, which is not at all surprising since he served as a teaching assistant to Harvard's Alvin Hansen, who was sometimes called the leading disciple of Keynes in America. However, Minsky was not comfortable with the way Hansen and most in the economics profession interpreted Keynes.

Minsky believed there were two fundamentally distinct views of the workings of a market economy, one of which he associated with Adam Smith, the other, with Keynes. In the "Smithian" view, Minsky argued, the internal and inherent (endogenous) processes of markets generate an economic equilibrium (either a static equilibrium or a growth equilibrium). In the Keynesian view, however, Minsky maintained that endogenous economic forces breed financial and economic instability.

This leads to what Minsky interpreted as two very different views of business cycles. In the Smithian view, business cycles are the product of exogenous shocks--forces external to market processes. In fact, unanticipated public policy interventions are, from this vantage point, among the most commonly identified sources of cycles. Moreover, in a Smithian variant called "real business cycle theory," an economy is believed to be at full employment during all cycle stages.

According to what Minsky called the Keynesian view of business cycles, however, booms and busts are considered an inherent part of the system. In the Keynesian view, the ups and downs of the economy are a product of the internal dynamics of markets, and this instability is considered a genuine social problem, in part because cyclical downturns are seen to be associated with an increase in involuntary unemployment. In the 1950s and 1960s, much of the economics profession interpreted Keynes in a way that brought him into line with the Smithian view of markets. Minsky disagreed, and outlined an alternative interpretation in his 1975 book John Maynard Keynes (Minsky 1975). The book is a major American contribution to what these days is called post-Keynesian economics, a label that scholars like Minsky came to accept as a way of distinguishing themselves from economists who held on to the mainstream view of Keynes.

Minsky's reading of Keynes rests on Keynes's appreciation of the distinction between risk and uncertainty. A situation involving risk is one where probabilities can be assigned with confidence. A situation involving uncertainty is different--there are no precise probabilities to rely on. According to Keynes, in a situation characterized by uncertainty, our knowledge is based on a "flimsy foundation" and is "subject to sudden and violent changes" (Keynes 1937, pp. 214?15).

In Minsky's book on Keynes, the stress is on the central role that uncertainty plays in economic life. This is especially true in the accumulation of wealth, which is the aim of all capitalist investment activity. Minsky's emphasis is consistent with an article Keynes wrote summarizing his General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936), in which he states: "The whole object of the accumulation of wealth is to produce results, or potential results, at a comparatively distant, and sometimes at an indefinitely distant, date. Thus, the fact that our knowledge of the future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of classical economic theory" (Keynes 1937, p. 213). In other words, investment depends heavily on conventional judgments and the existing state of opinion, but ultimately, investment sits on an insecure foundation.

Another fundamental element in Minsky's 1975 book is that investment is given a central role in understanding a nation's aggregate output and employment. This emphasis is also rooted in Keynes's summary of his General Theory, in which, while admitting that investment is not the only factor upon which aggregate output depends, he stresses that "it is usual in a complex system to regard as the causa causans that factor which is most prone to sudden and wide fluctuation" (Keynes 1937, p. 221). ADVERTISEMENT World Currency Booklet! With the advent of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange's new cash-settled world currency options and futures, trading in the world of foreign exchange has taken on a new dimension! Learn choice of markets and accounts, contract sizes, specifications, style, and more!

Financial Instability versus Market Efficiency

While Keynes clearly stated that he thought conventional economics was unsuitable for studying the accumulation of wealth, the dominant view in contemporary finance and financial economics is an extension of the approach Keynes rejected. A core concept of conventional finance, for example, is the "efficient market hypothesis." According to that hypothesis, even if individual decision makers get asset prices or portfolio values wrong, the market as a whole gets them right, which means that financial instruments are driven, by an invisible hand, to some set of prices that reflect the underlying or fundamental value of assets. As finance professor Hersh Shefrin writes, "Traditional finance assumes that when processing data, practitioners use statistical tools appropriately and correctly," by which he means that, as a group, investors, lenders, and other practitioners are not predisposed to overconfidence and other biases (Shefrin 2000, p. 4).

Instead of believing in the efficient market hypothesis, Minsky developed what he dubbed the financial instability hypothesis (FIH). According to Minsky's theory, the financial structure of a capitalist economy becomes more and more fragile over a period of prosperity. During the buildup, enterprises in highly profitable areas of the economy are rewarded handsomely for taking on increasing amounts of debt, and their success encourages similar behavior by others in the same sector (because nobody wants to be left behind due to underinvestment). Increased profits also fuel the tendency toward greater indebtedness, by easing lenders' worries that new loans might go unpaid (Minsky 1975).

In a series of articles that followed his 1975 book, and in a later book titled Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (1986), Minsky fleshed out aspects of the FIH that come to the fore during an expansion. One of these is evolution of the economy (or a sector of the economy) from what he called "hedge" finance to "speculative" finance, and then in the direction of "Ponzi" finance. In the so-called hedge case (which has nothing to do with hedge funds), borrowers are able to pay back interest and principal when a loan comes due; in the speculative case, they can pay back only the interest, and therefore must roll over the financing; and in the case of Ponzi finance, companies must borrow even more to make interest payments on their existing liabilities (Minsky 1982, pp. 22?23, 66?67, 105?06; Minsky 1986, pp. 206?13).

A second facet of the FIH that received increasing emphasis from Minsky over time is its attention to lending as an innovative, profit-driven business. In fact, in a 1992 essay, he wrote that bankers and other intermediaries in finance are "merchants of debt, who strive to innovate with regard to both the assets they acquire and the liabilities they market" (Minsky 1992b, p. 6). As will be discussed in more detail below, both the evolutionary tendency toward Ponzi finance and the financial sector's drive to innovate are easily connected to the recent situation in the U.S. home loan industry, which has seen a rash of mortgage innovations and a thrust toward more fragile financing by households, lending institutions, and purchasers of mortgagebacked securities.

The expansionary phase of the FIH leads, eventually, to the Minsky moment. Trouble surfaces when it becomes clear that a high-profile company (or a handful of companies) has become overextended and needs to sell assets in order to make its payments. Then, since the views of acceptable liability structures are subjective, the initial shortfall of cash and forced selling of assets "can lead to quick and wide revaluations of desired and acceptable financial structures." As Minsky writes, "Whereas experimentation with extending debt structures can go on for years and is a process of gradually testing the limits of the market, the revaluation of acceptable debt structures, when anything goes wrong, can be quite sudden" (Minsky 1982, p. 67). Without intervention in the form of collective action, usually by the central bank, the Minsky moment can engender a meltdown, involving asset values that plummet from forced selling and credit that dries up to the point where investment and output fall and unemployment rises sharply. This is why Minsky called his FIH "a theory of the impact of debt on [economic] system behavior" and "a model of a capitalist economy that does not rely upon exogenous shocks to generate business cycles" (Minsky 1992b, pp. 6, 8). Understanding the Crunch from Minsky's Perspective

This brief is not the place for a comprehensive application of Minsky's FIH to the 2007 credit crunch. Fleshing out and connecting all the details are beyond what can be accomplished and presented here. Moreover, the event is still ongoing as of this writing. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some of the key elements that must play a role in a Minsky-oriented account of this crunch.

Start with the housing boom, which began around the year 2000. After the "dot-com" bubble burst at the dawn of the new millennium, real estate seemed the only safe bet to many Americans, especially since interest rates were unusually low. At the same time, lenders became more and more creative, and enticed new and increasingly less creditworthy home buyers into the market with exotic mortgages, such as "interest-only" loans and "option adjustable rate" mortgages (option ARMs). These loans involve low payments at the outset, but then are later reset in ways that cause the minimum payments to skyrocket. Banks do not have to report how many option ARMs they write, but the best estimates are that they accounted for less than 1 percent of all mortgages written in 2003, but close to 15 percent in 2006. In many U.S. communities, however, option ARMS accounted for around one of every three mortgages written in the past few years (Der Hovanesian 2006). Also add to the mix new players: unregulated mortgage brokers. In late 2006, brokers accounted for 80 percent of all mortgage originations--double their share from a decade earlier. Brokers do not hold the loan, and they do not have long-term relationships with borrowers: commissions are what motivate brokers. Many brokers pushed option ARMs hard because they were structured to be highly profitable for banks, which in turn offered the brokers high commissions on such loans.

This leads us to another piece of the puzzle: securitization of mortgages. In plain English, this means that bankers bundle dozens of mortgages together and sell the bundles to investment funds. Among the biggest purchasers of such structured packages have been hedge funds, which took advantage of their largely unregulated status and used these mortgage bundles as collateral for highly leveraged loans--often using the loans to buy still more mortgage bundles. According to BusinessWeek Banking Editor Mara Der Hovanesian (2006), the idea was that buyers of these bundles are pros at managing the risk. Minsky, however, would say that Der Hovanesian has put her finger on the source of an important part of the current problem: the mortgage bundles, financial derivatives (such as futures and options trading), and other investment tools widely used by these investment funds involve a lot more Keynesian uncertainty than probabilistic risk. This points to yet another element that plays a role in the current crunch: the credit rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's. These agencies rate debt packages for the banks that sell them, and their ratings are supposed to be a guide to the likelihood of default. However, the rating agencies are paid by the issuers of the securities, not by investors, so they are always under pressure to give good ratings unless not doing so is absolutely unavoidable--offering less-than-favorable ratings can mean losing business to other rating agencies. And these agencies have made a great deal of money in commissions on such work since 2001 (Coggan 2007).

The contribution of credit rating agencies to the credit crunch, however, involves more than the conflict of interest among the agencies and those they rate. On September 1, 2007, Christopher Huhne--a member of the British Parliament and an economist who worked for a number of years at a rating agency--discussed the agencies and the credit crunch on the British Broadcasting Corporation's World Business Review. After acknowledging that conflicts of interest are a perennial problem, he shifted the focus in a Minskyan direction: "The real problem [is] that financial markets fall in love. They fall in love with new things, with innovations, and the [important] thing about new things is that it is very difficult to assess the real riskiness of them because you don't have a history by definition" (Huhne 2007).

There's also a matter of "garbage in, garbage out." Because the rating agencies do not verify the information provided by mortgage issuers, they base their ratings on the information they are given. That brings us back to the commission-driven mortgage brokers, who have often steered borrowers to high-cost and unfavorable loans (Morgenson 2007), and to home appraisers, who do not usually get steady business unless they confirm the home prices that realtors want to hear (Morici 2007).

When the aforementioned elements (which are not meant to be a comprehensive list of factors contributing to recent financial-market events) are mixed together, one needs only to hit "fast-forward" to arrive at the observed wave of defaults by homeowners, highly leveraged mortgage lenders, an holders of mortgage-backed securities. In other words, the eventual destination is the credit crunch or Minsky moment, which hit in midsummer of 2007. At that point, borrowing and lending--and the hiring of additional workers--became more cautious across the board.

This new cautiousness was partly due to panic, but it was also partly due to recognition of the fact that precarious borrowing had woven its way into the entire system--indeed, into the global financial system--and nobody really knew exactly where the greatest dangers were. For example, here is an excerpt from the Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements, released in late June of 2007:

"Who now holds [the risks associated with the present era's new investment instruments]? The honest answer is that we do not know. Much of the risk is embodied in various forms of asset-backed securities of growing complexity and opacity. They have been purchased by a wide range of smaller banks, pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, other funds and even individuals, who have been encouraged to invest by the generally high ratings given to these instruments. Unfortunately, the ratings reflect only expected credit losses, and not the unusually high probability of tail events that could have large effects on market values (Bank for International Settlements 2007, p. 145)."

Today, these "large effects" are being felt on both Wall Street and Main Street. Industry estimates suggested in late April 2007, before Bear Stearns lost $20 billion on its own, that investors holding mortgage-backed bonds could lose $75 billion as a result of home loans given to people with poor credit. It has also been widely reported that more than two million holders of these so-called "subprime" mortgages could lose their homes to foreclosure (Pittman 2007). Indeed, U.S. mortgage foreclosure notices hit a record high in the second quarter of 2007--the third, record- setting quarterly high in a row (Associated Press 2007).

Despite the arrival of a Minsky moment, a meltdown is not likely to follow. On both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, central banks have stepped in as "lenders of last resort" to help maintain orderly conditions in financial markets and to prevent credit dislocations from adversely affecting the broader economy. Through action taken in August and September of 2007, for example, the Fed reduced the discount rate it charges banks, lowered the quality threshold on collateral used by banks to secure overnight borrowing, infused cash into the financial system, and engineered a decline in private sector interest rates by cutting the federal funds rate. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has also endorsed proposals for quick and temporary legislative action designed to protect some mortgage holders via government-backed enterprises, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Thomson Financial 2007). All of these responses to the credit crunch are consistent with what Minsky would have advised, though he would also have stressed acting to preempt financial-market excesses by means of more rigorous bank supervision and tighter regulation of financial institutions (Minsky 1986, pp. 313?28).

Nevertheless, the housing difficulties at the root of much of the credit crunch are likely to continue for some time. Layoffs among lending institutions are expected to be up sharply in the next few months. The peak in the upward resetting of monthly payments for holders of option ARMs is also expected to come toward the end of the year; and the resets will continue throughout 2008 (Nutting and Godt 2007). Since there is already a glut of homes on the market, the construction industry will most likely remain in a severe slump, and home prices can be expected to continue to fall. ADVERTISEMENT Leverage on Energy Movement Get your free Guide on Sector Index Options from Think or Swim.

Conclusion: "I Told You So"

This brief demonstrates that the 2007 credit crunch can be understood as a Minsky moment. It should also be stressed, however, that pulling out Minsky's ideas only during a crisis, then letting them fall back into obscurity when the crisis fades, does a disservice to his contributions, and to us all. Regardless of whether one is a student or a scholar, a policymaker or a private citizen, Minsky's writings continue to speak to us in meaningful ways about the financial system and economic dynamics. Although Minsky's career ended in 1996, his ideas are still relevant. His scholarship challenges a belief in the inherent efficiency of markets. As a consequence, it also challenges a laissez-faire stance toward economic policy. His ideas draw attention to the value of evolutionary and institutionally focused thinking about the economy.

Having worked with Minsky on a daily basis at the Levy Institute, I know that he would not have been surprised at all by the 2007 credit crunch and its impact on the U.S. employment report. While the reaction of mainstream economists was "I'm shocked," Minsky would likely have just nodded, and the twinkle in his eyes would have gently said, "I told you so."

Tuesday, November 13, 2007

Fitch Downgrades $37.2 Billion of CDOs

From Dow Jones (no link yet): Fitch Downgrades $37.2B Of CDOs, Slashing AAAs to Junk

Fitch Ratings downgraded Monday the credit ratings of $37.2 billion of global collateralized debt obligations, with more than $14 billion worth of transactions falling from the highest-rated AAA perch to speculative-grade, or junk, status.
...
The rating agency said more than 60 CDO transactions are still on watch for potential downgrade, with a resolution due on or before Nov. 21.

On Monday, nearly $20 billion worth of transactions was cut from investment-grade to junk, said Kevin Kendra, managing director at Derivative Fitch.
From AAA to Junk in one fell swoop!

Talk of Worst Recession Since the 1930s

After what Los Angeles money manager Arnold Silver called "a brutal three days," the question is: What now for the market?

A Wall Street superstar this year who runs Balestra Capital Partners, Jim Melcher, says he's "worried about a recession. Not a normal one, but a very bad one. The worst since the 1930s. I expect we'll see clear signs of it in six months with a dramatic slowdown in the gross domestic product."

Balestra Capital, a $350 million New York hedge fund, was up 3% for the past three market sessions, when the Dow Jones Industrials, spearheaded by widespread declines in financial stocks and fears of more billion-dollar-plus asset write-downs, tumbled more than 677 points, or about 4.5%. The Nasdaq fared worse, skidding about 7%, triggered by across-the-board declines in those fast-stepping technology stocks.

Balestra has increased in value by 175% so far this year, Mr. Melcher tells me. A 9-year-old fund, it has posted compounded annual growth of about 30% since its inception.

Mr. Melcher, a market bear, had some pretty discouraging words. "What I think is not good for the country, but good for me." he says. His basic advice to the country's roughly 80 million stock players: Run for the hills — the worst is far from over. An investor's stock portfolio now, he believes, should be only about half of what it might normally be.

With the housing market in a state of collapse — and he says he believes it is far from over — Mr. Melcher argues that average homeowners will not be able to withstand the kind of recession he sees, given the added burdens of rising energy and food costs, and continued deterioration in the credit markets.

Noting that consumption is already slowing, Mr. Melcher figures sharply rising unemployment is inevitable. Another of his worries is that central banks around the globe, America's included, are debasing their currencies, which is setting the stage for a new round of higher inflation. Our bear figures the next six to 12 months will be awful for investors as the market goes down "pretty substantially." His frightening outlook calls for an additional 20% to 30% decline from current levels. A drop of that magnitude would put the Dow down in a range of roughly 9,100 to 10,400.

Asked how he could conceivably give credibility to such an ominous forecast, Mr. Melcher observes: "I've never seen a market with more risk and what's significant is that risk is not yet priced in."

Given his grim expectations, he says there is no equity market in the world he would play right now. "When the American market goes down, other equity markets around the world should follow," he says.

As of now, his portfolio is pretty much devoid of stocks, save for an exchange-traded fund focused on leading companies in oil services, which he regards as an ongoing growth industry. The ETF, the Oil Services Holders Trust, trades on the American Stock Exchange under the symbol OIH. Although enthusiastic about the industry's growth prospects, Mr. Melcher says he would be reluctant to recommend oil services stock because he believes the price of oil could easily drop 50% in the recession he envisions.

Another danger he sees for the market is the prospect of huge withdrawals of funds from America by foreign investors due to the falling dollar, the credit crisis, and a slowing economy.

At the moment, Mr. Melcher's chief investment strategy is shorting stocks and certain bonds, notably mortgage-backed and junk bonds, through the use of derivatives, put options, and credit default swaps. He is also short ABEX, an index of residential mortgage-backed securities.

His short strategy is largely responsible for his super performance this year, as are his holdings in gold. The fact he's sticking to this strategy is evidence that he firmly believes the chaos in the financial markets is far from over. Mr. Melcher is also gung-ho on several currencies, particularly the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen.

The average investor, he believes, should seek to protect his assets by raising cash, putting money to work in short-term treasuries, and buying some gold (notably through StreetTRACKS Gold Trust, an ETF that tracks the price of the precious metal and trades on the Big Board under the symbol GLD).

Is the world coming to an end? I asked our bear. "I don't think so," he replied, "but as I mentioned, the ingredients are in place for the worst kind of a recession, which means it's the wrong time to own stocks

etrade internet traffic

amazing technical charts of etrade internet traffic

Peak "Money" - Kunstler

November 12, 2007

The multi-dimensional meltdown underway in the finance sector illustrates perfectly how the complex systems we depend on start to wobble and fail as soon as peak oil establishes itself as a fact in the public imagination. Mainly what it shows is that we don't have to run out of oil -- or even come close to that -- before the trouble starts. Just going over the peak and heading down the slippery slope of depletion is enough. Peak oil, it turns out, is also peak money. Or should we say, peak "money?"
First of all, what is finance exactly? I'd bet that a lot of people these days don't know, including many working in the financial "industry," as it has taken to calling itself. Finance, until very recently, was the means by which investment was raised for useful economic activities and productive ventures -- in other words, the deployment of capital, which is to say accumulated wealth. Historically, this accumulated wealth was pretty meager. There wasn't a whole lot to deploy and the deployment was controlled by a tiny handful of people statistically greater only than the number of Martians in the general population. They operated as families or clans, and everybody knew who they were: the Medici, the Rothschilds. Even the Roman Empire was a kind of financial Flintstones operation compared to what we see on CNBC these days. Not having the printing press, the Romans had to inflate their currency the old-fashioned way, by adding base metals to their gold coins. Finance in the 200-odd-year-long industrial era evolved step-by-step with the steady incremental rise of available cheap energy. More to the point, the instruments associated with finance evolved in complexity with that rise in energy. It was only about two-hundred years ago, in fact, that circulating banknotes or paper currencies evolved out of much cruder certificates that were little more than IOUs. Once printed paper banknotes became established, and institutions created to regulate them, the invention of more abstract certificates became possible and we began to get things like stocks and bonds, traded publicly in bourses or exchanges, which represented amounts of money invested or loaned, but were not themselves "money."
Much of this innovation occurred during the rise of the coal-powered economy of the 19th century. It accelerated with the oil-and-gas economy of the 20th century, up into the present time. So, for about 150 years -- or roughly since the end of the American Civil War -- we've had a certain kind of regularized finance that enjoyed continual refinement. Even in the face of cyclical traumas, like the Great Depression, currencies, stocks, and bonds retained their legitimacy if not always their face value.
Russia was a bizarre exception. Crawling out of the mud of medievalism relatively late in the game, Russia pretended to abjure capital while still faced with the need to deploy it in industry. They solved this paradox conditionally by disqualifying the Russian public from participation in any part of the industrial economy except the hard work, and pretended to pay them in promises for "a brighter future," which never arrived as long as the Soviets remained in charge. (The Russian people repaid the system by only pretending to work.)
In any case, finance for the purpose of deploying capital has prevailed as reality among people who use the implements of the dinner table, but something weird has happened to it in recent years. It has entered a stage of grotesque, hypertrophic metastasis that now threatens the life of the industrial organism it evolved to serve. Its current state can be understood in direct relation to the run-up to peak oil (peak fossil fuel energy, really, since coal and gas figure into it, too). The oil age, we will soon discover, was an anomaly. Many of the things that seemed "normal" under its regime will turn out to have been rather special. And as the beginning of the end of the oil age becomes manifest, these special things are starting to self-destruct pretty spectacularly.
For one thing, finance in the past twenty years has evolved from being an organ serving a larger organism to taking over the organism, becoming a kind of blind, raging dominating parasite on its former host. Or to put it less hyperbolically, it has become an end in itself. That is what they mean when they say that the financial sector has been "driving" the economy. A feature of this ghastly process has been the evolution of financial instruments into ever more abstract entities removed from reality-based productive activities. Stocks and bonds were understood to represent direct investment in enterprise. Sometimes the enterprise was a failure, and sometimes the people running it were swindlers, but no one doubted that common stock represented the hope for profit in a particular venture like making steel or selling laxative chemicals. The new "creatively-innovated" financial "derivatives" of recent years are now so divorced from any real activities or product that often the people trafficking in them don't understand what they're supposed to represent. I'd bet that more than half the people in the New York Stock exchange any given day could not explain the meaning of a credit default swap if a Taliban were holding their oldest child over a window ledge across Wall Street.
The innovation of mutant financial "products" is a symptom of the "crack-up boom" that characterizes society's response to peak oil. The main implication of peak oil for an industrial economy is that the 200-odd-year-long expectation for continued regular growth in combined energy-activity-and-productivity at roughly 3 to 7 percent a year under "normal" conditions -- that expectation is now toast. Under the new regime of peak oil and its aftermath, regular energy depletion, society can expect no further industrial growth but only contraction, and all the certificates, instruments, and operations associated with the expectation for further industrial growth lose their legitimacy. Seen in this light, one can then understand the temporary value of these mutant financial derivatives. They allowed participants to conceal the fact that these "investments" were not directed at productive enterprise. They also provided a cohort of sharpies with "vehicles" for converting the leftovers of the industrial economy into assets for themselves -- a form of looting, really. Hence, the employees of Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch gave themselves $50-million Christmas bonuses for trafficking in these inscrutable non-productive financial gimmicks, and were able to acquire fifty-room East hampton houses, Gulfstream jets, and impressionist paintings.
Of course, the aftermath might not be so pretty for these guys, since the next thing they may acquire could be long prison sentences. If they flee prosecution in their Gulfstream jets, they will not be able to take their Hamptons estates aboard with them. Those who remain may live to see mobs with flaming torches outside their windows, as in the "Frankenstein" movies of their suburban childhoods. But this has yet to play out.
For the moment it appears that we have entered the climax of the crack-up. The slick and inscrutable derivative vehicles infesting the ledgers of the investment banks, are now being systematically revealed as frauds of one kind or another, and, self-evidently lacking in worth. The process now underway is gruesome. The sheer dollar losses involved are almost as incomprehensible as the phony operations and instruments that they are derived from -- twelve billion here, nine billion there. As the late Senator Everett Dirkson once quipped, "sooner or later you're talking about real money...." Or are we? Is it money or "money." And if it's "money," what will become of it? And of us? How will it allow us to live?

Monday, November 12, 2007

Trading rules

1. All successful traders use methods that suit their personality; You are neither Waren Buffett nor Jesse Livermore; Don't think you can trade like them.

2. What the market does is beyond your control; Your reaction to the market, however, is not.

3. To be a winner, you have to be willing to take a loss

4. HOPE is not a word in the winning Trader's vocabulary

5. When you are on a losing streak, reduce your position size

6. Don't underestimate the time it takes to succeed as a trader -- it takes 10 years to become very good at anything

7. Trading is a vocation -- not a hobby

8. Have a business/trading plan

9. Identify your greatest weaknesses, Be honest about them -- and DEAL with it

10. There are times when the best thing to do is nothing; Learn to recognize these times

11. Being a great trader is a process. It's a race with no finish line.

12. Other people's opinions are meaningles to you. Make your own trading decisions

13. Analyze your past trades. Study what happened to the stocks after you closed the position. COnsider your P&L game tapes and go over them the way Vince Lombardi reviewed past Superbowls

14. Excessive leverage can knock you out of the game permanently

15. The Best traders continue to learn -- and adapt to changing conditions

16. Don't just stand there and let the truck roll over you

17. Being wrong is acceptable -- staying wrong is unforgivable

18. Contain your losses

19. Good traders manage the downside; They don't worry about the upside

20. Wall street research reports are biased

21. Knowing when to get out of a position is as important as when to get in

22. To excel, you have to put in hard work

23. Discipline, Discipline, Discipline !

Friday, November 09, 2007

The Decline of the West, Act II

Truth and Beauty (… and Russian Finance)


Global Macros and Mayhem 2 Global Markets How to Trade ‘em 13 Acceleration of Economic Change - A Short -The Amazing Shrinking Dollar 15 History of Time 4 -Asian Markets One man’s bubble 16 Asia’s New Asian Millennium 5 -EMEA Catch-up time 16 George Bush and the Fall of the West -G7 Equity Markets 17 Economics 6 Commodities Revenge of the Old Economy 18 Fear and loathing in the Capital Markets 7 Agricultural Prices 18 -Against Economic Calvinism 8 Russian equities Bloodied by not bowed 19 Global Turbulence Blowback for the Empire 11 The Easy Money Rouble Bonds 19

Write Fast then Run like Hell!

Verily, we live in interesting times. Strategists in particular feel a bit like rabbits on the first day of the hunt. As the volatility in markets continues, we live in constant fear of issuing a brave call hitting the “send” button then promptly being made total fools of as the market spins back into crisis mode. Perhaps we should learn to live with it any given call will almost certainly be “right” at some time over the next 30 days (and stopped clocks tell the right time far more frequently than do most strategists at global investment banks)! Credit Markets the Fire THIS Time Quite extraordinarily, a clutch of sober, senior and very, very serious Wall Street bankers has been allowed to create a Frankenstein’s monster which now threatens the global financial market with massive destruction. This monster was built upon a foundation which any school child should have known to be hopelessly unstable extention of unlimited, inadequately collateralized credit to individuals clearly unable to repay. The US credit market is in even worse shape than is commonly acknowledged. Large segments of it are now broadly insolvent. There is a single theme underlying the entire debacle the US mortgage market, both Prime and Sub-Prime. Forgive the colourful language, but the “cancer of bad housing loans” has infiltrated itself so widely throughout the financial body as to imperil not just the housing market itself, but also the corporate high-yield debt market (via CLOs), the vitally important municipal bonds market (thanks to the near-bankrupt monoline bond insurers) and the banking system itself. The bank regulators have been badly discredited the rating agencies shown to be criminally negligent. We will almost certainly see the failure of one or more major financial institutions before the carnage abates. A series of bailout operations by the Federal Reserve is now both vitally necessary and very much to be expected. $$$ - Once Fooled Twice Shy Rather than actually doing something to support its currency, the US Treasury Department has long reassured itself that global investors would continue to throw good money after bad, thanks to their “deep faith in US debt markets the world’s deepest and most liquid; if so, this faith has been ill-rewarded as a wave of CDO defaults blows dozens of European and Japanese institutions out of the water; presumably, they shall henceforth take a slightly more jaundiced view. Yes, liquidity is cool, but fundamentals still count! Similarly, while the UST is not yet pricing in any default risk, the currency in which it is denominated has proved a bad bet. Ironically, the undoubtedly shallow and illiquid Russian bond markets have proved a far, far safer bet…while recently, there was a brief bout of mark-to-market damage, there have been no credit events; and investors face the comforting prospect of receiving both full interest and principal in fine.

Global Macros and Mayhem Those who cling to the memory of the economic primacy of Atlantic Alliance have taken to reminding us of the Japanese Bubble predicting that history shall repeat itself and China’s secular rise will prove equally unsustainable... “Bollocks!” we say. Like China, Japan grew fast based upon an authoritarian, export-driven politico-economic model with massive, state-sponsored investment in Capex. Beyond that, both countries are Asian, and Westerners can easily confuse Chinese and Japanese tour groups -the similarity ends there. Vitally, Japan was a fairly old country with a modestly-sized population, at least relative to that of China. Thus, as Japan’s GDP per capita reached the levels of the industrialized West, the rate of growth naturally levelled off. Undoubtedly, this same phenomenon would occur in China, the day its 1.5 billion people attained a European standard of living. Needless to say, by that (very hypothetical) point, its economy would dwarf that of Europe and America combined! We do not expect to see this happen due to the limited global resources available to subtend industrial growth, and expect to see an increasingly brutal competition for resources develop first. That, fortunately, is for a subsequent issue, and in the near term, we expect to see China reshape the post-war global politico-economic montage far faster than would have seemed conceivable ten years ago.

The Dollar Regime Change Our safest trading call remains our long-standing dollar short the EUR has just broken our first target $1.45, first suggested in 2004 -with patience, all things come. Disturbingly, the devaluation is occurring much faster than we had thought possible the USD has weakened by almost 4 big figures, from 1.415 to 1.4540, in the week since we started drafting this issue. Whilst a gradual, orderly decline in the dollar is in everyone’s interest (the Americans’ most of all), a sudden collapse could be calamitous. Everyone in particular, every central bank has some skin in this game, and presumably, will wish to ensure at worst an orderly demise of the world’s erstwhile reserve currency.

Mistakes, however, can happen and powerful, poorly understood forces are at work; a disorderly unwind with a panicked sale of US assets, soaring US treasury yields, disruption of trade flows and possibly, of dollar-based commodities markets would not be a happy event for anyone involved. As owners of dollar assets take an increasingly devastating hit to their net worth, we are seeing panicked sellers foreign private entities are net sellers, as are an increasing number of sovereigns. The Bank of America estimated this week that the US outflows of funds into foreign bonds and equities are likely to reach $290bn this year. Are currency controls next? As an interesting corollary, according to Chris Granville’s Trusted Sources, the G7 finance ministers spent an inordinate amount of time agonizing about the new sovereign wealth funds. It is quite extraordinary that the deficit countries expect the rising economic powers to continue accumulating constantly depreciating currency, simply to help support the deficit spending of the governments in question spending often directly inimical to their own interests. Instead, they are now planning to actually do something with their money - in a striking reversion of the classical roles, buying productive assets in the industrialized world.

The King is Dead! We live in troubled times. “Faith-based” economic mismanagement, with its convenient belief in the ultimate sustainability of a model whereby the world at large will forever finance the mushrooming US trade and budgetary deficits, has effectively killed the dollar as a store of value this, coupled while the secular rise of Asia and the newly industrialized economies, has sharply decreased at least the relative weight of the US economy. Fundamentally, we are facing not just another bout of financial volatility we are experiencing the economic equivalent of “regime change”. The fundamental tenets of the post-war global economy are quickly becoming obsolete: both the US dollar as the ultimate anchor against which all other assets are valued, and the overwhelming primacy of the American economy (indeed, of the West, as a bloc) have been fatally tainted. Those who chose to ignore these shifts do so at their own peril. Accelerate me up, Scotty! What we find truly extraordinary is the accelerating rate at which this shift is occurring. T&B is on the record predicting a dollar at 1.45/Euro and $100 oil but certainly, at the beginning of this year, we would never have foreseen either event occurring in 20071. Thus, as the world accelerates into the vortex of a generalized global catastrophe the contours of which we can only vaguely apprehend (see appendix II The Fire THIS Time) not only is the rate of change accelerating, but the rate of acceleration is itself accelerating second and third derivatives come into play.

A Bull in a Candy Store Global markets are currently both frightening and elating. Given the self-organizing nature of market economies, as the old system crumbles, a new meta-stable system will certainly emerge what is less clear is whether this will be a smooth, continuous process. We can only guess at the contours of this new system. Certainly, it will be multipolar, probably with a strong regional flavour. Given the absence of any obvious substitute for the US dollar, there will likely be a series of systems built around various stores of value: an Asian currency system, the Euro, perhaps systems anchored by the value of ounces of gold, even bushels of wheat and barrels of oil. Bridges will quickly form between the various components of this balkanized system. Now, more than ever before in living memory, investors must remain intellectually flexible, ready to abandon long-held preferences and practices at a moment’s notice. Old reflexes can be dangerously maladaptive in a new world as just one example, international investors who retreated to the perceived safety of US treasury bills at the beginning of this year (much less, to “high-grade” US debt securities) have suffered a substantial erosion of their wealth. Russian rouble bonds widely seen as high-risk assets have proved to be infinitely safer than Investment-grade CDOs. More controversially, Russian bank debt may turn out to be far safer than the paper of some of the major Western Investment banks. 1 Oil prices are now driven by a combination of fundamental supply/demand factors and financial drivers in particular, long-only US investment funds which have recently been buying protection against $100 oil leading the investment banks to hedge their exposure by going long the underlying commodity ed: thanks to W.A!

Acceleration of Economic Change

- A Short History of Time A man born in 1700 would have likely died in a world which had seen only very limited change. Economic relationships were fixed and regulated by long tradition, society was stable and predictable, the majority of men lived on the land, worked as their fathers had, and expected their children to inherit a world largely unchanged from the one they knew. Likewise politics: empires rose and fell slowly, over centuries. France had risen to become the preeminent European state by the early 18th Century; she remained so for some two hundred years. The seeds for the rise of what was to become National Germany were planted during the Napoleonic wars; the resultant tree grew disruptively into the middle of the 20th century. The Turkish Empire declined for some 250 years before finally giving up the ghost, playing its part in the bloody onset to the century just ended. The old Europe was inwards-looking. Given the huge costs and relative uncertainty of transportation, until the middle of the 19th century the impact of trade was very limited primarily based upon the importation of luxury goods from Asia and precious metals from the Americas. The agrarian societies of Asia and the Americas were tradition-bound, intellectually immobile, and inward-looking; they were little affected by the technological change which was transforming the West. Europe’s undisputed pre-eminence was due as much to a pragmatic and positivist intellectual approach as to her superior technology. The conquest of Mexico by a handful of Spanish adventurers was repeated throughout the Americas, resulting in a continent divided into a series of agrarian, hierarchical Catholic societies with deeply inflexible class structures, a conservative outlook, and widespread poverty Following the classic colonialist model, these countries were exploited for their commodities and kept as captive markets for excess industrial production, first by Spain, later by the United States (The Monroe Doctrine) The first experiments with left-wing revolution failed, both due to external pressure and to the maladaptive nature of the classical Marxist model; most Latam economies thus remained essentially feudal until recently, when a fundamental shift in global trading patterns allowed new experiments in alternative growth models . Likewise Asia, where despite a rich and complex high culture and substantial scientific achievement, Asian societies were loath to embrace technology i.e. the pragmatic application of knowledge. Having invented gunpowder and early artillery, the Chinese themselves had no workable guns to fend off European raiders. With the obvious exception of Japan, the first non-European nation to defeat a major world power in 1905, and despite brief moments in the sun for the likes of Argentina and Brazil as one or another commodity came into demand, this situation remained essentially unchanged until the 1960s. Trade in vital commodities, in particular oil, was almost entirely controlled by companies domiciled in the industrialized West; the commodity exporters - mined for their resources - were essentially passive price-takers. Indeed, seen from Europe, the emerging world seemed primitive and comical lazy, happy natives lying in the sun eating fruit - impoverished, tradition-bound societies obviously inferior to the civilized and prosperous industrial world of Europe and its English-speaking offshoots.

The Dragons Resume Smoking This seemingly immutable divide between the industrialized nations and the third world began to erode with the rise of the Asian Dragons. First a resurgent Japan, rising from the ashes to undergo radical modernization and industrialization, transformed itself from a primarily-agrarian backwater into a first world country. By the 1970s, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore authoritarian, centralized states hell-bent upon transformation in a single generation, became serious players. Other Asian states sought to emulate their more successful neighbours. Yet the true tipping point was the rise of China growth has been extraordinarily fast for the past two decades, but given the extremely low baseline, it is only in the past few years that it has belatedly been recognized as being one of the world’s most important economies (number one in terms of the gross volume of GDP growth, impact on global prices for consumer goods, as well as effects upon commodity prices).

The sheer size of the Chinese economy is by now daunting. A decade ago, China was strictly the appanage of Asian strategists no one else much cared. It is now inconceivable that a global strategy piece should be drafted without giving pride of place to China! Equally, as a working hypothesis, the limited effect of the subprime crisis on global markets can be explained by the resilience of the Chinese and Indian markets. If this decoupling can be sustained, it will accelerate the Eastward shift in the global centre of economic gravity. Future Shock 220V History does not repeat itself…Historians repeat themselves! The single greatest danger to the investor is to indulge his apparently inborn tendency towards intellectual conservatism the belief that things will always be as they are today. Perhaps a useful trait in a stable, predictable world, it becomes a crippling impediment to adaptation during times of rapid change. Even for those at least vaguely cognizant of the major events surrounding them, there is a huge resistance to accepting the implications of these events i.e. the disruption of tried-and-true traditional models. One of the best examples was the behaviour of the oil analysts. From 1998 until about a year ago, thanks to their highly sophisticated (if increasingly-irrelevant) supply/demand models, almost to a man they warned of the impending collapse of crude prices back to its “long-term average” of, say, $25. In the meantime, oil prices have surged some 900% intellectual conservatism in action! It is not that the analysts are fools simply, their finely-honed mathematical models, which had proved so useful in the past, offered a comfortably “scientific” means of extrapolating present trends into the future. The hugely inconvenient fact that an elephant China had entered into the elevator was simply ignored; in fact, this single factor has itself outweighed all of the other changes measured by the models. More recently, commodities analysts have fallen victim to the same fallacy, predicting a collapse in commodities prices due to an incipient US recession the fact that Chindia has replaced the US as the primary source of incremental commodities demand has apparently been missed. .

In Summary T&B believes that the current financial crisis and shift in global growth patterns is not merely a fluctuation within a relative continuum nor even a cyclical function; instead, it falls within a fundamental discontinuum; our basic assumptions are now that: - The centre of economic gravity is shifting away from the G7 it will not return in our lifetimes. As a result of the economic shift, the global political/diplomatic context will see a radical change. - For the first time in modern history, the world will be deprived of a single reference currency against which all others can fluctuate. A multi-currency system including not just classical currencies but also ounces of gold and perhaps bushels of wheat/barrels of oil will have to fill the gap. - Increasing prosperity may prove to be not a factor for peace, but rather, for a dangerous exacerbation of conflict, as increasingly-wealthy emerging nations compete with the old G7 countries for scarce resources…

Asia’s New Asian Millennium As we have noted previously, one of the most interesting aspects of the current crisis is that it will test our fundamental financial thesis that growth in the emergings is now self-sustaining, and that the centre of economic gravity has shifted from New York/London to Beijing/Bombay. While it is too early to arrive at any final judgments, T&B has clearly won the first round. While the short-term volatility in financial markets remains primarily driven by events on Wall Street, the real economies of Emerging Asia have not yet suffered any damage. Thus, as G7 equities have stagnated, Asian indices have boomed, both on surging liquidity as well as on signs of accelerating economic growth. As of this writing, the economic fundamentals have been decoupling smartly. As the US faces a housing recession, Japan is threatened with a renewal of deflation, and Europe struggles to avoid being sucked into the credit-withdrawal vortex. Chinese GDP has just printed at 11.5%. Singapore, India, Korea, even the Philippines and Indonesia are showing unexpectedly rapid growth. Russia is likely to come in well above 7.5%. Selected commodity prices are on a rampage - prices for oil, iron ore, as well as fertilizers, agriculturals, shipping (Baltic Dry Index) and most base metals suggest a continuation of rapid demand growth.

Again, whilst US imports of consumer goods are trending down, the real test is what will happen when US demand is hit by recession. As the value of the dollar plunges, and the credit squeeze hits, US consumers will be obliged to begin saving, thus decreasing the demand for imports. We continue to expect this to primarily affect those countries most dependent upon sale of high value goods Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, rather than those who fill up the shelves of the Wal-Marts of this world China, Vietnam, Thailand, etc. Nevertheless, to some extent, all will be faced with the need to find alternative markets in the Asia-Pacific region, and especially, to stimulate their own internal demand. If they succeed, then a new era will be upon us; if not, then the transformation will be delayed until the next cyclical trough. In any event, financial markets are increasingly discounting a decoupling. For the first time, average P/E ratios in the emerging markets are higher than those in the Atlantic countries…not surprising, given that emerging GDP growth rates are three times those in the G7, while fiscal policy has been far more virtuous in the major emerging markets than in their developed peers.

George Bush and the Fall of the West - Economics There are those who view history as a purely mechanistic process, with the rise and fall of great empires pre-ordained. In this view, statesmen are seen as mere actors, playing their roles in a tragedy not of their own conception. A contrary view, one espoused by our favourite modern historian, AJP Taylor, is that much of history is due to blind chance the stumblings of men across an unlit stage. Whether or not the relative decline of the American Empire became a certainty on the day after its greatest triumph the fall of the Berlin Wall is purely speculative, but unipolar global political systems have reliably proved labile, providing a compelling target for all of those outside the charmed circle. Diplomacy aside, simple economic determinism the secular rise of China and the other Asian powers is now inexorably diluting out the economic primacy of the West. What should be clear is that the election of George Bush in a rigged Florida election (albeit, confirmed 4 years later in a poll widely viewed as relatively free and fair) sharply accelerated this process. The election of what is now widely seen as the worst US administration in living memory, as well as the catastrophic failure of a finely-honed system of checks and balances to restrain the Presidential ability to make mischief, has a price. As was briefly the case during the late Reagan presidency, great empires may well fly for some time on autopilot they do not fly well with a chimp at the controls! It would have been extraordinary had a Bush regime which has proved so extravagantly incompetent in its foreign and domestic policies failed to do its bit to cripple the US economy. From the purely domestic standpoint, crony capitalism has flourished, while the increasing propensity to live beyond one’s means has masked a precipitous decline in social mobility once the mainstay of the American credo. Relatively unconcerned with US domestic issues, T&B will focus instead upon the international implications. The dangerous combination of gross incompetence and extraordinary arrogance characterizing Bush’ international diplomacy has also marked US economic policy: “deficits don’t matter” was the credo ‘faith-based’ economics the theology. Early in the Bush presidency, so as to brush away the inconvenient strictures imposed by economic reality, the new administration deliberately appointed compliant and ideologically pure non-economists to key economic policy positions. O’Neill and Snow could be reliably counted upon to countenance whatever policies suited the Neocon ideologues. Thus, in a grotesque expansion of Reagonomics, they convinced themselves that military spending could be driven to levels reminiscent of the late USSR, while taxes (at least for the wealthy) could be slashed; this would result not in massive deficits, but in a balanced Federal budget because they wished it to be thus. This childlike faith extended to the general populace which briefly enjoyed the delights of cheap credit, disavings, and home equity extraction. The laws of gravity are now extracting their brutal revenge.

The Kindness of Strangers The US budget balance, briefly in surplus under Clinton (an almost unheard of feat for the old, industrialized democracies),has swung into deep structural deficit; whilst the extent of this shift was temporarily masked by the enhanced tax revenues generated by a burst of credit-fuelled economic growth, it will be seriously exacerbated by the coming downturn, and will require substantial, pro-cyclical tax hikes in a recessionary environment (in turn, requiring the Fed to run an extremely accommodative monetary policy).

A recent study by the US Congress put the potential cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at as much as $2.7 trillion (under a moderately pessimistic scenario, and including compounded interest). The fundamental problem is not the deficit per se (other countries run larger ones as a proportion of their GDP) but rather the fact that, given US disavings - unlike Japan, France or Italy (but very much like Turkey and Estonia) the deficit must be financed entirely by foreigners. Those foreigners who have rushed to do so are now taking a nasty hit on their dollar holdings presumably, they will now be increasingly disinclined to provide further financing. Funding the US deficit could thus prove to be a far stickier undertaking than in the past. Again, gross incompetence and the conscious decision to see the world as it should be, rather than as it is, has a price. Payback time is at hand. While there is reason to hope that the coming US recession will be relatively mild, it is also likely to be prolonged, and to provide a convenient historic milestone marking the secular decline in US economic preponderance, at least in relative terms. This will be accompanied by a substantial decline in living standards as wealth is destroyed and the dollar loses much of its value. Eventually, the weak dollar will lead to a rebalancing of the trade deficit, consumers will be compelled to save enough to fund the US deficit, and (after an overshoot) the dollar will find a floor. The US may well avoid slipping into absolute decline, but in economics, as in politics, the era of absolute American pre-eminence is over. It is not coming back.

Fear and loathing in the Capital Markets Given the boom in Asian markets, the collapsing dollar, and the resultant run-up in commodity prices any half-competent international asset manager should currently be shooting the lights out if he had the courage to short credit indices, then he is an absolute hero. And yet speaking to our peers in Europe and Asia T&B has encountered a generous dose of fear, mixed in with the greed. Investment Banking Always Darkest…just before it goes Pitch Black Each time someone suddenly turns on the light switch in the financial kitchen and the market begins to take a closer look at the doings of the major investment banks, we encounter not just an almost inconceivable measure of greed but also, of raw stupidity. Thus, the bluest of the blue-blooded have been grievously mauled, and it is to be expected that at least one major financial institution will go bankrupt (or at least, be acquired under distressed circumstances) before this is over. Most extraordinarily, Merrill Lynch may be looking at a $30 billion dollar writedown (an achievement for which Stan O’Neal, Merrill’s outgoing president, is to be paid a modest $161M…) in a subprime crisis which any adult economist should have seen coming (this is not back-trading T&B warned of it repeatedly, as did, in far greater detail, a host of independent global strategists, notably Marc Faber). As of this writing, the list grows longer by the day: Bear Sterns, UBS, Citigroup, Bank of America, and predictably a host of Japanese banks. The Europeans also took a hit, stupidly competing with the American banks for a piece of the latest bubble. Typically reminiscent of its heroic role in the Russian financial crisis only Goldmans looks to come out relatively unscathed. Although they created some of the most egregious structured products (one of them nominated as the Worst Deal of the Year in what is proving to be a veritable kennel club a leveraged, collateralized structure based upon second mortgages with virtually zero homeowner equity, it was truly innovative given the almost complete absence of any recourse!) At least Goldmans had the good sense to then go massively short the entire CDO market! The systematic optimism of the economic commentators is heart-warming but misguided. Each time three days go by without another implosion of a bank/hedge fund/investment vehicle we hear that old chorus of “Thank Heavens, the worst is past!” Though T&B is certainly not predicting the apocalypse, equally, the worst is nowhere near past. The US/UK housing markets have a wretched 18 months ahead of them, promising a continual flood of defaults on the mortgage loans which provide the vital biomass which feeds almost the entire leveraged financial montage. Defaulting mortgages will mean massive losses for holders of the CDOs and SIVs. These, in turn, have been incorporated into a wide variety of other financial products, all of which are going to lose money. As the underlying loans go bad, they will continue to turn up in the most unexpected places. With a bit of luck, and a very proactive central bank, the financial system will have the time to absorb these losses, growing its way out of the problem; but anyone who imagines the losses will just go away is delusional.

Likewise the investment banks - do not be fooled by their carefully cultivated images nor by all those reassuring 4-colour press advertisements. They are large carnivores predators driven by a combination of greed and survival instinct in a viciously competitive environment to extract increasingly huge sums of money (“create value”) from the underlying economy; in recent years, as corporate profitability has grown faster than GDP, an increasingly large share of economic activity has been captured by the financial system much of the “growth” in the international economies has occurred in a fundamentally parasitic sector essentially specialized in the moving of money from one pocket to the other.2 Darwin has been at work here with the disintermediation of lending, as well as the commoditization of bond and share trading, the banks have been obliged to forage far-and-wide to feed their copious appetites. Recently, they thought to find their salvation in structured finance a wonderful example of the ability to extract substance from nothingness. Note that these are the same banks which essentially lost more than their entire combined profits for the previous hundred years in the emerging markets debt crisis of the 1980s. Having bought into the convenient fiction sovereigns could never default, they built a nice franchise recycling the huge mass of petrodollars created in the aftermath of the oil embargo into Latin America. When starting with Mexico these hopelessly over-indebted and recession-struck borrowers began defaulting, the entire US banking system became insolvent. They were saved by the regulators, who allowed them to continue to mark their non-performing loans at 100%. It took them a decade to grow out of the problem. The resulting “moral hazard” was an irrelevance. They will never 2 The author acknowledges his own membership in this fundamentally-parasitic clan it certainly beats working for a living! repeat the same stupid mistakes though their ability to find new ones never ceases to amaze! Under the circumstances, and given the nature of the beasts essentially pass-through structures where the top producers take home most of the profits it would have been miraculous had they failed to leverage up their new investment vehicles to the point where they endangered their very survival. No miracle was forthcoming, and verily the bluest of the blue-blooded have been bloodied to the extent that their independence is threatened. And thus, we encounter: The Dumbest Headline of the Month : “Fed May Be Done Cutting as Inflation Risk Increases” T&B is willing to make a largish bet that the Fed is nowhere near finished with the rate cuts. They are understandably doing their best to manage expectations, but in the absence of hard evidence of increasing core inflation, their first priority will be to avoid a meltdown of the financial and housing sectors. Rate cuts and a steepening of the curve can do wonders for a wounded banking system, whilst lower rates will have an immediate pass-through effect on borrowers having floating rate mortgages. We continue to believe that we will see a 3­handle on Fed rates before this is done, and that the Fed will remain in rate-cutting mode through end-2008.

-Against Economic Calvinism Von Sacher-Masoch : The Greatest of the “Austrian” Economists? Each day it seems, T&B reads yet another tirade demanding that terrible punishment be visited upon those who got caught in compromising positions under the influence of copious liquidity. The saintly Greenspan has been revealed as nothing more than the Devil’s accomplice, and his host of followers soft, pink and fat are to be scourged and shrived to save their immortal souls. One indignant columnist demands that “millionaire investors” who took advantage of the leverage on offer should be made to pay the Fed should tighten rates to support the currency (shades of 1929…), the US Treasury should allow the commercial paper market to implode, the ECB should let banks go bankrupt, SIVs collapse, financial markets should fail, all so that a chastened human race should turn away from sin, living according to the words of the gospel sober, frugal…and very, very poor.

Some of T&B’s favourite macroeconomic pundits aside, the current crisis sweeping through global capital markets is not the end of the world as we know it. Properly managed it will not bring the global (or even the US-) economy to a screeching, grinding halt; it will not cause a collapse in all asset prices, nor create global hyperinflation sending gold prices into the 5 digits. The dollar will not lose all (perhaps most…but not “all”) of its value. For once, the central banks, both European and American, have done precisely what they should have done maintaining an adequate level of liquidity to prevent the seizing up of credit markets. Even the much-maligned ‘super SIV plan’ if successful is an absolute godsend. The total meltdown in a one-trillion dollar market for commercial paper is a recipe for disaster not for recession, but rather, for outright depression. Central banks were not designed as vehicles for divine retribution, but rather, as institutions devoted to maintaining the viability of their financial systems, without which the real economy fails, disrupting the lives of millions of ordinary people. Markets have no magic. They make mistakes. They blow bubbles which collapse, and the collapse can cause huge and durable destruction of value. The economic masochism which demands that the culpable pay for their misdeeds is somewhere between misguided and insane. It is akin to suggesting that no one should have tried to extinguish the fires at Chernobyl after the operator’s intellectual curiosity led to a loss of control over the reactor. In fact, the guilt parties had already been irradiated. It was the neighbours who were at risk. The moral hazard argument is vacuous for the simple reason that no one is ever going to do the same awesomely stupid things again they will do other equally stupid things -but not the same ones. No amount of punishment for the culpable will prevent future folly. Future bubbles will be blown in new and unexpected places like dictators, successful bankers will always imagine themselves immune from the punishments meted out to their predecessors3. After the debt crisis of the 1980s, the global banks stopped sovereign lending, never to resume. The US S&L crisis put an end to the S&Ls. Following the tech wreck the problem shifted elsewhere internet IPOs ceased to be a problem. CDOs were invented. 3 Mr. O’Neals $161. golden handshake suggests that they are correct…. Letting the financial system collapse to warn bankers against doing silly things is like shooting fallen dictators to make sure that no one does it again. The nature of man is that he sees death all around him, yet does not believe that he himself shall die. An endless supply of dictators will always be available…and of risk-tolerant bankers too. Each feels sure that he will be the exception to every rule. By all means shoot a few of each, pour encourager les autres, but never believe that this will prevent future mistakes. Thus the era of the adjustable subprime loan with a teaser rate, of commercial paper based on worthless assets supposedly rendered viable by their short term-structure and of collateralized debt obligations of dubious provenance etc. is gone. Dead as the dodo. They are not coming back. The banks which engaged in ill-advised lending are taking massive write-downs Merrill’s initially reported $8bn loss was impressive even by recent standards it now it looks like that may have been just the tip of the iceberg. Hundreds of smaller mortgage lenders now sleep in a watery grave. Some two million Americans will lose their homes, and somewhere between 2-7 trillion (yes, that’s trillion) will be wiped off the US real estate market. Guillotines are being set up in the lobbys of US investment banks, with their presidents the first to step onto the escalator…ergo, punishment is not in short supply.

Who Said Investment Banks Lacked a Sense of Humour? Leafing through a recent back issue of The Economist strategically placed in our bathroom, T&B found the most delightful advert by Merrill Lynch

If we allow Merrills the benefit of the doubt by assuming that they did not know what the hell they were buying when they stuffed their own book full of hugely-complex toxic waste, we must assume that not only did the investors not understand what it was they were buying, but that Mother Merrills was equally at sea. As for whom one would want in the room we leave it to the readers` imagination personally, we think a priest would be a good idea, probably a model (you are going to end up marking your new product to her), perhaps someone from the bomb squad…and a whole bunch of attorneys!

Global Turbulence Blowback for the Empire Iran Mohammad Mosaddeq Or why do they hate us so? Amazingly, Condoleezza Rice, perhaps the most incompetent Secretary of State in American history, has just declared that Iran is the “greatest security threat facing the United States.” While the reasons for this obsession perhaps nothing more than an attempt to deflect domestic attention from their hugely successful efforts to “liberate” Afghanistan and Iraq are not entirely clear, the statement itself is obvious nonsense. As we have remarked previously, the greatest threat is Pakistan and the sorcerer’s apprentices in Washington have predictably succeeded in fouling up the single most dangerous foreign policy dossier on the planet. By putting all of their chips on Musharraf, the Bush regime repeated the US errors in the runup to the eminently-predictable overthrow of the Shah of Iran finding themselves totally cut off from the moderate opposition, and thus, from any of the potential successors. As a result, they were unable to switch mounts, and when a new leader swept aside the Shah’s rotten edifice, it was of course the one most inimical to their interests the Ayatollah Khomeini. Predictably, the US foreign policy establishment cajoled, bribed and prodded Musharraf into initiating a suicidal policy a hugely unpopular war against the radical, Taliban-aligned tribes in Pakistan’s border regions. Given the unmitigated hatred with which the US is viewed in most of the Islamic world, not excluding Pakistan (according to the Pew Survey, only Palestine and Turkey are more anti-American), an alliance with Washington was the kiss of death. Having failed in a desperate, last minute attempt to slip in a more compliant politician in Musharraf’s steed, Washington is now reduced to watching passively as Musharraf ignores his erstwhile masters, declaring martial law, and throwing his country into something looking dangerously like civil war. In Eastern Pakistan, military units are reportedly defecting to the rebels; elsewhere, a political free-for-all is underway. Most terrifyingly, the world at large is now faced with a high-cost, if low-likelihood danger of a Taliban-style state armed to the teeth with REAL nuclear-tipped missiles, not with the Iranian variety potential, hypothetical, some­day nuclear weapons but real ones, fully tested and ready to fire. Those 40 Virgins awaiting martyrs in Heaven should be getting ready for some heavy traffic there’s likely to be something of a virgin shortage soon….

Meanwhile, back in Teheran The Pakistan story aside, to everyone except perhaps the folk in Washington, it should be obvious that, rather than being the threatened party, in recent years it has been the United States to have posed the greatest threat to Iran’s security, first planning and supporting a coup that replaced the populist government of Mosaddeq with a puppet dictator beholden to the US4, then sponsoring the slaughter of millions of Iranians in the Iraq-Iran war. Regarding the first, in cahoots with a United Kingdom irate that the Iranians should presume to exert ownership over the massive oil deposits conveniently situated beneath their soil, the CIA engineered the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddeq, installing a corrupt, brutal and widely hated puppet regime under a tame Shah. When this regime was finally overthrown in a popular uprising led by the Ayatollah Khomeini (an uprising which included not only the religious fundamentalists, but also virtually that entire segment of the Iranian bourgeoisie not personally related to the corrupt and brutal Rezi family i.e. the bazaris) it was only to be expected that they vented their spleen on the erstwhile (neo-) colonial power the United States. The US embassy was occupied and its staff held hostage in a major humiliation which spelled the death-knell for the Carter presidency. 4 Before rolling their eyes, readers who suspect T&B lacks in balance would do well to run a Google search on “Iran, Mosaddeq, 1953” the CIA management of the coup, and the participation of the UK, has been amply documented, including by US academic sources based upon documents released by the CIA under the Freedom of Information act

No self-respecting imperial powers can Washington Foreign Minister Bernard countenance slights of this sort, and the US Kouchner, a political amateur more at ease in extracted terrible revenge by encouraging a the heady world of NGOs than at the Quai proxy war Iraq’s decade-long war against d’Orsay, made a fool of himself by appearing Iran. This sponsorship included substantial to threaten military intervention in Iran, before technical assistance in the manufacture of being silenced by an irate Sarkozy. chemical warfare agents, used with terrible effect against Iranian civilian populations. Before ending in stalemate, this war left Big wind, loud Thunder No rain? millions dead on both sides. Iranian foreign Despite almost weekly warnings of the policy, perhaps including the development of imminence of an American attack on Iran, nuclear capabilities, is generally backed up by presumably aimed at preventing any repeat of these calamities. When When all Else Fails try Diplomacy! The limitations on America’s international reach are being laid bare by the Iranian Arroz Sin Leche Rice in Moscow Miss Rice’ trip to Moscow was a predictable debacle. Along with US Defense Secretary Gates, Rice had been dispatched to attempt gain Russian cooperation on the Iraq dossier. In a wonderful example of the anachronistic nature of American diplomacy, no sooner had she landed than she was gratuitously antagonizing her hosts by publicly interfering in Russian domestic affairs, meeting with a gathering of anti-Putin dissidents. some intelligence regarding one or more US carrier groups cruising about in the Gulf, T&B has long predicted that the US would limit itself to bellicose language, empty sanctions, and moral outrage refraining from an actual military strike situation. With the Iraq Tacit any discussions of the advisability of against Iran. This was debacle, the US has gratuitously antagonizing your hosts when on based upon the become belatedly a visit to plead for diplomatic assistance, the assumption that, after aware of the need to meeting provided at least one delightful an almost unbroken work via international moment. A St. Petersburg woman got up to series of foreign policy institutions. Alas for tell Rice that, given the fact that America had failures, the Bush Washington, the UN lost the moral high-ground, rather than regime would be loath Security Council seeking to act alone, the US should join to start yet another includes Russia and forces with the European Union in bringing unwinnable war one China, both of whom pressure on Russian administration. having potential have important ties with Rice was predictably furious, snapping back consequences far Iran; whilst neither is that the United States has not forfeited one bit greater even than those comfortable with the of its moral standing! The funny part is that of its current Eastern notion of a nuclear- she was undoubtedly sincere in her stalemates. armed Iran, they are even more concerned with maintaining their ability to protect their own interests and to cluelessness. Surely, she must be one of the very few passport-holding Americans to be unaware of their extraordinary loss of international prestige over the past 7 years. And What if we’re Wrong? We could be wrong. Perhaps a fatally

retain an independent foreign policy neither wounded but still-dangerous hard-core is willing to become a tail wagged by the Neocon faction centred around Cheney its NATO dog. Likewise the other Caspian dreams of empire shattered and faced with states, which will have to live with Iran as a imminent political oblivion will lash out, major regional power. Even India, despite counting on a wartime patriotic reflex to save maximum pressure from Washington, has its fortunes… one last roll of the dice. More announced its intentions to go ahead with the sinister yet, perhaps not content to saddle the building of a pipeline to bring Iranian gas next U.S. administration with unwinnable wars across Pakistan; new sources of energy are in Iraq and Afghanistan, they would simply like indispensable for the continuation of the to add one more to the pile. Given the Indian economic miracle. progressive shift towards an imperial presidency and the utter failure of legislative Britain, already mired in both Afghanistan and oversight, they could just conceivably get Iraq thanks to a childlike faith in Bush, seems away with it. disinclined to open up a third front. Only France has surprised by aligning itself with The diplomatic implications of such insanity would fall outside of our remit. It could certainly destabilize the Middle East, paving the way for an unstoppable fundamentalist wave indeed, it could, just conceivably, provide the spark for a true war of civilizations

Islam vs. the West5.

Clearly, Iran would strike back against US and other Western interests throughout the region, and the survival of pro-Western Arab governments would be more a matter of luck than of planning. It seems unlikely that Russia

the major power in the Caspian or China, dangerously dependent upon oil imports, would stand by passively. Although an armed confrontation falls within the realm of political fantasy, Russia and China would be driven further into a hard, anti-Western military alliance. Iraq and Lebanon would explode. Iran - damaged but not occupied would dig in and race to build a bomb as a matter vital to national survival. Turkey already furious at the Americans for having ignored their warnings of what would happen if they invaded Iraq would find itself with another war zone along its sensitive Eastern border. Their patience could snap.

Oil and Money For financial markets, given the importance of Iran and the region for the global petroleum trade, this would be a catastrophe scenario. It is difficult to predict the reaction of erstwhile friendly Arab governments, and especially, of the Arab street, to yet another invasion of an Islamic country by Western Crusaders, with the perceived backing of Israel. Certainly, there is a real danger of a repeat of the 1973 oil embargo which plunged the world into a deep recession (at a time when dependency on imported oil was far lower than today). Even if one or more Middle Eastern states did not halt its oil exports and OPEC refrained from slashing quotas out of solidarity, and further assuming that the Iranians could not successfully imperil Gulf oil shipments (now that the Revolutionary Guard is armed with supersonic torpedoes, this is a risky assumption) the withdrawal of 3.5M bbd of Iranian oil, along with the perceived threat of a disruption of Middle Eastern supplies, would send an already tightly balanced oil market into panic mode oil prices would 5 Those who would scoff at our typically alarmist commentary are referred back to our predictions of the possible consequences of the Iraq invasion, including the fatal destabilization of Iraq, the export of fundamentalism and terrorism, as well as radicalization of Turkey likely surge above $200/bbl, tipping an already fragile global economy into meltdown mode.

How to trade it, if it happens: Massive longs in oil and gold, spot and futures. Initially, long USD and Yen, then quick reversal to short USD, Yen. Short equities. Long G7 treasuries. Long Russian Roubles and commodity currencies. Extreme case portfolio long canned food, firearms, land in New Zealand.

Global Markets How to Trade ‘em

The ultimate binary Trade Short-term trends in financial markets are driven not by rational expectations, but rather, by the alternation between fear and greed. Ordinarily, market participants oscillate back and forth between these two fundamental emotions, most unusually, we are now encountering an unprecedented combination of the two, with the savviest investors simultaneously elated and terrified. Whilst, over the longer run, markets are remarkably rational, the amount of short-term idiocy one must endure to get a piece of the “long-run” is really quite extraordinary. At present, global markets are almost totally binary. On any given day, depending in particular upon whether or not yet another global investment bank has just announced that some new horror has been found lurking in its basement, our screens are either blood red or the emerald of a well-tended lawn financial risk either gets put on or taken off, wholesale and indiscriminately. The prices of all risk assets move together in lockstep: Asian currencies, carry trades, metals precious and otherwise, Asian indices, credit spreads and emerging markets debt, are almost perfectly correlated, as the hedge funds scurry about, each trying to keep one jump ahead of the others. Events in the US markets continue to set the tone for the short-term volatility. Whilst the global economy is increasingly decoupling from the US (vide Chinese and Indian GDP growth), short-term market trends very clearly have not. This is to be expected old reflexes die hard, and preferring the comforts of the herd, traders are not the most adventurous of beast.

In the short term markets are voting machines in the long term weighing machines. If the economic centre of gravity continues to shift in the way we believe it shall, markets will eventually take their lead from Shanghai, Delhi and perhaps, even Moscow. We are not there yet, and the last shoe has not fallen, so Beware the Bear!

Fearful Greed/Greedy Fear T&B is gratified to find the majority of our trading recommendations from a massive and reiterated short on the US dollar, to our long Russian rouble debt, equity indices in China, India, Vietnam (and latterly, Indonesia), crude oil and industrial commodities shooting the lights out6. Equally, we are in self-congratulatory mode as regards our underweights Japan, the US, and to a lesser extent, European equities. Only our recommended overweight of the sole asset class for which we can claim some true, in-depth expertise Russian equities has proved a tad disappointing; after several years of massive outperformance Russia (and Eastern Europe in general) have been lagging the other emergings. We now see an inflection point, and expect Russian equities to close the year with a powerful rally. Whilst we have made similar predictions several times already this year, only to be left bewildered by the sogginess of the subsequent rallies, with oil nearing our $100 target faster than anyone imagined possible, and Russia awash in liquidity, we think it only a matter of time before she elbows her way back to the front of the pack.

Do you Really want to be Rich? As emotions go, fear is far stronger than greed. Risk is asymmetric, and men fear losing what they have far more than they hunger after new acquisitions. Thus, in times of rapid change and stress, like generals constantly fighting the last war, investors retreat back into the familiar; as often as not, this proves to be a fatal error. In 1999, when T&B was hawking Russian sovereign bonds for a major European bank, prudent investors gave us short shrift. One German institution listened politely before showing us the door - they were not going to risk their investor’s hard-earned money on 6 To forestall the temptation of back-trading, all past issues of T&B are available on our website speculative Russian assets, and instead, were building carefully hedged positions in safe, high-grade US securities with attractive spreads. We have just learned that this same institution is faced with imminent bankruptcy if a buyer cannot be found. As always at times of fundamental change, the psychological adaptation is lagging the reality analogous to the situation at the beginning of Russia’s extraordinary resurgence from 1999, relatively simple and hugely lucrative investment opportunities are available to those possessed of the requisite psychological flexibility needed to jettison tried and true reflexes and to adapt to the new reality. As the centre of global growth shifts towards the emerging economies and away from the old industrialized countries at a rate unprecedented in human history, the economic equivalent of “regime change” is sending the emerging markets ballistic. Meanwhile, the world’s erstwhile reference currency is plunging, while defaults in that ultimate store of value US investment-grade credit have triggered an avalanche of downgrades and defaults, posing a real threat to financial stability. Investors who withdrew into the safety of safe, predictable assets, the US dollar and high-grade credit, are facing severe losses. Those who invested in blue-chip equities have fared only a bit better; while, in dollar terms, US equity indices are holding up very decently given the carnage in the debt markets, expressed in terms of Euros (or, as Mark Faber likes to repeat, in ounces of gold, or bushels of wheat) they are once again underperforming their global peers.

-The Amazing Shrinking Dollar: Ay Dolores You are such a pain7.

Trade-weighted US Dollar 1985 Present. To hell in a handbag? In the few days between the time we began to draft the current issue, and the present, the US dollar has fallen by nearly four figures. In parallel, oil prices have surged to within spiting distance of our target at $100. Clearly, anyone wishing to make predictions had best move fast! It has long appeared obvious to T&B that the “Kindness of Strangers” model of US deficit funding was not sustainable, and that foreign entities would sooner or later grow weary of trading valuable goods for the hypothetical safety of US debt securities. Our long-term dollar short is playing out very nicely, indeed. While some patience has been required, investors who took our advice and maintained short-dollar forward positions against EUR, NOK, GBP, AUD, NZD or CAD have made out like bandits. While shorts on the USD by now the mother of all “crowded trades” are indeed getting long in the tooth, we do not believe that the slide is anywhere near over yet; at most, for caution’s sake, we might begin to diversify into the Asian currencies which have thus far traded closer to the dollar: TWD, SGD, KRW, etc. We reiterate our recommended Yen short with side bets on the INR, PHP, and even the Indonesian Rupiah. 7 T&B has been recycling the above title for the past 5 years. It is loosely borrowed from Swinburn’s extravagantly bad poem “Dolores Our Lady of Pain”, http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/swinburne/dolo res.html as well as playing on the homonyms dolores (Latin for pains), and Dollars (presumably also a source of pain for international investors, given its plunge by 50% in recent years) it caused some short-term discomfort during the August turbulence, but is once again providing much joy; there is simply no way that the Bank of Japan can hike rates into a deflationary, recessionary environment. The Yen will thus continue to provide the basis for a number of lucrative carry trades our personal favourite being leveraged Russian rouble bonds funded with borrowed Yen. The carry is about 8.5% p.a., with a nice currency kicker.

Anyone seen my bottom? During our days as Chief Strategist at Sovlink, T&B was repeatedly asked to predict how far the US dollar could fall. Our prediction was that there would be a first stop at 1.45, at which point the Europeans would make a forlorn attempt to intervene. Lying down in front of a freight train is generally futile, and following a period of consolidation, the Euro could easily go to 1.60 or more; we expected this long cycle to terminate in a blow out and a substantial overshoot. Our first targets may well be hit before we can release this issue we have no reason to change our assumptions. Despite Sarkozy’s squeals, the strong Euro is actually a decidedly mixed curse for Europe. While exporters are penalized by a rising currency, in recent years countries such as Switzerland, Germany and Japan saw a rapid increase in competitiveness, driven by their exorably appreciating currencies. Instead, it was the perennial laggards, in particular the Latin swath, who suffered the most from revaluation. Furthermore, Europe is being largely sheltered from the explosive growth in commodity prices by a strong Euro, which has also reduced the need for the ECB to raise rates to keep inflation in check. Thus, while Sarkozy blusters, the Deutsche Bundesbank sighs contentedly. In any event, intervention is futile without US participation and the Americans are delighted to see a continued, orderly sell-off in the dollar to help rebalance their unsustainable deficit. Not only is the European Central Bank opposed to intervention, the only way it could slow the sell-off would be to accumulate dollars massively, ultimately resulting in a huge mark-to-market loss as the dollar crashes further. At some point, of course, the cheapness of the dollar will start to price out imports, while exports are already providing substantial support to US GDP. Americans will once again produce what they consume. Living standards will decline until the trade gap is rebalanced. The dollar will overshoot, find support, and eventually strengthen to an equilibrium level but given the long lag-time (the J-curve) that is still well in the future, and one would be foolhardy indeed to trade it today.

-Asian Markets One man’s bubble… Some months ago we wrote that the crush of newspaper stories warning of the impending implosion of the Chinese “A-shares bubble” virtually guaranteed that nothing of the sort was about to happen. Journalists writing about economic issues for the non-specialist press tend to be superb contrarian indicators. T&B shares the view of our friend, CLSA’s oracle Chris Wood, that the reaction of the Fed to the risk of recession in the US will force money into the emerging markets, leading to an Asian equity bubble. We remind our readers that, despite the negative connotations of the term “bubble” the early and middle stages are a delight for the investor. We would now reduce our overweight on China, moving into the laggards Asia, ex-Japan, selected EMEA (short Baltics, neutral Central Europe, long Russia and Balkans a substantial long Middle-East) and perhaps Brazil.. The current crowded trade par excellence is Hong Kong, in particular the H-shares (Chinese shares listed on the Hong Kong exchange, which trade at a discount of around 50% to the same shares, listed on the mainland…) Although we would be wary of near-term volatility -and predicting the actions of the Chinese government poses a serious challenge - we think it still compelling, and least in the medium term. India has been our other favourite, and despite some well-intended, badly communicated attempts to limit the inflow of hot money, we think the Bombay market should remain a one-way bet. Rates have probably risen far enough to strangle inflation (at least, ex-food) and the Capex cycle has a long way to run. The Central Bank is currently tightening bank reserve requirements to slow the rate of liquidity growth, but that starts to smack of desperation. Our other overweight is in most emerging of the Asain emergings, Indonesia. It is very cheap by Asian standards, enjoying rapid disinflation, and finally embarking on much needed infrastructure build-out. Vietnam had a brilliant 2006, and is currently consolidating it will certainly enjoy another leg up in coming years. Brazil we missed finding the gapping income disparities unsustainable - thus far, it is doing rather better than we had expected, despite a dangerously overvalued currency. Although Thailand looks temptingly cheap, we cannot quite bring ourselves to jump in; perhaps we scare too easily, but the political situation is parlous at best, there is a murderous insurgency going on in the South, and we have great faith in the ability of Thai political establishment to shoot itself in the foot. In brief, despite a massive run-up, we are not convinced that the upside potential for BRICs/Asia is exhausted. Provided (a major proviso) that the US does not crash outright instead, gliding into a soft landing, and that the Fed continues to pump in liquidity which promptly flows offshore, then Asian growth should remain strong. Although inflation poses an increasing threat, thus far, it remains relatively tame. While some pundits have angrily asserted that food inflation is a major problem, in particular for the poor, what they miss is the fact that, like for oil prices, there is no way (at least, short of intentionally engineering a deep recession) that monetary policy can address this type of inflation, caused not by monetary factors but by growing demand for commodities in limited supply.

-EMEA Catch-up time The entire concept of EMEA is faintly ludicrous any asset class which includes Nigeria, Israel, and Russia in the same basket is pretty much useless. The impressive momentum in Asia may have distracted some of the attention in which the EMEA basked last year. As discussed elsewhere, we have been slightly bewildered by the lagging performance of Russian market, up a modest 18% this year. The Baltics, on the other hand, are due to get crushed. They are running the sort of unsustainable current account deficits associated with Thailand and Korea just prior to Asia crisis 17% for Estonia, 14% for Lithuania, and an amazing 25% for Latvia.

Any interruption of their ability to fund would be catastrophic. One can short these indices via ETFs. Eastern Europe is also overextended, but less dramatically so; C.A. defits are running about 4%, possibly sustainable for EU states. Poland is once again governed by adults, but the macros are precarious. We would exercise caution. Turkey we get consistently wrong. We have no further advice. Its continued appreciation in the face of dangerous macros, political turbulence, and the effective demise of the myth of Turkish EU ascension remains a mystery to us- perhaps it always will. Kazakhstan provides a cautionary tale of what can happen to investors who blissfully ignore macroeconomic imbalances. The sudden withdrawal of the global liquidity lifeline feeding Kazakh banking system has revealed the fragility of the entire montage. Like Georgia, Kazakhstan a vicious and corrupt dictatorship has become a poster child for the US Neocon faction which finds only good things to say of Nazarbayev. Unfortunately, this adulation does not extend to the provision of cash. We add one EMEA global trading idea this month. The Gulf markets. A relatively homogenous group including Dubai, Kuwait, Saudi, UAE, Oman etc. Ex-Saudi, still recovering from the leveraged bubble of 2005, these markets have already performed well this year, but given the huge amount of oil-infused liquidity in the region, we think that their revaluation is still in its early stages. Sooner or later all of them will be compelled to abandon their dollar peg, giving a further kicker to the dollar-term indices. -G7 Equity Markets Stay Neutral/Short

(or, not with MY bargepole) We reiterate our previously expressed view that there is no compelling reason for absolute-return investors to own the senior equity markets. Although we do not foresee any apocalyptic events in the global markets, US macros are clearly unsustainable, while the European markets are overly dependent upon Wall Street, as well as being weighed down by restrictive credit and a substantial currency effect. The risk/reward ratio is simply not compelling; we would rather take our Euro exposure via forwards. Expressed in anything but devalued dollars, the US has seriously underperformed its European peer group (and hugely underperformed Canada, Australia, etc. only Japan has lagged, and we reiterate our short on Japanese markets). By way of example, expressed in Euro terms, the S&P is down 3.61% on the year, the broad Dow Jones European Index is up 6.51%, with Germany’s DAX up 18.51%. On the other hand, we would be cautious about shorting the US indices. The weakening US dollar is itself the primary reason for the modestly positive performance of blue-chip US equity indices this year, providing support both via the monetary effect (like commodities, equities constitute “real assets,” the falling value of each dollar means it takes more of them to buy one share) and because foreign profits repatriated to the US buy more dollars thus, the large-cap companies with substantial international exposure are outperforming the broader market.

Can you spot the difference?

Commodities Revenge of the Old Economy Even that damned fool Jim Rogers cannot be wrong about everything (though he remains psychologically unable to acknowledge that he was totally wrong about Russia; had anyone been insane enough to follow his advice, his apocalyptic predictions and implicit recommendation to go short Russia at the beginning of this decade would have provided a fast track to bankruptcy…) - as regards commodities (as well as for the continued decline of the dollar and of the Baltic markets) he happens to be right. Alongside the emerging Asian markets trade, the commodities trades and their offshoots are perhaps the fundamental opportunities of our new century. As industrialization spreads, and hundreds of millions of people are drawn into the consumer sector, the demand for energy, base metals and food will increase inexorably; as they run into hard supply constraints, economic and diplomatic relations will be profoundly disrupted (as will the fundamental survivability of planet Earth). While the latter half of the twentieth century was characterized by a seemingly inexorable fall in commodity prices with a shift towards the service economy and economic growth based on the production of intangibles. Now, thanks to the emergence of Asia, the “Old Economy” has reclaimed pride of place. The fact that a trade is “fundamental” does NOT, of course, mean that it is unidirectional; given the weight of speculative money, fierce corrections are to be expected. In the near-term, except for specialized commodities futures players, we would steer clear of the S&P Index, In Euros futures markets; in particular, almost all are now in contango rather than backwardation,

i.e. forward premia cause a negative carry at each rollover (perhaps precious metals are the exception; long-dated gold futures have acceptable volatility, and as long as the dollar continues to tank, gold is an excellent hedge.)

Agricultural Prices - Malthus, Come Home Dinner’s On the Table! In a wonderfully ironic inversion of the classic roles, the “developed” countries are now major suppliers of agricultural commodities to the “emergings”, upon whom they are in turn increasingly dependent for imports of manufactured goods!

The explosive growth in energy prices has been squeezing the global economy for most of the decade - food prices are now joining the party. As the Asian countries get richer, they are enjoying a huge increase in their consumption of foodstuffs, moving up the value chain towards higher protein diets. Unfortunately, this comes in parallel with declining local food production due to the paving over of agricultural land, desertification, inadequate water supplies, pollution, and damage due to poor land management practices. This is already providing a boon for the agricultural exporters, Brazil and Argentina, but also for the old industrialized countries Europe, Canada, Australia/NZ, and the United States. Already, the EU is winding down the set-aside program which formerly paid farmers to not grow crops.

Alas, it is not easy to get exposure to food inflation as a pure play. Fertilizer companies provide one good alternative, infrastructure another. In terms of geopolitics, in the absence of sudden disruptions, it is just possible that price action will allow a gradual accommodation, while better agricultural technology helps to avoid severe deficits. If, on the other hand, there is a serious disruption to current production, e.g. a severe drought caused by the rapid loss of the Himalayan glacier flow which irrigates both India and China, then expect a free-for-all as the Asian tigers forage the world over for desperately needed food…at best, this will play havoc with pricing at worst,… Extreme case portfolio canned food, firearms and land on Jupiter…

-Russian equities Bloodied by not bowed Having initially predicted yet another strong year for Russian equities, T&B spent much of the year trying to explain the relative underperformance of the RTS vis-à-vis the emerging indices. Our explanations included the flood of egregiously mispriced IPOs, bad press, and a (justifiable) discount due to the fact that virtually all traded companies are controlled by a reference investor private or public rendering shareholder value somewhat concept. On the other hand, we had discounted political risk, given that we saw it as obvious - that a smooth presidential transition would be engineered. All of these explanations are now open to debate and perhaps a simpler one is justified: -While the IPO market has clearly been a case of naked greed and short-termism, a similar flood in 2006 was easily digested. Russia is increasingly part of the European sectorial plays: when Uralkaliy went public in London, it was bought as a global fertilizer play, not as a specifically Russian stock. Current IPO supply in China is being snapped up at extravagant valuations. The world is not yet short of liquidity… -Over the past 7 years, bad press has been a constant feature of the Russian economy. As we have noted previously, subscriptions to The Economist may have cost investors tens of millions of dollars per annum, i.e. the price paid for allowing oneself to be shoed-away from the world’s top performing debt and equity market. -Anyone attempting a hostile takeover in China had best be heavily armed this has not prevented the Chinese share market from going ballistic. -Finally, this year’s performance has not been as weak as suggested by the RTS. Indeed, some sectors retail, steel, and non-ferrous metals have been very strong oil has been the laggard, and oil is a disproportionately large component of the RTS. After spectacular performance in 2005/2006, the Russian market has slowed down this year. Perhaps the primary driver is simply a loss of momentum given the strong competition from Asian, Latin and even African markets. In particular, everyone we know has been shooting the lights out in Chindia this year, and Russia has slipped from being the flavour of the month. Not the most satisfying explanation, but certainly the simplest! As we go to press, we are enjoying a long-delayed rally. Absent anything truly ugly in the global markets, T&B continues to expect a substantial rally going into the year end. Please see our upcoming T&B Decline of the West Part II the Eternal Russia, for further detail.

-The Easy Money Rouble Bonds Finally, we reiterate our slightly contrarian view that the single best place for your safe money is Russian rouble bonds! Even during the worst of the recent bout of global financial carnage, the rouble declined by no more than a couple of percentage points, before clawing its way back to a post-crisis high. Similarly, while selected third/fourth-tier bonds, in particular the banks, weakened during August, we saw this as an excellent buying opportunity. Certainly, the likelihood of the CBR allowing any Russian bank to go under is nil. In the event that any got into trouble, the CBR would bail them out, impose a shot-gun wedding, or at worst, allow in a foreign buyer.

In particular, we like the Russkiy Standart and the URSA rouble bonds. This extends to the foreign currency instruments - the Euro-denominated URSA 8.3s of 2011 currently yields 10.5% or some 650 over bunds it is one of the most compelling mispricings we’ve seen since the Russia 28s traded at 25 cents on the dollar!

URSAP 8.3% 11/11 € Market 93.2205/93.8244 (yield graph)

Happy Trading…and Good Luck we’ll all need it! This message is provided for informational purposes and neither the information nor any opinion expressed herein constitutes an offer, or an invitation to make an offer, to buy or sell any investment funds, securities or any options, futures or other derivatives related to such securities. Investment in emerging markets bears a high degree of risk, and is not suitable for all investors. This report is based upon information we believe to be reliable, however it is provided solely as an intellectual exercise, and no investment decisions whatsoever should be based upon it, in full or in part. In particular, investing in securities, including Emerging Markets securities involves a great deal of risk and investors should perform their own due diligence before investing. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance. Some investments may be subject to sudden and large falls in value and on realization customers may receive less than they invested or may be required to pay more. Changes in foreign exchange rates, interest rates, or other financial parameters may have an adverse effect on the price, value or needs of customers. We would recommend that investors take financial advice as to the implications, including taxation, of investing in any financial product. Some investments may not be readily realizable and valuing the investment and identifying the risk to which customers are exposed may be difficult to quantify. It should be assumed that the author and/or the funds he advises will from time to time have long or short positions in any of the assets discussed, or derivatives thereof. These positions may at times be contrary to the views expressed. Although the Nikitsky Fund is a sponsor of T&B, its trading policy is totally independent of this publication, and it should not be assumed that it is positioned in a fashion in keeping with the market views expressed herein. Like cats and horses, markets whether emerging or emerged, are apt to do as they damned-well choose, and a considerable measure of luck is required to come out in one piece. Exercise caution in all things. Good Luck! © Eric Kraus, Nikitsky Russia/CIS Opportunities Fund www.nikitskyfund.com 7 November 2007 -20 -

Thursday, November 08, 2007

Bretton Woods II: coming apart at the seams

· The Bretton Woods II thesis of a sustainable symbiosis between a deficit prone core and a capital rich and export focused periphery was always based on questionable history and optimistic assumptions.

· And today, it is clear that the economic costs of this regime are increasingly outweighing the perceived benefits.

· As happened with Bretton Woods I in the late 1960s, inflation risks and worries about the dollar are disrupting the cartel.

· Emerging market currencies are on the move and the risk is of a further down leg for the US currency that could develop into a disorderly crescendo.

· Going long a basket of emerging Asian currencies is an attractive option.

BACK TO THE FUTURE

Since 2003, it has regularly been asserted that the tendency of certain countries to tie their currencies formally or informally to the dollar amounted to a new system of international finance. This system has been christened "Bretton Woods II" because of the perceived similarities to the system of fixed exchange rates that prevailed in the initial post-war decades. Just as was the case 40 or 50 years earlier, this new system had the US at its core, with a number of less mature peripheral countries linking their currencies to the dollar at artificially low rates. But this time around, rather than Europe and Japan, the periphery was composed of emerging Asia and additional nations in Latin America and the Middle East.

Nevertheless, it has been stressed that the symbiosis between the core and the periphery operated much as it had done before. The periphery was able to enjoy stable export-led growth via a cheap currency, the corollary of which was the accumulation of low yielding reserves issued and denominated in the currency of the core. The core, for its part, achieved cheap financing for a mounting external deficit and was able to extend the period during which it could live beyond its means.

Such was this mutually satisfactory outcome that it was believed this state of affairs could prevail for an extended period, perhaps even indefinitely.

QUESTIONABLE HISTORY

In reality, the historical similarities between the two periods and systems have frequently been exaggerated, and some of the significant differences all too easily glossed over. For example:

· The peripheral countries are much more numerous and heterogeneous today than in the 50s and 60s, when much of the developing world was not yet fully integrated into the international economy.

· In the prior period, the US current account balance never hit the extreme levels recorded of late. Indeed, the US was actually in surplus, and therefore exporting capital to the rest of the world, until the onset of the Vietnam War.

· The US currency was at the time fixed to gold - a hard currency peg - while it is now freely floating and the US authorities' commitment to keeping it stable is so limited as to be virtually worthless.

· And the old system was for years only sustained by a complex range of capital and other controls. Indeed, for much of the latter stages of its existence, Bretton Woods I required constant patching up as it lurched from one crisis to another and was increasingly seen as a source of international instability. When it finally broke down in the early 1970s and the US abandoned its gold peg, it left in its wake an unholy mess of sharply rising inflation, exchange rate and interest rate volatility and fractured political relationships.

ASIAN PRACTICALITIES

It is also true that, rather than an exercise in rose-tinted nostalgia for the swinging sixties, Asia's predilection for export-led growth in the current millennium had rather more practical origins. In short, it grew out of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. At that time, a number of countries with external deficits and limited foreign reserves found themselves at the mercy of sudden shifts in risk appetite and financial flows, and were rapidly forced into gut-wrenching fiscal and monetary adjustments to re-establish confidence in their currencies. Reserves also had to be rebuilt from scratch and what began as an understandable effort to restore a semblance of international credibility subsequently rather developed a life of its own.

But whatever the shortcomings of the historical analysis, the fact is that much of the emerging world has been quite happy over recent years artificially to depress their exchange rates to sustain export growth, improve their current account positions and recycle much of the money earned back into the US via reserve accumulation and the purchase of dollar fixed income securities. The latest IMF Economic Outlook estimates the external surplus of the Asian NIEs in 2007 at 5.4% of GDP, that of the ASEAN 4 at 4.7%, China's at 11.7%, the Middle East's at 16.7% and Latin America's at 0.8%.

COUNTING THE COSTS

However, there are now growing signs that the Bretton Woods II system is breaking down as the economic costs associated with it increasingly outweigh the benefits of stable export-led growth.

Bretton Woods II has generated a perverse constellation of capital flows and a misallocation of resources in both the US and those countries whose currencies are linked to the dollar. Capital, rather than flowing from the relatively mature and low return core to an opportunity rich periphery, as economic theory and common sense would suggest (no jokes please), has been moving in the opposite direction. Meanwhile, in the US, domestic spending, and in particular consumption, is being subsidised at the expense of exporters and those competing with importers, while there is less incentive for the US to adjust its policy-mix in an optimum manner. Interest rates are depressed and lower borrowing costs encourage the government to spend more. Outside the US, the subsidisation of exporters and import substitutes reduces current incomes. Such distortions are bound to encourage a political backlash from affected interest groups, of which US protectionism - which, it should be noted, also often enjoys a new lease of life in election years - is perhaps the most obvious manifestation.

Part and parcel of this process is that those countries adhering to the Bretton Woods II model adopt a cost of capital determined by US monetary policy rather than by their own domestic conditions. With the Fed latterly in easing mode, this has meant that monetary conditions in the periphery have loosened and that they could well get looser still, should, as seems likely, the US central bank deems it necessary to provide further support to a traumatised financial sector and domestic activity in general. In most of these economies, an independent monetary regime would have seen the domestic authorities tightening over recent months rather than loosening and, not surprisingly, we have seen a growing reluctance on the part of some, not least the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, to march in lockstep with Dr. Bernanke and his colleagues.

Reserve accumulation has gone well beyond the prudent. China now has more than $1.4tr in fx reserves and, as the table below illustrates, seven of the top ten holders of fx reserves are in Asia, with Russia and Brazil also on the list. Not just in these economies, but in a broader range of emerging market economies, reserves run far in excess of six months of imports and 20% of GDP, which in any context would represent extremely conservative insurance policies against an interruption of international capital flows. In the meantime, the return on these assets, which are typically short term and low risk in nature, is well below the average rate of return available on domestic assets. Former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers estimated more than a year ago that the opportunity cost of the excessive wealth tied up in reserves was some 2% of those economies' GDP, or the equivalent of global foreign aid or the next round of gains from global trade liberalisation! And, of course, there is also the threat of major capital losses on these assets should the dollar continue to decline. Ten H

Top Ten Holders of

FX Reserve ($bn, latest)

China


1420

Japan


946

Eurozone


482

Russia


425

Taiwan


267

South Korea


257

India


232

Singapore


153

Brazil


163

Hong Kong


141

The sterilisation of fx reserves is a further problem, especially in countries with relatively underdeveloped money markets. Commercial bank balance sheets can become saturated with sterilisation instruments, forcing interest rates on them higher and adding to the cost of the process. China, for example, is suffering consistent problems in controlling monetary growth and is now seeing rapid asset price inflation spill over into more elevated rates of increase in goods and service prices. An alternative mechanism to limit monetary growth is to raise the reserve requirement ratio, which China has been doing consistently of late. But while this is not costly for the central bank, it does represent a tax on the banking sector and can promote disintermediation as non-banks seek to by-pass the requirements.

THE CORROSIVE INFLUENCE OF INFLATION

It was worries about inflationary policies and the fact that monetary policy in the core was too loose for the periphery that triggered the demise of Bretton Woods I. The late 60s saw first France and then Germany and Britain all start to swap their dollar reserves for gold as they questioned why they should continue to accumulate assets at depressed yields in a currency that was only going to go one way - down. We may well be witnessing a similar situation today, as spare capacity is increasingly exhausted and price pressures in the emerging world build - the greater the instability in prices, the greater the likelihood of currency realignments.

And the members of Bretton Woods II have already begun to adjust their behaviour. For some time now, they have been gradually diversifying their fx reserves away from dollars. The dollar share of global reserves was more than 71% in the late 1990s. It is now under 65%, with the Euro (25.6%) and Sterling (4.7%) the prime beneficiaries of the rebalancing. In addition, a number of countries have set up, or are in the throes of setting up, sovereign wealth funds in an effort to achieve a higher rate of return on their reserve assets by investing in a broader range of assets. Korea and China are just two examples of those choosing to go down this path.

EMERGING CURRENCIES ON THE MOVE

And finally, countries are proving more willing to let their currencies rise. China has widened its intervention band from 0.3-0.5% and officials have talked openly of the pressures building for a faster pace of appreciation. But attitudes to revaluation have evolved right across the emerging world, from Brazil to India, from Russia to Turkey, and from Vietnam to Kuwait.

Although not without some merits - for example, it encouraged us to consider how national balances of payments fit together as interdependent elements of a larger system - the Bretton Woods II thesis was, in truth, always a stretch. It was based on a superficial view of history and encompassed a good deal of complacency about the negative aspects of the regime. It implied the existence of a cohesive bloc of countries happy to act in their collective self-interest for a protracted period - in effect a cartel. But cartels tend to break down under strain. And just as in the late 1960s, it is in the interest of each member to exit the cartel before the dollar collapses.

If Bretton Woods II is, indeed, now unwinding, then there are some clear market implications. First, the dollar is going to fall further, perhaps substantially so, and second, a number of pegs and quasi pegs will be broken, or at the very least evolve in some way, shape or form. Of course, politics will play a part in the precise timing and nature of this evolution, especially in countries like Saudi Arabia or Hong Kong, but generally speaking, the currencies that will probably gain most will be those that have the largest current account surpluses and most dynamic economies - in this sense buying a basket of emerging Asian currencies would appear to be a sensible strategy. In the meantime, asset diversification will provide greater support to equities and remove some support from US Treasuries, although whether this rebalancing of demand will be sufficient to dominate the effects of the underlying cyclical dynamics in the world economy is open to question.

reflections on central bankers

Why are the Central Banks in laying awake at night?

The central banks are over run with Milton Friedman junkies, the Jackson Hole crowd who devalued the emphasis on fiscal restraint present in Friedman’s as well as Keynes and Schumpeter's work and then tried to steer the ship with monetary policy alone a route that that all three of great economists warned would fail without fiscal restraint, the fear they have been wrong all along (thats what they fear).

On the opening day of Fox Business Alan Greenspan discussed whether closing down the Federal reserve is a good idea and suggests we return to the gold standard except this time he says it directly

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZjMQG3qUFKo

Yes I suggest you watch it again (he really said that) Greenspan is a goldbug J

The situation is ludicrous here we have Bernanke who's previous claim to fame was Professorship at Princeton, with zero practical management experience and the only thing in his locker of qualifications is a bunch of papers of an average length of say 50-100 pages., 100% of which very few people have read outside academia.

If you actually read all these papers they are naive nonsense and outstandingly stupid. In 1999 he suggested that money supply financed tax cuts combined with a discounted interest rate would (using his words) transmitted money to the consumer via the Real Estate asset channel………….(using his words again) this through the wealth effect (consumers feeling wealthy due to asset inflation) would cause the consumer to borrow against assets and consume, as a further measure he suggested that if this didn’t cure deflation the Fed should deprecate the currency and cause import price inflation………if deflation was still persistent he suggested the purchase of real services and assets in the open market…..he believed that a determined central banker could always cure deflation by using these measures..

Is there anything about that last paragraph that feels kind of spooky ? These were the measures that Bernanke winning academic acclaim for in 1999 (many years before he joined the Fed) and he was by no means the only one Brad Delong, Marty Feldstein, Paul Krugman , John Taylor, Bruce Bartlett , Summers etc etc…..letting the academics takeover monetary policy is like handing over the asylum to the lunatics

Again all academics with zero real management and business experience and yet Bernanke was placed in charge of the entire US economy………….I guess its not much worse than electing a baseball team owner as President.

the US market on a currency weighted basis has been in a bear market since 2000 and now the commodity backed currencies are appreciating at the same pace as gold .

The world is transitioning to new economic leadership there are shortages of nearly everything that are unlikely to be impacted by the demand destruction of a US recession.

The old paradigm has the US at the center of the world, whenever the US turns down the rest of the world follows, the consumer of last resort, the old thinking says that Asia (and the rest of the world) isn’t big enough to survive on it’s own .

Kondratiev said the cause of the shortages were caused by cyclical upswings in prices that lasted 20-25 years and that during these upswings new economies were transitioned and incorporated into the global economy. The Great depression occurred 10 years after the 1900-20 commodity boom. From 1920-30 the only country that really prospered was the United States, this was achieved with very expansionary monetary policy after the commodity crash that sucked capital out of the rest of the world and into the US speculative bubble. One of the aspects of Kondratiev’s waves that was supported with the strongest data was that the down wave was always correlated with falling agricultural prices, agriculture prices are rising not falling. For those who think we are heading to a 1930 global depression please realize that the depression happened on the back of a 10 year old commodity bust. It didn’t happen at the height of the boom.

These shortages might look coincidental but shortages like this occur in every upwave (that’s what Kondratievs work was about)

The reason these tides turned in the 1930’s was that the rest of the world declared economic war on the US system and sucked the capital back out of the US market. This economic war included interest rates, currencies and tariffs the reason for the depth of the depression was government protectionism (read economic war) closed down international trade.

The US will head into recession and the Asian economies (after large corrections) will continue to grow . This is a Kondratyev transition , during the transition the US economy will collapse and the rest of the world (after barely keeping its head above water during the collapse) will continue to grow and transition to leadership.

During this phase economic war will break out between the US and the rest of the world and the like England in the 20’s the US will continue to attempt to reinitiate it’s previous economic primacy. America will attempt to control international liquidity and capital flows like the English attempted in the 20’s , in an attempt to stop the bleeding they will attempt to impose capital controls on their own citizens , the only people that will be able to get their money out of the US economy will be the wealthy because they are doing it now while they can.

Commodities are still cheap, most when inflation adjusted are still 60-70% less than of their 1974 prices highs, yes the US and Japan have been inflating like crazy for 2 decades and they will again, eventually ruining America economically forever.

Report from the belly of the beast - models/modes busted

I just finished polishing up an e-mail from a buddy of mine's son (an up-and-coming hotshot at an investment bank) who attended this week's “ABS East Show” (a conference where all the “Debt Dicers and Slicers” get together and drink, play golf and congratulate each other on being “Masters of the Universe”).

The kid described the conference as a “cross between a baseball card convention and a funeral” in that all these former big-shot, preppie, blue-blazered, mark-to-model mavens were somber, sobered, and even downright despondent—and were all trying to sell each other used ABS, MBS, and CDOs at deeply-discounted prices. He also stated that they had some kinda weird “Speed Dating” event where the shysters were matched up for ten-minute sessions to give their pitch to investors. Hmmmm…

I asked the kid to forward to me his electronic notes taken during the sessions he attended so that I could share them with the board, and he was all too happy to zip them right over—as long as I promised NOT to reveal his identity. “No problemo”, I promised.

His short-hand scribblings represent his capturing of the salient points from various panel discussions and seminars over two days.

Interestingly, as I was reading the cryptic-but-clear thoughts he shared, I was struck by:

a. How much these guys at the conference sound like we do here and:
b. That I actually understood much of what they were discussing, although some of the finer points they were discussing that I didn't understand, I edited out.

Now, for those who don't want to take time and rummage through all the statistics, comments, and prognostications below, please allow me to sum up in one, succinct, sentence the collective message of this little get-together:

WE'RE SCROOMED!!!! SCROOMED WE TELLS YA!!!

For those of you who DO want to take a peek into “the belly of the beast” so to speak, here are the kid's notes--pretty much unadulterated by me, other than the highlighting:

Day One Notes:

Affordability Products: should have stopped lending in 2005; significant risk positioning, Wall Street took "super-senior" tranches, now equity being hit; de-leveraging taking place”

Mortgage debt to GDP: 67%

$350 billion in resets in next 12 months=disaster waiting to happen;

Banks have many loans on books with NO offset credit enhancement!;

Troubles with MBS that are already in place, can't re-fi them properly; FHA-Secure2" changing loans to fixed-rate; Very few loan modifications taking place because they are "uneconomic" to underwriter.

No one in audience thought that MLEC would solve CDO problem.

MLEC: Bail out for Citi; will transfer at "market price" but no one knows what "market price" really is

Quasi-bailouts of CDO holders going on through Fed discount window to keep system afloat; steepening yield curve ( Note: Ergo free money which lowers current rates at the expense of future rates which are bid up by inflationary expectations )

Question to audience: "Will we see ANY ABS/CDO based on mortgages in 2008/2009?

Audience response: NO!; "Who's going to take the warehouse risk?"

Fire sales may increase due to sellers refusing to sell because bid/ask is too wide for them; will have distressed sales when, not if, sellers break.

Audience question to panel: "How long before Wall Street recognizes losses in RMBS and when will market return to normal?"

Panel Answer: Remittance reports get worse and worse each month! After all of 2008 we will know more after all resets, recasts, refis and REOs; wouldn't give number for cumulative losses for vintage '06 but he stated that Fremont pools are at 30% to 40% default rate presently. Finally estimated 20% loss rate.

Day Two Notes:

2006 vintage is blowing up BEFORE getting to rate reset, stated we need government bailouts.

Possible "rush to exits" coming in CDOs if monolines credit rating deteriorates of other market events happen.

This environment is challenging our livelihood!; Rome is still burning but no one (Wall Street or DC) is coming to rescue!.

Final panel question to audience: ABX '08?

Audience response: NO!

"BBBs" have been wiped out; So has "BBB-";

Only certain dealers and monolines know where dead bonds are buried.

2006 vintage of mortgage originations is much worse than 2003!; 2006 trading at LIBOR plus 550; Prior to 2003 didn't see defaults in the 30% range, now common!;

Just because someone says a bond is worth 50, it may be worth 20; Market has been systematically incorrect.

Mark-to-model is leaving market;

We are only in 3rd inning in terms of markdown of assets.

Question: FAS 157?

Answer: Fas 157 will translate to tons of supply of ABS going forward.

Spreads are irrelevant; People buying "BBs" at 1500 bps

(Conclusion): If this doesn't send you on an emergency Wheaties run, then I don't know what will. These guys have scroomed the entire world's economy and they now realize it.

Gold dealers don't know what they are selling

Movements in the price of gold are sometimes "so enigmatic" and central banks and bullion banks are so involved with it that the gold market may be less than free, the deputy chairman of the Bank of Russia says.

The deputy chairman, Oleg V. Mozhaiskov, made the remarks in a speech at a meeting of the London Bullion Market Association in Moscow in June, but the LBMA and other participants in the meeting suppressed it, refusing repeated requests to release a copy. After months of negotiation, the Bank of Russia last week supplied the Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee with an English translation, which is appended.

-END-

On the growing gold demand and why The Gold Cartel is gagging … only two weeks ago MIDAS reported the following:

October 25 - Gold $767 up $5.40 - Silver $13.82 up 35 cents

My contact within the Istanbul Gold Exchange has told me that the exchange itself is "running" out of physical at breakneck speeds. So much so that they have started to solicit major and mid tier gold mining companies world wide with the hope of securing some more physical before the markets get wind of it. Says quite a bit, doesn’t it, when the world’s 3rd largest importer of gold is scrambling to find physical to meet the massive demand coming out of that area. I smell a commercial signal failure around the corner.....

-END-

Now this:

Dear Mr. Murphy!

The following might be of interest for your next Midas and explain some things going on in the world of gold. This is based on a mail I received from a reader of my German language gold website

My translation:

"Today I had a conversation with a friend who works for a broker-house in Dubai: Because stock and bond markets moved sideways in recent weeks, but the USD sinks quite rapidly and precious metals rise, I asked him about his opinion as a professional:

He told me, the sheiks currently don't throw dollars on the market. BUT HE HAS THE ORDER TO BUY ALL GOLD WHICH APPEARS ON THE MARKET, BY USINGUS-DOLLARS FOR THE PURCHASES. The same order is valid for stocks of selected companies (even if they are in the US), but they buy no government bonds."

My commentary:

This might explain the current unsatiable demand for gold and a rising price despite all gold cartel efforts. But who buys the Treasuries sold off/not bought? Helicopter Ben?

Gold and silver market situation in Europe: Especially in Germany the market is on fire. Silver in larger quantities is almost impossible to get in Germany and Austria. Gold becomes more difficult to get, but is still available. Also the financial media became quite gold-friendly in recent weeks.

In other countries of Europe, like Switzerland, France, Italy the interest in PMs is markedly lower. There is a certain irony, that it is very difficult to get information about the situation in other EU countries. The reason is the language barrier. PM investors can only tap information in their own language area and from the US/UK (because most people understand English).

PS:

Last weekend I visited the annual precious metals fair in Munich, Germany (I have heard your speech there last year) and talked to several PM vendors and mining companies:

No one knows what the really sell: lifeboats for the collapse of the fiat-money-system. They all think they sell metals or coins. So they are totally unaware of the real potential in PMs.

This verifies repeated observations in Midas, that almost no one in the "professional gold world" really knows what their product is for.

Best Regards from Vienna, Austria

Walter K. Eichelburg

The PM Fix soared to $822.50. Demand for physical gold is on fire.

The big picture news could not be better. In the meantime The Gold Cartel gave us the usual drill … same ole crap. Gold spent most of the day up $15 to $16, meaning it was capped after the initial dramatic surge, as gold breaks away from $800 after yesterday’s test. Then it dipped a couple of bucks on the close.

The gold open interest shot up another 11,543 to 551,022, which gives you some idea of how much The Gold Cartel was on gold’s case yesterday with all US financial market turmoil. Who knows how much it went up today.

Monday, November 05, 2007

The next round of the credit crunch: two German banks reportedly in trouble

Frankfurter Allgemeine has a report according to which the defaults in the subprime sector are likely to be much higher than previously estimated. It recalled a Deutsche Bank forecast from July, which put the total global losses of this segment at $60-90bn. Now Josef Ackermann, chairman of Deutsche Banks, puts it at $150-250bn. There are now fears that there are more big write-offs to come. FAZ also names two German banks - WestLB and a specialised banks which serves doctors and pharmacists only - as possible next victims of the crisis.





Nouriel Roubini on the next phase in the credit crunch

In his blog in RGE Monitor, Nouriel Roubini says there is already another mortgage crisis in the offing. "If you are interested in understanding where the economy is going you should rather look at the ongoing disaster in credit markets – with a severe and spreading credit crunch - that will get uglier in the next few months as financial institutions are forced to mark to market massive – still unrecorded – losses on trillions of mortgages and related MBS and CDO tranches. With the ABX index for BBB- now down to the 20s and even the AAA tranches now down from par to 79 there are hundreds of billions of losses that no financial institutions has even started to account for. When allegedly AAA tranches of CDO trade at 79 cents on the dollar you know you have a massive and severe financial nightmare ahead. So, instead of the NFP report look daily at what the ABX indices are telling you about what is happening the economy and the financial sector."

Paulson's Focus on Subprime 'Excesses' Shows His Goldman Gorged

By Mark Pittman

Nov. 5 (Bloomberg) -- Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson says the U.S. is examining the subprime mortgage crisis to ensure that ''yesterday's excesses'' aren't repeated. He could be talking about himself and his former firm, Goldman Sachs Group Inc.

Paulson, 61, doesn't mention that Goldman still has on the market some $13 billion of almost $37 billion in bonds backed by subprime loans or second mortgages that it created while he was chief executive officer. Those bonds have an average delinquency rate of almost 22 percent, higher than the average of other subprime bonds from the period, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Goldman, the most profitable investment bank, was one of 14 primary dealers of U.S. Treasuries who contributed to a three- year binge as $1 trillion of subprime mortgages were packaged and sold to investors. The value of its remaining subprime bonds trails Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.'s $33 billion, out of $106.8 billion created during Paulson's years at Goldman, and Morgan Stanley's $28.8 billion, out of $82.5 billion.

''He should admit to having been involved in creating the problem that we have now,'' said Representative Brad Miller, a North Carolina Democrat, who introduced a bill Oct. 22 to make firms packaging subprime mortgages liable for bad loans in some circumstances.

The subprime crisis developed earlier this year when falling home prices triggered defaults by homeowners who wouldn't have normally qualified for a mortgage. Many were unable or unwilling to make adjustable-rate payments that were due to rise. Home foreclosures doubled in the third quarter from a year earlier to 635,159, RealtyTrac reported Nov. 1.

'Largely Contained'

Starting in March, Paulson said the damage was ''largely contained'' and was no risk to the larger economy. When other credit markets began to be affected, he and others began pushing for solutions.

''I can't help but notice that when middle-class homeowners were losing their homes to foreclosure, he was pretty nonchalant about it,'' Miller said of Paulson. ''But when Wall Street CEOs start seeing trouble in their absurdly complicated financial instruments built on the mortgages of middle-class homeowners, he feels their pain.''

Paulson declined to comment through spokeswoman Michele Davis, who said, ''he can't talk about Goldman business.'' Spokesman Michael DuVally of New York-based Goldman declined to say how much subprime mortgages contributed to the investment bank's profits, or Paulson's compensation, during his tenure from May 1999 through June 2006.

Goldman paid Paulson $38.5 million for 2005, and he received an $18.7 million bonus for the first half of last year.

Bet Against Subprime

While competitors reported losses from their subprime portfolios in recent months, Goldman said Sept. 20 that it profited from the market's decline by using derivatives to bet that mortgage securities would continue to fall.

Paulson's involvement in the subprime crisis ''points out that there needs to be complete accountability up and down the system,'' said Allen Fishbein, the director of credit and housing policy at the Consumer Federation of America in Washington. ''Goldman wasn't alone. All the brokerages did this.''

Goldman ranks 10th among 118 issuers, based on the amount of subprime loans still on the market. Bonds with a face value of $484.6 billion remain from those created in the years Paulson ran Goldman.

Market leader Countrywide Financial Corp. has $40.7 billion in subprime bonds still on the market, or 8.4 percent of the total. GMAC LLC's Residential Capital LLC has $34.4 billion. Lehman's $33.1 billion leads Wall Street firms.

Calabasas, California-based Countrywide, the nation's biggest home lender; ResCap, the Minneapolis-based home lending arm of General Motors Corp.'s finance subsidiary; and Goldman were among those competing to create pools of mortgages consisting mostly of subprime loans, made to borrowers with poor credit records or high debt.

Citi, Chase

Goldman has more subprime debt outstanding than Credit Suisse, which has almost $10 billion; Citigroup Inc., with $6.8 billion; or JPMorgan Chase & Co., with $7.8 billion.

The data on subprime bonds, compiled by Bloomberg from reports by debt servicing companies, don't include all of the mortgage bond offerings managed by any of the firms. That's because all of them handle offerings by bond issuers outside of Wall Street, including Irvine, California-based New Century Financial Corp., a subprime lender now in bankruptcy.

The House bill Miller introduced is backed by Representative Barney Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat who is chairman of the Financial Services Committee. One provision would make firms that package and sell subprime mortgages liable for damages if loans violate certain minimum standards, including ensuring a borrower's reasonable ability to repay.

Criticized Liability

Paulson criticized the liability idea in an Oct. 16 speech at Georgetown University in Washington.

''We need to ensure yesterday's excesses are not repeated tomorrow,'' Paulson said. Penalizing Wall Street for packaging mortgage loans ''is not the answer to the problem,'' he said.

The House measure would ''potentially paralyze securitization,'' which, Paulson said, has been ''extremely valuable in extending the availability of credit to millions of homeowners nationwide and lowering the cost of financing.''

In New Delhi on Oct. 30, Paulson repeated his pledge to find what went wrong in the financial system. ''We need to shed light on it and make the policy adjustments so this doesn't happen again,'' he said.

When the subprime mortgage issue exploded as an economic and political issue this year, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben S. Bernanke was the federal government's point man. He was called before Congress to defend regulators' failure to prevent lending abuses.

Saving SIVs

Paulson's public role increased in the past month as the credit crunch spread to the commercial paper markets and off- balance-sheet structured investment vehicles, known as SIVs. He urged major lenders in a Sept. 12 meeting in Washington to help subprime borrowers keep their homes.

Paulson and Robert Steel, a former Goldman Sachs vice chairman who is the Treasury's undersecretary for domestic finance, helped persuade Citigroup and other banks to set up an $80 billion partnership to buy assets from any SIVs that couldn't refinance their debt.

Goldman under Paulson created 58 mortgage pools branded under the acronym of GSAMP, which originally stood for Goldman Sachs Alternative Mortgage Products, starting in July 2002. The value of the loans at risk of default is almost 50 percent for one Goldman pool, according to Bloomberg data, which includes pools identified as containing home equity financings as well as subprime mortgages.

Delinquency Rates

The average delinquency rate for subprime bonds sold from May 1999 through June 2006 is 19.3 percent as of yesterday, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Among the top 20 issuers that have more than $5 billion outstanding, Goldman's GSAMP ranks ninth with 21.7 percent for delinquencies of 60 days or more, foreclosures or real estate that has been taken away from borrowers.

That rate is higher than for JPMorgan, with 20.8, and Citigroup, with 19.9 percent, according to data compiled by Bloomberg through October. Goldman's delinquency rate is lower than the 26.2 percent for bonds in Deutsche Bank AG's ACE trust, as well as 25.1 percent for Barclays Capital's SABR and 23.8 percent for Merrill Lynch's MLMI.

One of Goldman's bonds, GSAMP 2006-HE2 B2, is valued at 47 cents on the dollar, to yield 14.5 percent, according to Merrill Lynch. The pool, which was sold March 1, 2006, already has a delinquency rate of 16.4 percent. The bond was cut five levels from investment-grade Baa2 to a junk rating of B1 on Oct. 11 by Moody's Investors Service.

To contact the reporter on this story: Mark Pittman in New York at mpittman@bloomberg.net .

Last Updated: November 5, 2007 00:20 EST

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a5IcbvTr6oaM&refer=home

Sunday, November 04, 2007

Analyst takes hit from CITI

Meredith Whitney, the analyst who prompted a $369 billion (£177 billion) plunge in the value of US shares on Thursday by issuing a negative note on Citigroup, hit out at Wall Street’s culture of intimidation yesterday after receiving several death threats from investors in the bank.

Ms Whitney, a CIBC analyst who is married to the former World Wrestling Entertainment champion Death Mask, prompted a near 7 per cent drop in Citigroup’s shares on Thursday, after suggesting that the bank needed to raise more than $30 billion to restore its capital cushion.

She also downgraded her recommendation on Citigroup’s shares to “market underperform” in the note that set off America’s biggest stock market decline since August.

Ms Whitney, Forbes’s second-highest ranked stock picker for 2007, told The Times: “People are scared to be negative, especially when a company has such a wide holding. Clients are not pleased with my call and I have had several death threats.

“But it was the most straightforward call I’ve made in my career and I am surprised my peer analysts have been resistant. It’s so straightforward, it’s indisputable.”

Ms Whitney, whose marriage to John Charles Layfield, the wrestler, 2½ years ago was detailed in The New York Times, said that she has never felt any pressure from the Wall Street firms themselves to be positive. But she said investors could be “nasty and belligerent” if they felt you had lost them a lot of money by influencing the price of their shares.

“No one had the moxie to put in print what I put in print,” she said.

Ms Whitney’s note came two weeks after Citigroup reported a 57 per cent drop in its third-quarter profits, following a $6.5 billion writedown, much of which related to the credit crunch.

That writedown intensified recurring calls for Chuck Prince, Citigroup’s head, to stand down, although he remains at the helm of the world’s biggest bank.

But in a move that will fuel speculation about his position, Mr Prince yesterday cancelled a speech he had been due to give tomorrow at the US Japan Business Conference. A Citigroup spokesman said he had cancelled the appearance to prepare for the company’s new listing on the Tokyo Stock Exchange on Monday.

Ms Whitney, 37, met Mr Layfield in 2003 when they were panelists on Bulls & Bears, a programme on Fox News.

Mr Layfield credits Ms Whitney with helping to make him more sophisticated. The New York Times reported him saying at their wedding: “She took a country boy like me and kind of refined me. I know what fork to use now at the dinner table, and I drink my beer from a glass.”