Kontent News

My take on the commodity supercycle zeitgeist...and the rise of the precious metals, uranium and alternate energy. Get ready for peak everything, the repricing of the planet and "black swans" all over the place..

Sunday, July 29, 2007

Banks burnt by credit meltdown

Credit derivatives markets saw a strong bout of further heavy selling on Thursday in both Europe and the US, with the widely watched indices of riskier credits bearing the brunt of the pain.

Behind the headline numbers, banks and other financials have been among the worst affected as investors worry about their exposure to a range of problem areas from mortgage markets to the leveraged loans that fund private equity buy-out deals.

The iTraxx Crossover index, the key barometer of appetite for credit risk in Europe, saw the cost of protecting €10m ($13.7m) of mostly junk rated corporate debt jump above €400,000 per year on the five-year contract for the first time in almost two years.

The index at 400 basis points is more than twice the level at the start of June. Its US cousin also traded at record levels, hitting 326bp.

The perceived credit risk of owning the debt of US banks, which has soared in recent weeks, jumped to new highs yesterday as investors reacted to revelations that Wall Street had been left saddled with billions of dollars of unsold corporate debt.

Analysis by the Financial Times shows that investment banks in the US and Europe could have already been forced to retain more than $40bn worth of high-yield debt that they intended to sell in recent weeks.

Investor appetite for high-risk, high-yield debt has significantly diminished – illustrated this week by the failure to place about $20bn worth of loans for just two companies, Chrysler and Alliance Boots.

US banks especially had already seen both their stock prices and credit default swaps – which provide a kind of insurance against non-payment of debt – under heavy pressure owing to their exposure to US subprime mortgage crisis and to the hedge funds that were invested in related products.

“A lot of people are spooked that the [credit] lines extended to hedge funds have created massive counterparty risk,” said Christian Stracke, a senior analyst at CreditSights. “We can’t really have a great sense for what counterparty exposure is – and these players are beginning to drop off like flies under the weight of subprime.”

However, he added that the market was nervous more because of uncertainty than because banks were obviously in dire straits.

JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs postponed on Wednesday the sale of $12bn of debt financing for Cerberus’s purchase of Chrysler. The US carmaker has agreed to hold $2bn, leaving the banks with a hefty $10bn on their books.

The two banks’ CDS hit their highest levels since 2003 yesterday. JPMorgan’s CDS was at 75bp, an increase of 25bp on the day, according to data from broker Phoenix Partners Group.

The bank is Wall Street’s biggest underwriter of leveraged loans, according to Bloomberg data, and its cost of protection in CDS markets has tripled in the past five weeks.

Meanwhile, Goldman’s CDS jumped as much as 18bp to 85bp.

However, one of the worst hit is Bear Stearns, the largest US underwriter of mortgage-backed bonds, which saw its CDS rise to 105bp from 83.50bp on Wednesday. This is five times the level seen at the beginning of this year, and the highest of any bank on the Street.

Most of these banks have also seen their stock prices stumble. Bear is down 23 per cent this year after falling another 3.7 per cent to $124.49 on Thursday. JPMorgan is down 8.5 per cent and Lehman 16 per cent.

The S&P investment bank index tumbled 3.7 per cent on Thursday and is down 9.1 per cent in 2007.

Another barometer of bank stress and a leading indicator for credit market weakness is the interest rate swaps market, which is now at the widest levels over US Treasury yields since February 2002.

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Wednesday, July 04, 2007

Building Homes in Florida --- a nightmare

Building in Cape Coral a Homebuilders Perspective

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Where do I begin with this mess?
We are homebuilders in the cape, and cannot believe what is going on out there. The general public and Florida lawmakers need to be aware of this situation.
If you drive around the cape and see alot of unfinished homes, have you ever wondered how that transpired? Well, let me tell you!
Situation #1 Customer comes into the builders office and wants to sign up for a home. Customer signs on the dotted line, gets there loan.....sometimes the bank is on the NOC/sometimes not! The price of the home is divided into 5 draws. Builder gets a deposit draw does work, then gets another draw.
Builders are having subs do work, getting draws, and then not paying subs.
Subs file liens, title co does not do title updates, builder gets other subs to finish trimouts etc. Builder gets another draw. Now the builder is 75% done with the home. Builder has profited (example 350k home w/out lot price in there)
$280k builder maybe paid for some earlier subs work, say concrete and site work 40k
builder now has $240k in his pocket. Bank isn't aware, homeowner has gotten
a few nto, but builder says its standard proceedure, that bill was paid etc.
Now bank has a title update! Bank says no more draws....there are liens out there. Customer wonders why there is not activity on there home, now that
there interest payments are getting larger based upon amount borrowed.Bank does not relay no draws to builder to homeowner. Homeowner has never built before and isn't sure of building time frame.
Builder then decides to exit. The property has 140k of liens to subs,
some subs didn't file nto/per builder request? and the property is 70k away from being completed. Now a new builder tries to complete it.
plus the liens have to be contested , paid, or neg. The new builder goes out to bid.
New builder checks property and the soffit panels are missing for scrap metal
$500, The a/c copper lines have been cut $500, a couple cabinets are gone
$300 and the pocket sliders have been ripped out taken into a bedroom and the glass broken out and the frames and used for scrap metal. with a rock, (that the vandals just left on the floor, with the broken glass) a bathrom door is missing $50.
Why aren't the police checking for "new metal slider frames: at scrap yards?
There are areas with 200 properties that are going through this right now!
The builder comes in with a price of say 85k to finish.
Bank has 70k draw money left, new builders bill is 85k to handle the mess, and warranty work that has been done by numerous subs he didn't know, and
several subs doing electrical, in some cases three companies completing one house's wiring.
So at the end of the day, the homeowner has a lot he bought for 100k,
had a builder build a 350k home on it. So instead of the homeowner having a 450k dream home, this is what he has........

a lot for 100k
a home 75% complete
a home with 140k liens on title
a new builder who will finish for 85k
draw money left in loan 70k
amount buyer must come up with to finish home 15k
liens contested, some stay,some go away
to leave a balance of 90k

Now builder has helped client get everything on track, homeowner borrowing against his personal credit lines to pay liens and come up with the shortfall
of what is needed to complete construction.
Now bank says"the borrower has gone over the aloted time for construction,
now we have to protect ourselves, and at our discretion, we will need a new appraisal and will requalify borrower for the loan. If the home does not appraise for the loan amount, we will need to put that borrower in default".
That came from a bank that has written loads of loans in cape coral.
The market has taken a nose dive, the homeowners lot has gone down say half of its value,.....mr banker, I can tell you now, that it will not appraise for what it did a year ago!
So what does this homeowner do?
He has a home that he double paid for on some subs work.
Essentially he has a home that has cost him 100k lot
350k const 90k liens 15k to finish over draws left=$555k home and lot
that will appraise in todays market at about $370k
So he is upside down $185k, instead of the 80k in todays market.

So the cape has hundreds of these homes scattered around from other builders doing the same thing, leaving the homeowners in a bad situation.
Where is the previous builder? Well he is still building! By the way, he built
a mini mansion for himself and didn't pay subs on that either......but his home got a CO, where as the (9) homeowners we are working with didn't get their CO, just problems. Plus he has the cash from the draws.
This needs to stop!!!!
This is the atmosphere in the cape-
Hundreds of half finished houses, hundreds of empty new houses just sitting vacant, 19k homes for sale oin lee county. Eight hundred forclosures last month.
When I drive around the cape north of veterans, and see all this, like the lady I saw struggling to put out the last of her belongings , she couldn't take with her.....(she was probably losing her home) it gives you an earie feeling that
I have never experienced in my life before.
Ps, another builder who did this has started a new company in the cape, and a bank just loaned him over a million to build his personal home!
After checking more closely on this one, he changed his first name on his license to the state, but forgot, and put the first name he used on his old license on the NOC of
his new mansion being built.
This builder left his homebuyers in forclosure, didn't finish homes, we could not even help them!
They only had home loans for the under 200k range.
What is this ............people are getting two loans and one closing to avoid the pmi insurance. That insurance is so if the homeowner defauts there is something for the bank to fall back on to resell the property.
Ps, even the million dollar loan has this. Who is allowing this behavior.
I like cape coral, but all of this is wearing on us, and it leaves us wondering
what is coming down the road. What happens when the lenders go under?
Helping these people move forward is somewhat rewarding, with alot of
problems at every turn most loans take 2-3 months each to get on track. My emaillog is the thickness of a phonebook!
It is very frustrating when the lender gives you the title co name, and they are out of business, and then you go through three more to finally get the
one who is still in business, and they are handling the work from 3 out of business locations so it takes weeks to get anywhere.
We called a homeowner last week to give them a heads up about ther home
with liens and that they might want to look into it. We told them they are so far under we cannot help them, they stated that it is under control.
Some builders advertise a cheap price and rob peter to pay paul.
As long as new deals are signed they can go on for a very long time, until
no new deals are signed, then someone is left holding the ball.
We can have a sign telling homeowners that we can build there home for
100k, but after the builder starts nearing the end of the job and the house costs
150k to build, as long as the builder signs new deals and subs are floated
payment it won't catch up until new deals are not signed.
Each deal I have worked, the identical home has ranged in price(construction price only) same areas of town, same options,and time frames 20-30k.
What does this tell you? Someone was building for cash flow only.
Maybe with a home builder in high places, this will all change.
P.S. These homeowner are too distraught with what has happened to them they never file anything against the builders.
Some I have worked with are on their 2nd or 3rd builder on one house!!!

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Monday, July 02, 2007

Does It All Add Up?

Nope...

By Saskia Scholtes and Gillian Tett
Financial Times, London
Thursday, June 28, 2007

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d5f91f6e-2513-11dc-bf47-000b5df10621.html

As head of the financial stability unit at the Banque de France, Imene Rahmouni-Rousseau travelled to America this month to look at the current turmoil in the US subprime mortgage world.

Although initially that had seemed an all-American saga, Rahmouni suspected that French and other European investors also held assets linked to subprime securities. So on behalf of her central bank she wanted to assess the risks.

What she discovered surprised her. There was little confidence about how to value the holdings. "Pricing data are difficult to obtain," she says.

It is a discovery being shared by numerous other policymakers and investors around the world as the fallout widens from a subprime lending boom, in which US banks provided vast amounts in home loans to financially stretched borrowers who put little money down and gave no proof of income. Among the casualties have been two hedge funds run by Bear Stearns, the Wall Street investment bank.

Until recently, when late payments and defaults on these mortgages spiked higher, the problem drew little attention. This was because, through the magic of so-called structured finance, risky assets such as subprime mortgages could be packaged into attractive investment products.

These elaborately constructed securities, called collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), are designed to yield juicy returns while also carrying high credit ratings. They have proved popular with hedge funds as well as with longer-term investors such as pension funds and insurance companies, many of which have bought billions of dollars of such securities in recent years, thus providing the liquidity that was then channelled into mortgage loans.

But heavy losses incurred at the two Bear Stearns hedge funds as a result of such financial haute couture have prompted fears that the CDO emperor may turn out to have no clothes. Such a revelation could threaten the value of investor portfolios around the globe -- not just in the mortgage sector but in the way many sorts of company fund themselves.

This is because unlike stocks listed on an exchange or US Treasury bonds, CDOs are rarely traded. Indeed, a distinct irony of the 21st-century financial world is that, while many bankers hail them as the epitome of modern capitalism, many of these newfangled instruments have never been priced through market trading.

Instead, products such as CDOs, which are designed to be held until they mature, have often been valued in investor portfolios or on the books of investment banks according to complex mathematical models and other non-market techniques. In addition, fund managers and bankers often have broad discretion as to what kind of model they use -- and thus what value is attached to their assets.

So when Wall Street creditors last week threatened fire sales of CDOs seized from the stricken Bear Stearns funds, thus creating a market price for them for the first time, they also threatened to create a wider shock for the system. Fire sales rarely realise anything close to the previously expected value of assets. But if these deals went ahead, they would provide a legitimate trading level that would challenge current portfolio valuations.

In the event, Bear Stearns' creditors sold only a fraction of the assets put up for auction. Market participants suggest that this was in part because bids fell far below expectations, with traders increasingly reluctant to take on CDOs tainted with subprime exposure. But the crisis at Bear's funds has left investors, brokers, and regulators asking an uncomfortable question: Can the pricing models that have provided the foundations for this new financial edifice really be trusted? Or will valuations turn out to be over-optimistic and result in further investor losses?

"Investors are slightly more cautious, becoming more picky and asking more questions," says Michael Ridley, co-head of high-grade debt capital markets at JPMorgan. "They want us to lift the lid off the box a bit more."

To an extent, the valuation problem for CDOs reflects the fact that the frenetic pace of innovation seen in the financial industry this decade has outpaced the development of its infrastructure. It has often been the case that when new instruments emerge in the banking world, the market is initially quite illiquid, meaning that the level of trading is low. But the murky nature of new products has rarely had broad systemic implications, because they have typically occupied a small niche.

What makes the CDO sector unusual is that it has exploded at such a breakneck pace with bankers packaging bonds, loans, and other debts into ever more complex structures. Last year alone, about $1,000 billion (£500 billion, E745 billion) in cash and derivatives CDOs was issued in Europe and the US, according to data from the Bank for International Settlements. More than one-third was composed of asset-backed securities, often including low-grade mortgages.

As this explosion has occurred, some corners of this universe have already become relatively widely traded and transparent. Every day in the London and New York markets, for example, billions of dollars worth of deals are struck involving indices of derivatives on well-known corporate bonds -- making it easy to obtain prices.

However, many other such products are created by bankers directly with their clients and then simply left to sit on the books of an investor. Since such instruments typically last three to five years -- and the CDO boom is so recent -- many have not come to the end of their life. Nor have they been traded. Christopher Whalen of Institutional Risk Analytics, a consultancy, says: "The lack of a publicly quoted market for CDOs and like assets is exacerbating the liquidity problems for these assets beyond the underlying economics, for example, in subprime real estate."

To compensate, investment institutions and banks use a variety of techniques to assign a value to these instruments in their accounts. In some areas, third-party data groups exist that can offer price estimates. However, the pace of innovation is so intense that it is hard for these providers to keep up with all corners of the market. So in many cases, investors are turning to alternative techniques to create prices. One tactic used by hedge funds entails asking several brokers for price quotes and taking an average. Results vary -- not least because dealer banks may hold positions in these instruments themselves.

"It is very easy for hedge funds to shop around to find valuations that suit them best and then book their assets at that," says one banker who advises hedge funds. "Going back to the bank that sold you a CDO and asking for a price is rarely likely to produce an accurate picture."

Another approach is to estimate valuations based on the ratings the instruments receive from credit rating agencies. Yet this does not offer a fail-safe valuation method either. The rating agencies have been downgrading bonds backed by subprime mortgages in recent weeks but critics say they have been slow to act and face difficulties in analysing the market.

Christian Stracke, analyst at CreditSights, a research company, says: "With so little truly relevant historical data on the behaviour of subprime mortgages, and with such massive structural changes having occurred in the mortgage landscape in recent years, any time-series analysis approach is little more than a not-so-educated guess."

Moreover, while ratings attempt guidance on the chance of default, they offer no indication of how market prices could behave -- as the rating agencies stress. As the BIS noted in its annual report this week, ratings reflect expected credit losses rather than the "unusually high probability" of events that "could have large effects on market values."

That means that on the rare occasions that instruments are traded, a large gap can suddenly emerge between the market price and its book value. This week Queen's Walk Fund, a London hedge fund, admitted it had been forced to write down the value of its US subprime securities by almost 50 per cent in just a few months. That was because, when it was forced to sell them, the price achieved was far lower than the value created with the models the fund had previously used -- which had been supplemented with brokers' quotes.

But unless circumstances arise that force a market trade, valuations often remain at the investment managers' discretion. While managers say they strive to assign honest values, these are often difficult for an outside accountant to verify, since the techniques used are invariably highly complex.

Moreover, incentives do not always encourage fair valuations: for example, hedge fund managers are typically paid a percentage of the profits they book, giving them a vested interest in reporting a high asset valuation. At best, this means that the valuations of CDOs, for example, may often lag behind any swings in broader asset classes; at worst, this ambiguity may enable hedge fund managers or investment bankers to keep posting profits -- even when markets fall.

But Amitabh Arora, head of interest rate strategies at Lehman Brothers, points to a further potential impact from the Bear Stearns upheaval. "The bigger risk now is that it calls into question CDOs as a financing vehicle in the corporate credit market. I think in the next six to 12 months we will see a significant reassessment of CDOs as a financial vehicle not just in the subprime world but the corporate world too."

Adil Abdulali, a risk manager at Protege Partners, a fund of funds, recently studied the performance of hedge funds and discovered clear statistical indications that they tend to stage-manage their earnings when they trade illiquid instruments. "Conservatively, 30 per cent of funds trading illiquid securities smooth their returns," says Mr. Abdulali.

Some bankers and policymakers argue that this is simply a teething problem that will fade as structured finance becomes more mature. History suggests that most opaque, illiquid markets eventually become more transparent when they grow large enough -- and behind the scenes, the Bear Stearns hedge fund problems are prompting bankers and investment managers to re-examine their valuation techniques. "We are getting a lot of calls from worried people," says one third-party data provider.

However, history also shows that large-scale structural dislocations -- such as a serious mispricing of assets -- are rarely corrected in an orderly manner. Thus the big risk now is that if thousands of banks and investment groups suddenly have to slash the value of the securities they hold, the wave of accounting losses might at best leave investors wary of purchasing all manner of complex financial instruments. At worst, it could trigger more distressed sales and a broader repricing of financial assets, not just in the subprime sector but in other illiquid markets too.

"If every CDO was forced to mark to market their subprime holdings, it would be. ... Well, I can't think of a strong enough word to describe what it would be," confesses a US policymaker.

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Tuesday, June 19, 2007

Got to agree with Edmund here..

Edmund M. McCarthy is President and CEO of Financial Risk Management Advisors Company. This piece was originally published in his newsletter.
Prudent Bear
Five Years Of Supposed Prosperity! Cost? Possibly The End Of About A Century Of Hegemony Inducing Growth?

China buys a piece of Blackstone, a company being perhaps the ultimate in capitalistic finance. When the Yellow Peril/Communists start buying the private equity players, something has certainly changed. Not too long after the gang in Beijing joined the rush to have their investments complemented by participation in leveraged buyout players, global interest rates started a significant climb. Coincidence? Time will tell but there has to be a suspicion that there is some congruity.

If you are a Kudlow and Co. disciple, the natural reaction is to continue to embrace “goldilocks” and utter or mutter, the old Mad comic’s character, Alfred E. Neuman’s” phrase, “What! Me Worry?”

If ridiculously Big numbers, comprising monstrous aggregations of capital/liquidity alarm you, the new acronym, SWF or Sovereign Wealth Funds comes very much to mind. Global reserve assets, including the pitiful $78 billion in the U.S., now total (Another Monstrous number), about $5.4 TRILLION. Of that total, approximately $2.5 Trillion are in or headed for one of these SWF creations. The purpose of having such an instrument for the sovereign creator is to enhance return on the pile. This isn’t done by continuing to sit in U.S. Treasuries where the return has been denuded by the crowded trade already in there with you.

We had the dotcom/telecom etc. bubble succeeded by the GSE induced residential bubble, succeeded by the structured finance/financial engineering residential bubble, succeeded by the CRE/financial engineering bubble, succeeded by the private equity/leveraged buyout/return of the conglomerateurs/no covenant, no guarantee bubble, and they were all looking a bit exhausted. Are we now to witness the SWF buys all of the foregoing bubble? Since the total amount of reserves available for growth and movement into these SWF’s is more or less the annual amount of the United States Current Account Deficit of $1 Trillion, on top of the aforementioned $2.5 Trillion approximately already thrown in, this could be an incredible self-sustaining bubble if only viewed from the aspect of resources and liquidity. In some of the more obscure financial publications, there has recently been some cognizance of this possibility. All this in aid of finding the next bubble since our past thoughts that we would run out of big enough new bubbles to keep the game humming have obviously been in error. It is also worthy of note that a requisite of a successor bubble is to have resource and leverage sufficient to equal or exceed its fading predecessor. Also, for the last five years or so, beneficent interest rates globally have been, at a minimum, a strong aid, perhaps an inherent necessity to this leverage addicted wealth creation methodology.

Most of the liquidity/inflation generated by the massive $1 Trillion+ U.S. annual foreign deficit has, so far, been channeled into: first U.S. Treasuries and Agencies, and then corporate or other debt, with the local currency generated to purchase the $ going, until recently, into residential or commercial real estate and/or local equity markets. Neither the ROW (Rest of the World as it is called in the Federal Reserve Z1 report), nor the bubble blower (The United States) has had terribly painful domestic inflation at the consumer level. In fact, asset inflation in houses and investment indexes has been a pleasant trend for all of these nations.

As the ability to extend asset inflation bubbles reaches or exceeds market possibility, the inflation increasingly spills over into the more visible parts of the consumption economy. Central banks are increasingly forced to recognize the Hydra-headed monster they have accommodated, and raise rates/tighten liquidity. Some such as Kuwait and Syria have been so extreme as to sever their link to the $. New Zealand shocked the markets with an 8% short term rate. Euro rates and other global rates are up and/or rising and, it can be argued, are pushing up U.S. rates concomitantly. This is the counter force that we would argue will constrain the potential glee in the markets in anticipation of the Petro states, and The BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) nations, as well as reserve rich others, such as Korea, Taiwan, maybe even Japan, from all buying their very own Blackstones. Obviously, should they be such buyers, with the leverage the Blackstone’s can employ, the limits to an SWF bubble are imponderable but truly immense.

Another restraint to this emerging new global bubble is the question of to whom do these reserve rich players sell their enormous holdings of U.S.$ Treasuries and Agencies, purchased, at the best, at breakeven yields today, with much of the portfolio surely underwater with Greenspan rates in effect for many of the last five years.

With the U.S creating well over a $Trillion of new sovereign paper in recent years, obligating the buyers thereof to create the equivalent in local currency and find a home for the dollars bought, the merry-go-round has been continuously working with the recycling of those dollars back into the sovereign or near sovereign (Agencies) debt of the U.S. There was thus a natural purchaser as the dollars issued by the U.S. Treasury. The SWF’s can be a disturbance on the merry-go-round as they look for Yale Endowment yields.

Yet another potential problem for those embracing “goldilocks” (Particularly for those surveying the global scene from behind the diaphanous blur of the United States knowledge screen) is the perhaps invidious state of the longstanding global reserve currency, the United States $. For going on a century, Seigneurage privileges (globally accepted) have enabled the U.S. to print money to pay global debts. This is a rare historic privilege accorded few sovereign entities. Even more rare is the status accorded the currency on emergence from World War II; that of sole hegemonic issuer. More rare still was continuing global acceptance when “Guns and Butter” Nixonian policies severed the currency’s last link to outside control of issuance, the supposed redemption availability in bullion. Basically, at that point, the global reserve currency stands on “The full faith and credit” of the U.S. Government. We forswear politics in these ramblings but would not be surprised if “some of the people, some of the time” are not as completely convinced of the value of such full faith and credit.

After a series of successes from the 1987 dip onward at thwarting any economic downturn with lowered rates and tsunami’s of liquidity, the Fedheads really went to an extreme with their 1% interest rates more than 5 years ago, ushering in the most massive global debt bubble, arguably, in the history of mankind. This crescendo of debt permits the globe to have simultaneously expanding economies virtually everywhere, a couple of exceptions such as Lebanon and Zimbabwe out there to be noticed by the few still thinking that a debt culture must eventually be constrained. As noted above, deluging liquidity everywhere has enabled simultaneous global expansion, unusual phenomena in the history of mankind.

A couple of thoughts here. The U.S. expansion, driven by the Fed cuts, and largely centered in 1.Real estate of all varieties 2. Buy-out/M&A/Leveraged lending. 3. Financial Engineering/Structured Finance creation, distribution and fee administration and investment and 4. The massive expenditures on Defense related and Security related to prosecute the ever-expanding utilization of militant activities. The cuts of interest rates by the Fed bought this going. (Oh, we have forgotten the “saving” temporarily of such industries as “auto” with low interest rates.) There are signs of satiation and aggravating credit risk in the credit sensitive areas of these sectors. Oh, by the way, do any readers actually give credence to the Commerce Dept. consumer inflation statistics (If so, read John Williams’ “Shadow Government Statistics” to find the 10.2% REAL consumer inflation rate in the U.S.) In any event, the reported (not the nonsensical core) rates last week were demonstrating that lifestyle is being negatively impacted in the U.S. by dripover inflation.

The foreign central banks largely followed ours into the trough of rates. And their expansion started a little later. Asset inflation, as in the U.S., took over first. The two culprits in the U.S. stand out in the foreign markets: residential real estate and equity markets.

Nevertheless, the inevitable occurs; housing bubbles, affordability problems, equity bubbles that produce P/E’s that are untoward and, finally, lifestyle inflation that impinges on the central banks. As an example, the ECB, a central bank that actually has an inflation containment mandate in its constitution, is raising rates and warning of probable necessity to do more. A rising rate currency looks attractive to a stable one, possibly accounting for some $ defection in the recent past.

I met a young entrepreneur who opened and expanded a bikini factory in Brazil some years ago. The enterprise was/is a success, however, the climbing real is rendering him non-competitive. His solution: sell out to one or another of the private equity guys currently soliciting and go into the wealth management business. Such examples and the potential consequences are seldom seen in the U.S. media.

The Belief In Our Own Worldview Is Our Own Most Powerful Intellectual Imperative!

Here we hearken back to what we believe to be the consensus “worldview” in the U.S.; most particularly in the financial sectors thereof. Obviously not universal and imbued with the author’s prejudices, a construct thereof follows:

The U.S. economy is emerging from a “soft” landing. Although occasioned by the residential bubble in significant part, particularly sub-prime, that area is contained without widespread contagion and employment, production, efficiencies through privatization, growing exports and technological breakthroughs will lead to a new, burgeoning expansion.

Accompanying this renewal of “Goldilocks” seems to be a guiding belief that once out of the trough, another expansion similar to the pleasant 2002-2006 will follow as night follows day as has occurred for approximately 20 years.

This worldview, predicated on the Universal Empire the U. S. was at the beginning of the new millennia, is not a worldview shared by the ROW!
1. This 5-year period of prosperity, kicked off by the massively excessive Fed rate cuts and ensuing global liquidity started from a pitiful foreign reserve assets number globally (Much of which had been accumulated by Japan as it sought to recover from the bubble we taught them). The budget surpluses in the U.S. more than offset the then midget trade deficit, and the currency stood on a pinnacle. With the aforementioned exception of Japan and the inscrutable Swiss, the reserves and currencies of most of the rest of the world ranged from pitiful to disastrous. Argentina went on to a sovereign default and theft from creditors, Brazil devalued, Russia defaulted etc.,etc.

Five years later, the players have the aforementioned $5.4 Trillion in reserves and the U.S. currency is held aloft on generosity after an average fall in the 30% range. The domestic economy, driven by the afore-mentioned continuous bubble machines, has exhausted a debt laden U. S. consumer to continue to propel the machine. Foreclosures and defaults are hitting new records, not at the bottom of a recession but with record low unemployment rates. The only game still running at breakneck speed is the leveraged private equity play, still battening on low relative rates and tax advantages. The press of ROW, by and large, see and present this worldview in contrast to Bubblevision and Goldilocks.
2. We normally eschew the “It’s Different this time” approach as an exegesis for a thesis but find it necessary when confronted by the unprecedented.

Five years ago, the financial sector, both within the U.S. and globally, while having small entries into some of the following fields of risk and finance, was struggling to recover from the blows of the Asian debacle, the Russian default, 9/11 (although it actually served as an economic expansion ignition.), the 2000/2001 U.S. Recession and the afore-mentioned Latin imbroglios. True, the U.S. banking system had been hit by some, many or all of these, depending on the institution. Frankly, this opened the door for the previously intermediary giant Broker and Universal banks to vault into the new world of Financial Engineering/Structured Finance on a global basis.

Five years later, world finance has significantly and nearly totally changed. As an example, Fed NY Governor Corrigan only had to hit the rolodex for a dozen and a half names to suck up $4 Billion to stop the panic about LTCM. Today he admits that the number affected by a systemic event could go into very large numbers.

There really is no infrastructure in place to deal with a contagional systemic financial crisis! One has not yet occurred in the era of RMBS’S, ABS’S, CDO’S, CLO’S, SYNTHETIC CDO’, ‘S’S and the legions of forms of CDS’S and their progeny, CPDO’S, CPPS’S etc.

I recently looked at an 190 page report on this “market” which has enough other gibberish in it to confound any but the math ph’d’s who create, manipulate sell, buy and, occasionally run from this stuff. It is mindboggling. In previous efforts, we have described how BBB- securities can be transformed into 80% AAA. The weekend WSJ described how a fund of some of this stuff is coming unglued. One of the players, Merrill, has seized and is auctioning some of the collateral, impolitely screwing up “rescue” loans and other attempts to salvage. Mixed in will be some of the insurers, in front of the pension funds, endowments, foundations etc. presumably the ultimate owners of this smoldering wreck. Remember, we are at the beginning of the problem in residential real estate with still record unemployment! There is only some $7 Billion directly and peripherally mixed up in this Bear Stern’s directed vehicle, but it could serve as a eye-opening lesson as it burns on the way to sinking.

3. We mentioned the insurers above. At the beginning of the decade and in the early stages of the post 2000 downturn, these two entities guaranteed and/or absorbed into portfolios hundreds of billions per year in mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. Then it became apparent that the Financial results reported by these entities were suspect, that Management possessed less integrity and they were clueless as to the risks they were assuming. Investigations, Resignations and ability to provide limitless buying strength for the mortgage origination world disappeared!

The world of Financial Engineering/Structured Finance has largely operated without the two prior foremost liquidity providers, Fannie and Freddie, as they languished in Congressional hearings on their fraudulent or incompetent doings. They have recently re-emerged as large players as investigations came to a close, reparations were determined and some semblance of financial reporting was re-instated. The recent return of the yield curve to a positive slope has also been a tremendous help to these inveterate players of this type of curve with their Congress-given subsidy and their willingness to make noises about the alleviation of the Brokers sub-prime default and foreclosure-laden results to years of Financial Engineering/Structured Finance garbage.

In order to perform the legerdemain necessary to take less than investment grade and other slightly unsavory assets to the public type buyers described above, they had to throw in some sauce. This came, in the absence of the GSE’s from the private world of insurance, the AMBAC’s, MBIA’s, MGIC’s, RADIAN’s etc. Functioning in a not dissimilar way to the rating Agencies, these worthies would look a prospective issue over and then insure the higher rated tranches. Much like a GSE guarantee, such insurance would serve to make the issue palatable to the institutional buyer as all the due diligence necessary.

We were recently privileged to read an in depth credit review of the Insurer group with particular emphasis on the Ambac and MBIA numbers. We remember a scholarly look at MBIA a couple of years ago which would have given pause to thoughtful analysts except for coincidence with the Greenspan rush to Zero rate structure. The insurers have responded to slow times in the low rate environment by diving headlong into the Structured Finance world. The thing about insuring munis is that you either have taxing power (full faith and credit) or revenue generating capability (toll roads, airports) etc. It is not clear that these worthies fully understood that, in the absence of the appreciation which appeared to happen inevitably to houses in the immediate period in which they leapt headlong into insuring CDO’s composed of BBB- or equivalent to get them to AAA, that houses don’t mystically create debt service revenue, they eat it!

The leverage these critters have taken on historically may have been speculative when they were playing muni’s but it is outright outlandish in the game of Structured Finance. 900 to 1 leverage makes LTCM look cautious. Equity and Reserves are infinitesimal and not growing in proportion to the non-muni game they are playing.

The afore-mentioned analysis asks: “Who is holding the bag?” In the game, and points to the insurers. Since a 10% drop in house prices wipes out their equity, we agree with the analysis that they are too slender a reed to support the ratings they carry and that there is going to be tremendous disillusionment when the axe falls. We would then repeat the question, Who is holding the bag? The ultimate buyers of these things are the ultimate bag holders, pension funds, the equivalent of Orange Counties all over the country, university endowments trying to emulate Yale, maybe the Gates Foundation but certainly the foundation industry and others seeking the yield in alternative investments that will pay for their commitments.

Not to be forgotten are the latter day monopolists, the rating agencies, Moody’s S&P, Finch etc. Their revenue streams went ballistic when Wall Street created the Age Of Structured Finance. They get paid for rating. Isn’t there a conflict in here somewhere? In my days as a practicing credit guy, the watchword was that the rating agencies were a lagging indicator. I will never forget classifying a then fabled Texas bank substandard after a merger in the ‘80’s, only to have a giant argument with headquarters when Moody’s gave them a AA rating. They failed. Put all of this together and maybe this time it Is Different! Only not the kind of different I want to be a creditor of!

4. What else has happened while the United States happily built houses, bought cars and remodeled for the last five years as the Financial sector, particularly Wall Street emerged as the most significant earnings stream in the S&P? Well, going back to that word used before, “worldview,” the U.S. convinced itself that the most important problem internationally was something called “The War on Terror. Hey, I’m against terror too. I just think it’s necessary to know and be sure who it is we need to go to war with. We don’t seem to have done too good a job on that front. It has been expensive but not effective. In a different “worldview”, the costs might have been ascertained in advance. The swing from a Federal surplus to a deficit, the curtailment of a current account deficit before it headed into dangerous territory, the maintenance of a sound currency, the maintenance of world/global respect and, at least, reasonably cordial relations with sovereign states all have a value to be measured, before lost, in pursuit of consumption and the War On Terror.


During this semi decade, the ROW, on its proverbial back when we began this crusade, reinvigorated. A possible “worldview” NOW must encompass a China with $1.3 Trillion in reserves and an industrial/manufacturing base of unbelievable proportions. Courtesy of Chian Kai Shek, their WW2 leader, they sit on the Security Council and are in a position to permit Iran to become what it wishes. Five years ago would have been a more propitious time for being bellicose about Iran. On the same Council is a Russia with $400 Billion in reserves, risen from the defaulting dead.

I don’t know a thing about Putin’s “soul” but I do know he and his Administration are ex-KGB, jingoistic about their nation, loaded with petroleum and still a powerhouse in terms of weaponry. We probably could have bought the weapons five years ago with a fraction of the funds since gone in the aforementioned War and its counterpart, the War on Drugs.

Net net, in the opinion of the writer, there is a very real danger that our worldview for the last five years has risked a century long hegemony as the reserve currency nation as well as creating a Credit Bubble, largely Unregulated, that has expanded far beyond the worst nightmares of the writer. It is also our opinion, as a long time credit troglodyte, that this bubble is leaking air and is in danger of bursting. With no infrastructure to deal with the first truly global bubble, we have an interesting time in front of us.

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Monday, June 18, 2007

speculative credit excess

Bears' Chat - Welcome: "In a foreword to the report, Crispin Odey, CEO of Odey Asset Management, says: 'Not only does he [Chancellor] make a cogent and persuasive case that current trends are unsustainable, but his unique knowledge of the hinterland of previous periods of speculative credit excess also illuminates the range of potential outcomes...There is no question that financial markets are not priced for the sorts of risks that Chancellor identifies.'

Well, Chancellor's latest: Inefficient Market: Blackstone Letter, may indeed prove prescient. It was posted here earlier, and presents what to me is a plausible outcome to the financial madness so rampant today. Once again, the salient points:

'Looking back over this difficult period, most of our problems can be ascribed to deteriorating economic conditions; extraordinary convulsions in the credit markets; a worsening political and legal environment for the buyout industry; and the consequences of what is now commonly referred to as the 'private equity bubble.' I will briefly examine each of these issues in turn.'

1. The Macro-Economic Climate: When Blackstone came to the market in the summer of 2007, economic conditions were remarkably benign. Most economists agree that the decision by Congress to impose punitive tariffs on Chinese imports during the "

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